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Robert E. Hudect
Long before the current crisis triggered by the recent United States
initiatives in trade and monetary policy,' a crisis of quieter dimensions
was taking shape in GATT legal affairs.2 For some years now, the
GATT's code of detailed substantive obligations has been in failing
health. One source of the difficulty has simply been old age, for a
number of the rules written in 1947 have become unresponsive to
current attitudes and market conditions. A more basic problem, how-
ever, has been an increasing tendency among GATT participants to
question the utility of any detailed substantive rules. Many have
argued that the GATT would operate more effectively if it turned away
from rule-oriented regulation and tried instead to influence govern-
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1. The current crisis was triggered by President Nixon's announcement on August 15,
1971, that the United States would float the dollar, impose a ten per cent surdarge on
most imports, and consider legislation that would grant a ten per cent tax subsidy on
purchases of United States-produced capital goods. The measures were taken in the
context of a demand by the United States for a major realignment of world exchange
rates, coupled 'with demands for revision of defense arrangements and for a seemingly
unilateral reduction of trade barriers, the entire package to achieve a massive thirteen
billion dollar improvement in the current United States balance of payments position.
See N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1971, p. 14, col. I (city ed.) (text of President's announcement).
The measures have been reviewed in GATT, where a working party reportedly deter-
mined that the surcharge was improper under GATT rules, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1971,
at 12, col. 1.
2. GATT is an acronym for General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a multilateral
agreement promulgated in 1947 which contains a comprehensive set of substantive ob-
ligations and procedures relating to international trade policy. Oct. 50, 1947, 61 Stat.
pt. 5, at All (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
The Agreement has been modified in several respects since 1947. The current authentic
text is published in 4 GAIT, BAsIc 1N'sfuMENTS AND SELEcrTED DocuMwrs (19)
[the series of volumes and supplements is hereinafter cited as GATT, BISDI. The acronym
is also used to describe the institution which, though without formal United Nations
status, has grown up to service the Agreement and to furnish a variety of organizational
services in related areas. More often than not, the acronym is used to describe both
Agreement and institution as a single entity.
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ment trade policy by means of nondirective consultative procedures.
As long as the GATT code seemed to be working, arguments of this
kind were usually regarded as a healthy counterbalance to "legalistic"
tendencies. As various rules have become outdated, however, these
arguments have come to have a much more important effect on GATT
regulatory practice, supporting a growing tendency to put the old rules
aside and to operate without any such rules at all. The accumulation of
these responses has gradually been forcing the GATT to abandon the
kind of legal system represented by its detailed rules, and has raised the
possibility that GATT itself might one day be abandoned in favor of
another institution more in keeping with the current taste for non-
directive consultations. A United States proposal in June of this year
to establish a new forum for trade policy discussion under the aegis of
the OECD made this latter possibility seem not at all remote.3
The current crisis has quite naturally pushed these questions of
GATT legal structure into the background, for governments are now
confronted with a challenge to the very premise of economic coopera.
tion. If a major breakdown can be avoided, however, it will not
be long before these earlier questions are returned to the agenda, for
the one certain effect of the current crisis, once the dust settles, will be a
greatly intensified search for ways of improving the structure and con-
tent of international economic institutions.4 Whatever happens to
GATT itself in the subsequent reexamination, the issues raised by the
3. See N.Y. Times, June 7, 1971, at I, col. 3 (city ed.). The OECD (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development) is the successor to the Organization for Euro pCan
Economic Cooperation, the institution formed to administer the Marshall Pla and reat ed
programs. Its membership is presently confined to the nations of Europe ind North
America, and Japan. The OECD serves as a forum for study and discussion of a wide
range of economic problems, and has been used in recent years as a developed country
caucus on issues such as the proposal to grant tariff preferences to developing countries,
discussed pp. 1348, 1360 infra.
As explained publicly, the United States proposal remains unclear as to the precise role
envisioned for the OECD vis-5-vis GATT. It may be noted, however, that the proposal
comes at a time of increasingly frequent public statements suggesting that GATT as It
now stands is outdated. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, May 1971, at 9 (speech by
President of EEC Commission); STAFF OF SENATE COMM. oN FINANCE, 91ST CoNa., 2o Sss,,
ANALYsIs OF CERTAIN ISSUES RAISED BY THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAPRIFFS AND TXAVI
3, 9-10 (Comm. Print 1970). A similar question is raised in a recent study of GATT by one
of its most knowledgeable veterans. J. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE
POLICY: Tur TwiLIG T OF THE GATT? 318-27 (1971).
4. Some evidence of this tendency is the recent release, without comment, of the
recommendations of the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment.
The recommendations, drafted before the present crisis, call for new and comprehensive
negotiations on the subject matter of the General Agreement, recommending specifically
an effort to develop new rules on matters such as export subsidies and government pro.
curement preferences for domestic producers. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1971, at 24, col, 8
(city ed.) (text of summary).
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long-standing debate over the role of GATT substantive rules will
have to be confronted wherever international trade policy is considered.
The present article examines that earlier debate. It was written be-
fore the current crisis erupted. Upon reviewing it again in light of
more recent events, I have concluded that, except for an eerie sense
of tranquility, the analysis and recommendations seem as valid now
as they did when written.5 The article is offered, therefore, as a pre-
crisis examination of an issue that should occupy an important place
in the post-crisis period.
The central problem to be discussed is the role, if any, that detailed
substantive rules can play in current international trade policy. The
particular focus or target of the article is the growing criticism of such
rules mentioned above. Partly for ease of reference (but mainly, I con-
fess, to weight the scales a little), I have chosen to characterize that
criticism as though it were a proposal for an alternative institution,
called GABB,6 that would operate without any substantive rules. The
issue, of course, is not an all-or-nothing choice between GATT and
GABB, for it is unlikely that either point of view would be carried to
absolute extremes in practice. But the issue is of that general dimension.
Unless governments decide, fairly soon, to make a major effort to save
the old GATT code, the pressures of a changing world will leave no
choice but to commit the major part of GATT's work to GABB-type
procedures.
The article is divided into four parts. Part I examines the present
debate over the utility of GATT substantive rules, focusing particu-
larly on the analyses offered by Professors Dam and Jackson in their
recent books on GATT. The remainder of the article represents an
effort to carry that debate further. Part II seeks to examine in some
detail the particular ways in which, assuming a certain minimal
5. The monetary adjustments which are likely to follow the present crisis will not
change any of the major assumptions on which the article rests. I had assumed the
existence of a minimally viable monetary structure as a background to the trade policy
questions. The sudden international consensus that the dollar was overvalued prior to
August 15 now shows that there were more problems than I had supposed in this regard.
The effect of any adjustments, therefore, will be to support tEi original assumption. It
might also be noted here that the observations made later in this article relating to tie
evident upswing of protectionism in the United States, see pp. 1351-52 infra, were based
on reactions attributable, at least in part, to the pressures of monetary disequilibrium.
I believe, however, that the problem of grouing protectionism is based on more funda-
mental changes in the competitive relationship between the United States and other
major economies, and that unless the outcome of monetary readjustment is inconceivably
favorable to the United States the basic pressures will continue to exist.
6. The name GABB, for General Agreement on Better Bargaining, should not be con-
fused with GAB, the International Monetary Fund's General Arrangements to Borrow,
in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF), SELECTED DECisIONS OF THE FxECUTIVE DIRECTOM
AND SELECrED DocumENTs 56, 66 (3d issue 1965).
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consensus, the presence of detailed substantive rules can influence
government behavior in the area of international trade policy. Part
III explores the conditions which have in fact prevailed in the GATT's
legal experience to date, attempting to trace those factors which seem to
account for its early successes and its more recent failings. Part IV then
discusses, in light of this analysis, several proposals concerning the
possible future revision of the GATT legal structure.
The article offers several conclusions, general and specific. As a
general proposition, I believe that detailed substantive rules can exert
a potentially important influence on the way that trade policy decisions
are made, and that consequently there should be a bias in favor of
trying to maintain such rules. In each specific context, however, there
is the further question of whether a sufficient consensus exists to permit
such rules to be written and supported. I would argue that the experi.
ence of the early GATT demonstrates that a fairly durable consensus
is at least possible. Whether such a consensus exists today is a much
closer question, one that can only be answered by an effort at renegotia-
tion. I believe, however, that an examination of the particular substan-
tive and political factors which account for the present malaise will
show that there are grounds for attempting such a renegotiation, at least
in the key area of developed country industrial trade. Finally, assuming
this to be so, I believe several specific changes in the GATT's present
legal structure would improve the chances of success if such a renego-
tiation were undertaken.
I. The Current Debate
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was part of a larger
postwar effort to restructure international trade along lines that would
prevent a recurrence of the autarkic policies that had plagued the
1930s.7 Its legal form was greatly influenced by the lesson government
officials had drawn from the repeated failures of the broadly-worded
international agreements negotiated during the prewar period,
7. The text of the General Agreement was drawn from a draft of the Comntcrclid
Policy chapter of the Charter for an International Trade Organization, better known as
the Havana Charter or ITO Charter. The ITO was to have been the twin of the
International Monetary Fund, a specialized agency of the United Nations dealing with
the non-monetary side of economic affairs-trade, economic development, commodity
agreements, restrictive business practices and employment policy. For the final text of
the ITO Charter, see U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948), or ICITO/1/4 (1948). The ITO
Charter was never ratified. On the reasons for failure, see W. DimOL, Tut END o1? T. ITO
(Princeton Essays in Int'l Finance, No. 16, 1952).
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the pious hopes expressed in a thousand and one economic con-
ferences that "a fair and equitable international distribution of
commodities" would come into bein.....
This time, instead of pious hopes, the draftsmen set out to write de-
tailed rules that would leave no doubt about the trade practices
governments were expected to follow. The level of tariffs was to be
negotiable and subject to legally binding commitments. Most other
forms of trade restriction, to be identified in precise detail, would be
prohibited, with exceptions to be circumscribed by carefully-drawn
criteria. Though a good deal of compromise crept in, the final text
of the agreement was basically faithful to this design.0
The current debate about the effectiveness of detailed substantive
rules takes place, naturally enough, against the background of what has
actually happened to the GATT code in practice. GATT legal history
provides each side with a demonstration of its case. In the first decade,
roughly 1948-58, the GATT code seemed to work reasonably well.
The GATT developed a series of dispute-settlement tribunals, eventu-
ally a third-party Panel on Complaints, which succeeded in disposing
of over fifteen cases during this period, full judicial opinions and all. 0
8. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, objecting to a particularly flaccid draft of
the Atlantic Charter's economic policy statement on the ground that it resembled too
much the prewar agreements, quoted in R. GARDNER, STr.INc-DoLLat DIPOMcY 43
(2d ed. 1969). See generally id. at 104; LEAGuE oF NATioNS, COMMERtCIAL PoLICY IN 'm
ITERWAR YEARs: INTERNATIONAL PROPOSALS AND NATIONAL POLICES 162-64 (1942).
9. The textual complexity of the GATT code is legendary. Every commentator has a
favorite demonstration, to wit:
Mr. BROWN [speaking of GATT Article XI]. Sir, this is boilerplate language which
has come up through the years. And, as you know, they get encrusted in traditional
form.
Senator MILLIKIN. If you just take it as a matter of grammar-
Mr. BROWN. Please don't do that, Senator.
Hearings on HR. 1211 Before the Senate Finance Committee, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1219
(1949) (the "Brown-Millikin debate'). As the quotation indicates, the postwar agreements
drew on considerable prewar drafting experience. Contrary to the appearance of the
prewar multilateral agreements themselves, the multilateral conferences of the time had
produced a good deal of detailed drafting that was simply never used. See, e.g., Recom-
mendations of the Economic Committee Relating to Tariff Policy and WFN, LEAcU oF
NATIONs Doc. E.805,1935.I.B.1. See generally LEAGUE OF NATIONS, supra note 5, at 33-34,
38-40. The drafting was used in a number of bilateral trade agreements, and the GATT
text drew heavily from them, particularly from the standard United States bilateral
trade agreement. See W. A. BRowN, THE UNrrED STATES AND Tm REsTORAION OF W'ORLD
T.ADE 20-21 (1950).
10. The tribunal function evolved cautiously. At first, legal issues were resolved in
plenary session by vote of the Contracting Parties themselves or by "rulings" from the
Chair. Later, such disputes were referred to "working parties," ad hoc negotiating
groups consisting of the interested parties and a few neutrals. Some early working es
experimented with third-party rulings, and eventually, in 1952, third-part), "panels' w" -"ere
adopted formally as the dispute-settlement device. GATT Doc. W.7/20 (1952). See generally
GATT Doc. L/392/Rev.J (1955) (Secretariat analysis of Panel procedure).
In only one case during this period did the Contracting Parties refuse to accept the
ruling of a tribunal. Appendix, Item A-I7. Disagreement or grumbing by the losing party
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(An Appendix to this article contains a table of all GATT complaints
from 1948-1970.) Although in many areas GATT obligations were not
prosecuted with quite such vigor, the rules continued to serve as a
framework for community supervision in those areas as well. For
example, formal "waivers" were generally required to excuse open
noncompliance, and some of the waivers were as demanding in ap-
pearance as the General Agreement itself."1
Since about 1960, the tone of GATT legal affairs has changed. One
still encounters occasional charges that one member or another is
violating the law, but etiquette now seems to dictate that such charges
not be pressed beyond the consultation stage. The practice of requesting
waivers when deviating from the Agreement has also become much
less fashionable. The overall incidence of noncompliance has increased
markedly, to the point where a number of the GATT's rules have now
been written off as simply inoperative.' 2
GATT participants tend to react to these developments in two ways,
Some feel that the demise of GATT "legalism" is regrettable, and that
GATT must somehow return to the attitudes of the first decade if it is
to function effectively. A somewhat larger group argues, to the con-
trary, that the present wave of "pragmatism" is actually the wisest and
most realistic way to conduct international trade relations. The legalist-
pragmatist debate has been part of the GATT landscape since the be-
ginning, the sort of tension one would expect to see in any rule-oriented
institution. As noted earlier, however, the significance of the debate
has changed considerably in recent years. Once a matter of balancing
"tendencies," the debate has become a matter of basic institutional de.
sign.
The legalist-pragmatist controversy has been examined in two recent
books about GATT law, Kenneth W. Dam's broad-ranging study of
was not uncommon. In four cases the losing party indicated it would not "accept"
the result, but in none of those cases was the end result significantly affected. Appendix,
Items A-2, A-5, A-6, A-20.
The only early case in which a tribunal was unable to reach a decision was the second
case involving Cuban Textile Restrictions. Appendix, Item A-4. Even after having estab-
lished what was probably GATT's first third-party "panel," the working party was unable
to resolve the factual dispute in issue.
More recently, a panel declined to rule on the legality of the EEC's variable levy
system for agriculture. Appendix, Item A-24.
For a further discussion of the GATT disputes procedure, see pp. 1337-45, 1370-71 inira.
11. For a further discussion of waivers and other practices during this period, see
pp. 1337-398 infra.
12. For further discussion of current practice, see pp. 1343-46 infra. An examination
of the GATT cases listed in the Appendix, and particularly their dates, is also of some
interest. For discussion of the key substantive areas threatened by breakdown, see pp. 1046-
64 infra.
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GATT law, institutions, and commercial policy problems, 3 and John
H. Jackson's longer and more systematic treatise covering all aspects
of the GATT legal structure.14 Though neither Dam nor Jackson
wishes to join one camp or the other, their analyses and criticisms of
the debate offer several insights into the assumptions and concerns on
which the opposing viewpoints rest.
Professor Dam is generally critical of the detailed code approach
taken in drafting the General Agreement. His criticisms vary. Some
are directed only to the substance of the rules. Others bear a strong
resemblance to the more sweeping GABB-type arguments advanced
by the current school of GATT pragmatists. Dam's opening chapter
outlines the main theme from which both kinds of criticism seem to
flow. He charges that the drafting of the General Agreement was domi-
nated by a certain type of "legalism,"
an approach to the drafting of international agreements under
which draftsmen attempt to foresee all of the problems that may
arise in a particular area (such as, let us say, the elimination of
quantitative restrictions) and to write down highly detailed rules
in order to eliminate to the greatest extent possible any disputes,
or even any doubts, about the rights and obligations of each agree-
ing party under all future circumstances.";
This legalism, he goes on to say, rested on a "naive" view of law, for
it tended to view law as substance-substantive rules.
Law is not solely, or even primarily, a set of substantive rules. It
is also a set of procedures, adapted to the subject matter and de-
signed to resolve disputes that cannot be foreseen at the moment
when those procedures are established. Perhaps more important
than settling disputes, law viewed as procedures and process serves
to identify the common interest in complex situations and to for-
mulate short-term policies for the achievement of long-term
objectives.
Part of the history of GATT is in fact a movement away from
the naive view of law that held sway for many years and toward
an interest in procedures. The legalists found that substantive
rules requiring the abolition of trade barriers did not make much
13. K. Dr, TrE GATT-LAw AND INTERNATIONAL EcoNosnc 0RcAzArznoN (1970),
reviewed by Ehrlich, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955 (1970), and Fulda, 69 AfMcit. L. RL. 783 (1971).
14. J. JAcrSON, WoRLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969), reviewed by Hudec, 5
J. WoP. TRADE L 365 (1971), Evans, 71 COLUM. L. Rzv. 185 (1971) and Fulda, 69 Micu.
L. REv. 783 (1971).
15. DAm, supra note 13, at 4.
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difference, and the pragmatists found that good will and ingenuity
could achieve little in the way of reducing trade barriers and
promoting international trade unless those qualities were accom-
panied by procedures for identifying the underlying economic
problems that made barriers inevitable, for promoting stated
multilateral moves toward the liberalization of trade barriers
where it was difficult for any one contracting party to move alone,
and for providing governments with a mechanism or an excuse to
do that which they wanted to do but were unable to do because
of domestic pressure.16
Later portions of Dam's book develop both the narrower and broader
criticisms of GATT "legalism" suggested in these opening observa-
tions. The narrower criticism emerges in the form of an argument that
many of the GATT's present rules err in addressing themselves to form
rather than substance-the level of a tariff, for example, rather than
its real trade effects. Dam sometimes proposes new substantive rules,
stated in terms of actual trade effects, to meet the problem.'7 The
broader criticism of substantive rules themselves comes out less clearly,
the main thrust seeming to be a recurrent skepticism about the impact
of such rules on government behavior. Thus, although Dam at one
point concludes that substantive rules may be essential to third-party
adjudication of trade disputes,' he describes the GATT's growing
aversion to such lawsuits as "the recognition by all contracting parties
that legalism does not contribute to trade liberalization."' 0 On another
occasion, Dam applauds the use of nondirective consultative procedures
because they avoid "poisoning the diplomatic atmosphere through
charges of illegality."20 Dam's discussion of the Artide XXIV rules on
customs unions, perhaps the fullest treatment of this issue, points to
16. Id. at 4-5.
17. E.g., id. at 214-21 (border tax adjustments) and 274-95 (regional economic arrange-
ments). For other examples of the criticism, see id. at 58-61 (reciprocity in tariff negotia.
tions) and 87-91 ("substantially equivalent" concessions); cf. id. at 296, 315 (quantitative
restrictions). For further comment on this part of the criticism, see pp. 1374-76 in/ra.
18. DAM, supra note 13, at 360-62.
19. Id. at 356. Dam goes on to admit that there may also be some disadvantages with
the negotiating approach, an approach which he terms "conciliation." When lie returns
to the disadvantages of "conciliation" a few pages later, however, the "conciliation" he
speaks of at that point seems to be a form of third-party Panel adjudication without
the aid of written rules. Id. at 360-62. Although he concludes that such adjudication Is
less workable than adjudication based on rules, he never does get back to the original
question of negotiation versus adjudication as a dispute settlement device.
It might be added that while Dam is correct in pointing to the Panel's tendency to
rest on written roles wherever possible, his discussion somewhat overstates the tendency by
failing to take account at this point of the earlier nullification and impairment decisions
which succeeded quite well in ruling on disputes without the aid of prior rules, Sce
p. 1339 infra.
20. DAr, supra note 13, at 354.
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the growing noncompliance with that provision as evidence that the
"essential error" of the draftsmen was "their conception of a legal
institution as largely a set of substantive prohibitions rather than as
largely a set of procedures."
21
If one were to press a little harder for an explanation of this broader
skepticism, several factors might be noted. The surface "legalism" of
the GATT's very detailed rules obviously contributes to this view, for
it appears to identify substantive rules with a rather naive view of legal
process. Recent GATT history also seems to provide important evi-
dence that governments generally do not respond to such rules. The
underlying explanation seems to run like this: Trade restrictions are
the product of underlying economic problems, and they are "inevi-
table" as long as the problems are not solved. The mere existence of
rules will not make these economic problems disappear, nor will rules
promote the kind of discussion needed to understand and to solve
them. The better answer, it seems, is full and open consultation about
the economic problems themselves.
The very existence of Professor Jackson's decimal-numbered treatise
suggests a more sympathetic view toward GATT substantive rules.
Jackson's treatment of the legalist-pragmatist debate offers a thought-
ful statement of the concerns which support that view. There are,
Jackson admits, some advantages in attempting to solve problems by
ad hoc negotiation. Negotiation is less likely to ruffle feathers; negoti-
ated solutions avoid the win-lose discomfort of a lawsuit; and, of course,
the bargained-for result is more likely to stick. Jackson doubts, how-
ever, that negotiation alone can serve as an adequate basis for GATT's
work. He lists three main disadvantages. First, the outcome under the
negotiating technique is much more responsive to economic or political
muscle. Second, the ad hoc approach builds no precedents for future
decisions. And third, Jackson argues, the ad hoc approach to trade
problems is simply not manageable:
It is theoretically advantageous that particular international differ-
ences of opinion are seen in the context of the broader relation-
ships involved, but there is a limit to this advantage. At some
point the whole business becomes so complex that the human mind
can no longer cope with it .... A simple problem of a breach
of a particular GATT obligation.. . could produce discussion of a
number of other facets of international economic relations, includ-
21. Id. at 291. Dam's final position on this "error" is somewhat unclear, for part of
the solution he proposes looks like another set of substantive rules. Sec id. at 294,
discussed p. 1333 infra.
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ing inconsistencies with the GATT norms by the complaining
country itself, other negotiations ... going on at the same time
between these parties and other parties, foreign aid promised or
proposed between the parties, . . . political support in other
bodies . . ., monetary and balance-of-payments problems between
the disputants and the like. A desideratum of international tech-
niques for dealing with problems that arise is to try to limit the
complexity and scope of such problems so that they can be dealt
with one by one. Legal norms, and compliance with them, can
provide the framework-the woof and warp of international
economic relations, so that particular problems that arise can be
dealt with in relative isolation by judging them in the context of
the legal norms associated with them. The other complicating
factors ... do not need to be analyzed in depth in every case. To
put this another way, what is necessary in international economic
relations is the development of procedures and techniques that
will "chip off" bits and pieces of the amorphous complex totality
of commercial relationships and find solutions to those chipped-
off pieces so that they are not an issue in every new negotiation that
occurs in the future.22
Unfortunately, Jackson's analysis of the difficulties with the GABB
approach does not really come to grips with the basic assertion on the
other side. For, if it is true that governments do not, and perhaps
cannot, respond to legal norms in this area, neither the problem of
political muscle nor the inevitable complexity of negotiation is going
to be cured by resort to a system of rules. Jackson obviously believes
that legal obligations can have some impact on government behavior,
but his assumptions in this respect are never stated clearly. He men-
tions the GATT's early legal experience, and seems to treat that
experience as a basis for expecting that governments can be made to
respond.23 But little is said as to why or how such responsiveness was
22. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 766-67. Jackson also discusses the benefits and disadvan.
tages of the secrecy which often attends negotiating procedures, a factor which is not
usually part of the prospectus for GABB consultation procedures.
23. The perspective is implicit in the following account of GATT legal history which
Jackson reports having received in private discussions:
m1]t has been suggested that the EEC debates were a turning point in the viewpoint
of law in GATT. Up to that time, it can be argued, GATT was more responsive to
legal arguments and to the idea of the importance of the substantive obligations In
GATT. There were more frequent formal complaints in GATT and these complaints
were more often processed with the use of a "panel," which rendered a report that
dealt with the legal arguments in great detail, and reflected the importance in which
those arguments were held. Subsequent to the GATT examination of the EEC, there
have been fewer formal complaints, and lately there has even been the hint that the
complaint procedure has fallen into disfavor in GATT, at least among the larger
nations. The failure of some of the 1955 changes in GATT's structure and obligations
to come into effect also had its influence on the declining value placed upon the
legal procedures and norms of GATT.
Id. at 759-60.
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achieved, or what has gone wrong since then. What comments there
are seem to focus on the force of "obligation" itself. Jackson observes,
for example, that continued disobedience to GATT legal norms is
bound to engender "disrespect for law."24 He also attaches particular
importance to maintaining a clear distinction between "norms of obli-
gation" and "norms of aspiration," arguing in his concluding chapter
that GATT law would be more effective if formal legal obligation were
reserved for those rules as to which governments are able to guarantee
full compliance.25
The absence of a more direct answer to the pragmatist arguments is
regrettable, for it leaves the issue open to a certain kind of over-
simplification which very often afflicts the legalistic position. Those
who oppose the present wave of GATT pragmatism are usually con-
tent to argue that the GATT substantive code can be made to work
because it once did work. As to how it worked, and how it can be made
to work again, the most common assumption is that the GATT legal
system must have worked like any other legal system, and will do so
again if only the citizenry will make up its mind to be law-abiding.
Such arguments tend to reinforce the pragmatist criticism rather than
dispel it, for they make it appear that the legal design being argued for
is really as naive as it appears.
II. The Function of Substantive Rules
In order to deal with the assertion that detailed substantive rules
have no influence-or the wrong influence-on trade policy decisions,
one must first try to separate two rather different grounds on which
that assertion may rest. The first is the matter of consensus. It must be
conceded that rules will not be worth much without some degree of
community recognition as to their validity. Skepticism about the impact
of such rules may, accordingly, reflect doubts about the existence of
any underlying consensus. The second ground goes to something more
basic. Much of the criticism of GATT rules seems to argue that, even
if such a consensus were present, it would not do much good to reduce
it to rules in advance, because the pressures which operate on govern-
ment trade policy are simply too strong and too varied to be affected by
such rules-in other words, that writing rules does not really add any-
thing to the force of whatever community consensus exists. The greater
24. Id. at 757.
25. Id. at 761-62, 7885.
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the results promised for GABB diplomacy, the more the criticism of
substantive rules tends to suggest this second argument.
Part II is addressed to the latter ground of criticism alone. It is neces-
sary, therefore, to say something at the outset about the assumptions I
shall make regarding consensus. The kind of liberal trade policy ex-
pressed by the GATT rules has never commanded universal approba-
tion. The fact that governments were able to agree to these rules meant
simply that the forces in each government favoring the rules were, on
balance, stronger than those opposing. Support for the rules once writ-
ten has been the product of a similar balance, a balance quite capable of
shifting from case to case. About the most one can assume, therefore, is a
situation in which trade policy officials within the various governments
recognize and are prepared to defend the validity of the rules, and in
which the overall balance of forces within the governments is at least
open to such claims. One way of describing this degree of consensus
would be to say that it is the measure of basic agreement which, at the
time in question, would enable trade policy officials to negotiate the
same rules on an ad referendum basis. While I recognize that there is
a legitimate question as to whether such a consensus does in fact exist
at the present time, I shall assume for the purpose of the analysis in
Part II that it does.2 6
The assertion that detailed substantive rules will have little or no
influence in these circumstances usually proceeds from a bit of conven-
tional wisdom about the politics of foreign trade. Liberal trade policy is
a political orphan in most national governments. Even in countries
where foreign trade occupies a much larger share of GNP than it does in
the United States, the benefits of freer trade tend to be spread too thin for
political effect when compared to the specific jobs and business profits
threatened by increased imports. Although many of the pressures
generated by this one-sided political situation can be overcome by ag-
gressive executive leadership in the name of the larger public interest,
political accountability makes it certain that governments will have to
satisfy some of these pressures some of the time. Thus, no matter how
reasonable a rule may seem at a given time, no government can ever
guarantee its ability to comply for very long into the future. Because of
this fact, it is argued, detailed "legal obligations" are simply utopian;
one would do better to debate each case on the merits as it arises.
I believe this point of view ignores a number of very important func-
tions that detailed rules can perform. My disagreement is not with the
26.. Part III, infra, discusses the question of whether such conditions do in fact exist.
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observation that "legal obligation," as an independent force, seems to
have relatively little impact on these situations. Nor do I quarrel with
the general observation that most of the moral, economic or political
forces which bring governments to the point of writing a code will
continue to exist whether or not the code is actually written or signed.
I would argue, however, that writing and signing such rules does
contribute significantly to the conservation, organization and intensifi-
cation of those forces in the day-to-day decision-making which is the real
source of policy. Most of what I shall have to say about the function
of GATT rules will concern their operation in this marginal-though,
I believe, important-area.
My purpose in describing these functions is not to argue that GATT
is "law" any more than GABB. I doubt that any meaningful distinction
exists along these lines. The case for GATT rules is more pragmatic.
It rests on the particular ways in which such rules increase the influence
of the GATT point of view, and the particular need for those incre-
mental advantages in the type of decision-making environment in-
volved.
A. The Draftsmen's Objectives
The place to begin an inquiry about the function of GATT rules
is to ask what the GATT draftsmen themselves were thinking when
they wrote the rules. Professor Dam to the contrary, the draftsmen
were not as naive as their iron-clad rules would suggest. The leading
participants were all veteran trade policy officials who had lived many
years in the land of political earthquakes. 7 Any illusions they might
have had about postwar politics would have been quickly dispelled
by the course of the negotiations themselves. Although there was a
fairly solid consensus about the rules that ought to be written, no major
government felt that it could promise any important changes in existing
practice for the sake of those rules. Exceptions to the rules had to be
carved out in almost every such case.28
27. The legal design of the ITO Charter, supra note 7, from which the GATT %as
taken almost verbatim, was established in the joint United States-United Kingdom draft
which served as the basis of negotiations. See U.S. DEIr or STATE, SrGEsTEo CATurrmn
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (Pub. No. 2593, Commercial Policy Series,
No. 93, 1946). See generally note 7 supra. The principal architects of tie United States
position, men such as Harry Hawkins and Francis B. Sayre, came to the negotiations
fresh from a decade of experience negotiating bilateral agreements under the Recipocal
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 943 (1934), amending 46 Stat. 703 (1980). Their
British counterparts has a similar background. See GAIwNE, supra note 8, at 16, 103-04.
See generally E. PENRosE, EcoNoMic PLANNING FOR THE PEACE (1953).
28.. The GATT Articles containing the major exceptions, and the countries which led
the fight for them, are:
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The decision to write precise substantive rules in these circumstances
can be explained, I believe, by a more careful examination of the
function these rules were meant to serve. Two points about the drafts-
men's substantive objectives should be noted. First, for the most part
the draftsmen were not trying to legislate the removal of existing trade
barriers. The commitments almost invariably represented one of two
typical situations: (1) the government was not now violating the rule
and negotiators were betting that future policy could be kept within
bounds (tie United States situation), 20 or (2) the government was now
imposing extensive temporary trade controls due to the postwar balance
of payments crisis, and negotiators were betting that the rule would
be observed when "normal" policy was formulated in the future (the
situation for most of Europe).80 The rules were thus mainly an effort
to help prevent bad things from happening.
Second, the substantive rules themselves were primarily intended to
channel trade restriction into acceptable forms, rather than to legislate
any particular ceiling on the level of restriction. The most pernicious
forms of trade restriction (including discrimination) were prohibited
outright, but the tariff remained as an instrument of policy that might
be used to satisfy demands for protection. Although the draftsmen also
hoped to negotiate legally binding reductions in the tariff over time,
(a) Article 1:2, permitting continuance of existing tariff preferences (United King.
dom and France);
(b) Article IV, permitting quotas on cinema films (several European countries);
(c) Article XI:2(c), permitting quotas needed to effectuate certain agricultural price
support programs (United States);
(d) Articles XII-XIV, permitting broad latitude in the use of quotas for balance of
payments reasons (United Kingdom and France);
(e) Article XVI, originally permitting virtually uncontrolled use of export subsidies
(United States);
() Article XIX, permitting quotas as well as tariff increases to counter injury to
local producers (United States);
(g) Article XXI, permitting restrictions for reasons of national security (United
States).
The United States did agree to some rules requiring changes in existing legislation,
chiefly GATT Article VII which would have required, inter alia, abolition of American
Selling Price valuation. The United States Executive proposed the necessary legislation
at one time, but without success. See Hearings on H.R. 1535 Before the House Ways and
Means Committee, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-30, 79, 612-20 (1951). Under the terms of the
Protocol of Provisional Application, accession to GATT itself did not require that such
inconsistent legislation be changed. See note 92 infra.
29. For example, the rule of GATT Article XI:2(c) requiring production controls as
a condition of imposing agricultural quotas was accepted on the assumption that, although
the relevant United States legislation provided for quotas without regard to production
controls, the legislation could be administered in a way to limit its impact to cases In
which production controls did exist. See GARDNER, supra note 8, at 374. For an account
of what happened to these expectations, see Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MIcH. L. RE.. 249, 266-67 (1967).
30. See, e.g., K. KOCK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY AND THE GATT-1947-1967, at
57 (1969); C. WILcox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 199 (1949).
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these latter obligations were explicitly made subject to certain escape
valves-a right to suspend concessions immediately in the case of
serious injury and a periodic right to withdraw concessions for any
reason whatever.3' In short, the level of protection was to be determined
by periodic negotiation, as governments were ready for it.32
More important than either of these substantive limitations were
the draftsmen's expectations regarding enforcement. The enforcement
machinery was defined most clearly in the negotiations over the Inter-
national Trade Organization (ITO), the United Nations specialized
agency from whose "Charter" the GATT code was drawn. The ITO
negotiations made it clear that there was to be no enforcement of the
GATT/IT0 rules beyond a formal ruling announcing the violation,
plus, perhaps, some gentlemanly exhortation. The idea of punitive
sanctions was considered and rejected, leaving the injured party only
the right to "compensate" its injury by withdrawing commercially equal
benefits in return. The possibility of issuing formal directives was like-
wise considered and rejected. Although the International Court of
Justice was to have jurisdiction to issue legal rulings, it was decided
after much debate that these rulings would take the form of advisory
opinions to the ITO itself, thereby removing the possibility of an
ICJ judgment against the guilty party. The ITO, in turn, was left with
a deliberately ambiguous power to "request" compliance.p
The policy that emerged was one of using legal obligations as
instruments of diplomatic pressure. Legal obligations, and the rulings
thereon, would define the desired result. They would, in addition,
create some pressures of their own toward that result, principally that
sort of exposed discomfiture which diplomats like to call "embarrass-
ment." Finally, the obligations would tend to legitimize and sharpen
all the nonlegal pressures which would have been there anyway. One
of the delegations which had originally supported a more "legal"
procedure summed it up this way in explaining the ICJ advisory opin-
ion procedure:
31. GAT Articles XIX and XXVII, respectively. Although Article XXVIII adjust-
ments must be accompanied by negotiations looking toward the substitution of other
concessions as a way of maintaining the overall level and balance of existing concessions,
the making of such substitute concessions is not a legal requirement; affected governments
may adjust the balance by withdrawing tariff concessions of their own.
32. This design assumed, of course, that tariffs would be suffident to accommodate
the demands for protection that would have to be accommodated, an assumption which
has since proved overly optimistic in some areas. See pp. 1352-55 infra.
33. The final text of the ITO disputes procedure appears in ITO CILU=rrn, supra note
7, arts. 93-95. For a more extensive treatment of this negotiating history, see Hudc, The
GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. Wonan TPADE L. 615, 621-31 (1970).
See generally notes 7 and 27 supra.
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The delegation of Belgium and Luxembourg agrees to make this
concession, as it considers that an advisory opinion procedure will
facilitate the settlement of disputes by sparing the political suscepti-
bilities of states, which can subsequently take advantage of the light
thrown on a case by public hearing and the opinion of the Court
to arrive at a compromise among themselves by diplomatic means.
... [T]he Court's action in an advisory capacity should create an"atmosphere" which will encourage the parties to seek a solution
to their dispute.3 4
In his final chapter, Professor Jackson makes a useful distinction be-
tween two aspects of rule making: (1) the definition of an agreed nor-
mative standard, and (2) the commitment to abide by that norm.85 The
drafting history just described involved a splitting apart of these two
aspects. Once it was recognized that governments were not in fact
going to undertake a very firm commitment to the rules, the rules
themselves became primarily a statement of agreed "norms."3 0 By
continuing to work for maximum precision of the rules, the draftsmen
were saying that normative standards themselves were of value, and
that even without an absolute commitment (or perhaps especially then),
34. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/W/257, at 2 (1947). Secretary of State Acheson had this to say:
The sanctions of this Organization are not the sanctions of force, or of power to
direct action by member nations, or of the power to spend money .... But It has
sanctions. Its sanctions stem from the voluntary agreement of its members to abide
by certain rules, and include the power to bring up for open discussion and public
scrutiny cases of failure to abide by that agreement, and the power to release members
from their obligations under charter to another member which is found by the
Organization to have failed to abide by its agreement.
Hearings on Membership and Participation by the United States in the ITO Before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1950).
35. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 783-85. For a discussion of Jackson's use of this dis-
tinction, see pp. 1372-73 infra.
36. The word "norm" may raise some questions. I believe the term is appropriate to
describe both the rules a government makes for itself in this area and the GATT rules
that governments make among themselves. As to the former, although trade policy issues
typically present claims representing widely divergent values, the rules that are made in
response to those claims are normally framed and justified in terms of what is right, and
their administration is generally guided by the normative framework so established. As
for GATT rules themselves, it is sometimes said that while the United States and United
Kingdom may have had such a normative framework in mind when proposing the rules,
the other governments which accepted the rules did so merely because they wanted the
United States tariff concessions which came with them, and not out of any general con.
viction that the rules were right. The evidence usually offered in support of this view
is the fact that the United States had to work very hard indeed to persuade the other
governments (even the United Kingdom in many instances) to adopt the rules. I do not
believe this is an accurate interpretation. Setting aside the developing countries--which
were, I admit, in fundamental disagreement about the equity of the entire structure
-I believe that the main resistance to the United States-United Kingdom design on the
part of others came primarily from a desire to preserve autonomy. The proof Is what
happened afterward. The early GATT displayed a remarkable command of the spirit
behind the rules, developing common law interpretations and additions to GATT law
which demonstrated not only that the members of the community knew what was behind
the rules, but also that they were prepared to accept that underlying consensus as the
basis for authoritative action. See p. 1339 infra.
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the more specific they were the better. That, I would argue, was the
hypothesis behind the GATT rules.37 To test it, we must look at the
various decision-making processes the rules were meant to influence.
B. The Role of Substantive Rules in National Decision-Making
The following examination of trade policy decision-making at the
national level deals only with the United States. Admittedly the
structure of that process in the United States is not representative of
GATT governments generally. I suggest, however, that the functions
served by GATT rules in the United States decision-making process
will very probably be found, mutatis mutandis, in other GATT govern-
ments as well, for both the interests involved and the political struc-
ture behind governmental processes appear to be substantially the
same.38 This larger claim is, of course, hypothesis. Hopefully, what is
said here about the United States will offer one part of the comparative
study needed to test it.
1. The United States Executive
Executive decisions on trade policy seldom appear "inevitable" to
those who make them. The process of decision typically begins with
claims on one side asking for as much as possible, countered by resis-
tance of equally unbending character on the other. The results which
eventually issue from the process are usually a form of equilibrium be-
37. It may be asked why the draftsmen used forms of legal obligation at all. The
answer, I think, is that the momentum of past practice virtually forced them to accept
the conventional form of an international agreement as a starting point. On the purely
technical level, the United States Executive's authority to negotiate tariff reductions was
tied to the formation of conventional agreements. On a more general level, governments
did want some demonstration that the rules would be taken seriously, and, particularly
in the light of past practice, any lesser form of commitment would have excited undue
suspidons that such was not the case. Although legal obligation may have said too much
in the circumstances, governments had in fact been able to live with similar over-
statement in the case of prior bilateral agreements and were no doubt confident that
they could continue to "manage" the GATT/ITO rules in the same way.
A8. Parliamentary forms of government naturally reduce the sharp division between
executive and legislative roles found in the United States. It has been my experience,
however, that one tends to find virtually the same divisions in these governments between
domestic and foreign ministries.
There are, of course, the few traditionally low-tariff countries in which commitment to
liberal trade is a much more solid fixture in the overall political environment. In addi-
tion, the size and cost structure of the United States market, as vell as the relatively
greater capabilities of the United States foreign investment, tend to make United States
business somewhat less interested in foreign trade than their foreign counterparts gen-
erally. Nevertheless, if one considers the trade policy behavior of the major GATT
participants-the United States, the EEC, Japan, and countries such as Canada and
Australia-in the recent Kennedy Round trade negotiations, the similarities in overall
outlook toward foreign trade far outweigh, I think, the differences. Indeed, more than
one GATT observer would argue that the major source of GATT initiative since the war
has been the United States, and that the current malaise is due mainly to the loss of
that leadership.
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tween the contending forces, with dimensions of time and degree that
may not be immediately apparent. Surprisingly few decisions issue
directly from the Chief Executive.80 Issues usually grope their way
upward from initial skirmishes toward some official or group of officials
with power to act. The decision itself is usually a rather protracted
affair. Debate over the details is frequently as important, and as intense,
as the contest over the general result. Once a decision is made, the
losers will generally press for reconsideration or modification, and more
likely than not a decision will be reopened once or twice for further
important bargaining. Few things are ever "settled" for very long.40
The influence of GATT substantive rules upon this ongoing tug-of-
war comes down to their impact on the various actors whose collective
weight moves, and holds, the result in one direction or another.
Individual positions will be determined largely by the actor's appraisal
of two central factors: first, the normative question of whether the
local interests "deserve" the protection they are seeking, and second,
the collateral "costs" that disappointed participants are likely to inflict
on the decision-making official or his government. I would argue that
89. In the author's experience, even those issues which are bounced to the "hIlghest"
level are usually bounced right back unresolved, either in the form of a recommendation
that the matter be "worked out among yourselves," or else, with a Delphic response
broad enough to cover all important points of view.
40. Although it is manifestly impossible to document this generalization, an example
may be helpful. During the winter of 1963-64, manufacturers of furniture using black
walnut veneer petitioned the Secretary of Commerce to restrict exports of black walnut
logs under the rather broadly defined authority granted by the Export Control Act of
1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, ch. 11, §§ 1-12, 63 Stat. 7 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2021-32
(1964)) (now 50 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 2401-13 (Supp. 1971)). The demand was couched In terms
of helping to conserve the supply of black walnut trees in the United States in the face
of abnormally high foreign demand. A possible reason for the conservationist urge was
the fact that foreign manufacturers, having developed a technology for significantly more
efficient use of the logs, were bidding the price out of sight. Several government agencies
objected to the proposal on the ground that GATT permitted such export controls only
if the controls were part of a conservation program applicable equally to domestic con-
sumption. The original proposal called for no mandatory limits on domestic consumption.
Debate raged on several different fronts-the need to follow the GATT rule, the equity
of the GATT rule, the conservation forecasts as to the supply of black walnut trees, and
the effects of the price increase on United States business.
The GATT forces lost the first round, for export controls without domestic controls
were imposed on February 14, 1964. Dep't of Commerce Press Release G 64-33 (Feb. 14,
1964). They succeeded in establishing the point about parallel controls, however, in the
form of two concessions: (1) the controls would be imposed initially for only one year,
as a "trial period," and (2) the controls would be continued only if the domestic industry
succeeded in reducing domestic consumption by an arguably similar amount, At the end
of the year, domestic consumption was found to have exceeded the voluntary target amount
by thirty per cent, and, relying on this fact, the Secretary terminated the controls, Dep't
of Commerce Press Release G 65-20 (Feb. 12, 1965).
The battle was not over. Legislators concerned about the outcome convened formal
hearings, at which every issue was gone through again with a parade of experts on both
sides. Hearings on Export Controls on Black Walnut Logs Before the Senate Commerce
Committee, 89th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1 (1965). In response to the strong legislative criticism,
the Secretary agreed to reconsider. Later in the year, the decision was reaffirmed, and
even a second round of hearings did not move it this time. See id., pt. 2, at 215.
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the existence of detailed substantive rules can have an important influ-
ence on both of these calculations.
The role that substantive rules play in the normative side of trade
policy debate is sometimes obscured by an inadequate understanding
of what the normative issues are. Very frequently, questions of right
and wrong are treated as though they were matters of economics-
issues of comparative advantage and resource allocation that could be
answered by economic analysis. If this were so, one might indeed won-
der whether substantive rules perform any function at all. Energies
would probably be better spent distributing a good economics text-
book.
In fact, the normative standards of trade policy debate are not
questions of economics. Whether cast as GATT rules or simply as
"policy," the value judgments which make up the GATT consensus
have always been a compromise between the dictates of free trade
economics and other social welfare values which require (or are thought
to require) practices inconsistent with trade liberalization. There are
a few GATT rules that do not involve such balancing. The classic
example, of course, is Article XIX's escape clause formula which allows
governments unilaterally to abrogate tariff concessions and other obli-
gations when imports cause "serious injury" to a domestic industry.41
A more esoteric example would be GATT Article IV allowing inter-
nal quantitative restrictions on cinema films. Although the exception
could probably be justified solely on grounds that tariffs have no mean-
ing in the cinema film trade, the justification is usually embellished
with the quite serious contention that a national film industry (and,
more recently, national television) has a role in preserving national
cultural traditions which exempts it from the general pursuit of com-
parative advantage. 42
It is important to underscore both the complexity and the ultimately
unverifiable character of these judgments. A particularly good demon-
stration of what is involved occurred recently in a debate before a con-
gressional committee over the merits of GATT Article NII, the rule
which requires that valuation of goods for the purpose of computing
ad valorem customs duties be based on the market value of the imported
goods themselves and not on the value of competing domestic prod-
ucts.4O 3 Opponents argued that the rule was inconsistent with the very
41. Essentially the same standards appear in the United States domestic legislation
which is the counterpart of Article XIX. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1901-02 (1964).
42. See Jackson, supra note 14, at 293.
43. Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals Before the House Ways and Means
1317
HeinOnline  -- 80 Yale L.J. 1317 1970-1971
The Yale Law Journal
purpose of having tariffs, for a tariff meant to protect domestic pro-
ducers from cheaper foreign goods should certainly not go down as the
foreign good becomes cheaper. In addition, the opponents argued, the
GATT rule actually works a trade distortion among competing imports,
for the lower-priced of two competing imports will gain an extra price
advantage by paying a smaller duty. A totally candid reply to these
arguments would probably have gone something like this: In the judg-
ment of trade policy experts, the administrative procedure of finding
the competing domestic product and determining its price is a very
cumbersome business, one which leaves the importer uncertain as to
the duty until the goods arrive, and which, in addition, creates both
commercially disruptive delays and opportunities for other subtle ad-
ministrative inconveniences. These possible consequences, it would be
argued, simply outweigh whatever theoretical problems the rule may
present. The argument would add that the theoretical problems them-
selves are not serious. With regard to the potential discrimination be-
tween competing imports, proponents of the GATT position would
contend that one simply cannot generalize about whether price advan-
tage is a function of absolute or percentage differences. As for supposed
inconsistency with the theory of tariff protection, the reply would
simply offer a competing value judgment; once a tariff has been set,
a relative increase in price ought to expose the domestic producer to
stiffer international competition.
The proposition that international rules will have an appreciable
influence on normative judgments of this kind is at once both obvious
and impossible to document. To be sure, some officials will already have
made up their minds on the basis of prior experience. In the usual
controversy, however, there will be a significant number of officials who
will not have had extensive experience-particularly higher ranking
officials, those from "other departments," and those new officials who
continually enter the scene due to political change and the normal
turnover of personnel. Even as to these officials, of course, it cannot be
said that international rules are indispensible to persuasion, nor, in-
deed, that they are a guarantee against failure. But such rules do endow
the GATT consensus with an objective authority which, given the
absence of other anchors in this type of debate, should make that con-
sensus more persuasive at every level of argument.
Two particularly important points of impact deserve to be men-
Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4537.41 (1968), reprinted in C. FuLDA & W. SciWARTz,
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INvESr ENT 233-B6 (1970).
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tioned. The first concerns the phenomenon of "digging in." Like any-
one else, government officials have a tendency to hold positions once
taken, for changes of position usually entail losses of prestige and
authority that most officials would just as soon avoid. It is important,
therefore, to "get to" officials as early as possible. International rules,
and especially fairly precise rules, are an effective device for packaging
and transmitting policy to operating officials in a manner that will
affect initial responses. Even if such rules do not always cause officials
to dig in on the GATT side, they will at least alert officials to the
presence of the GATT position, in a way that will discourage pre-
mature commitment to the opposition.
The second point of impact involves the hearing accorded to the
GATT point of view once debate is begun. Officials committed to the
GATT position at present would probably continue to argue their
convictions with equal vigor under GABB. The attention they would
receive is another matter. Commentators writing about trade policy
often make the mistake of assuming that their own, generally favor-
able view of pro-GATT officials is shared by the decision-making
heirarchy as well. Not always so. In the eyes of many government offi-
cials, the pro-GATT official is also a self-interested participant-a
single-minded internationalist whose only concern is to maintain for-
eign good will.4 Officials who view the debate in these terms find it
easy to dismiss GATT arguments as personal bias. The presence of
international rules makes it more difficult.
This last phenomenon deserves to be underlined. I would argue that
the existence of something like the GATT rules gives pro-GATT
officials a much greater voice in all phases of internal decision-making.
There is nothing sinister or undemocratic about this fact. It is one of
44. During the late 1940s, when Congress was reviewing the GATT/ITO negotiations,
the Executive was asked to submit detailed biographies of every member of the United
States negotiating team. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 6566 Before the Senate Finance Corn-
mittee, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-76 (1948). Complaints that United States negotiators in-
variably get the worst of every trade bargain are as commonplace as assurances that the
critic has always been in favor of free trade. See, e.g., Hearings on Tariff and Trade
Proposals Before the House Ways and Means Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Ses. 564 (1970).
In drafting the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, these concerns were serious enough to raise
a demand that responsibility for the contemplated trade negotiations be shifted from the
State Department to the Commerce Department, a demand which had to be met by
assigning responsibility to a new White House office situated at least on an organizational
chart, somewhere between the two. 19 U.S.C. § 1871 (1964).
The distinctive colorations ascribed by Congress to the various Executive Departments
tend to be expressed in inter-agency relations as well., As any State Department trade
policy offidal will testify, one of the most taxing assignment diplomats face is to
persuade other Executive Departments to give discretion to State Department officials in
the field. As in the case of the Executive-Congress relationship, see pp. 1325-26 infra, differ-
ences in institutional prespective tend to be magnified in practice by a saints-and.sinners
role perception into which most participants fall sooner or later.
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the natural and intended consequences of writing international rules,
part of the contract a national government makes with itself and with
others when it agrees to put some aspect of its policy under this sort
of surveillance. Whether intended or not, GABB would withdraw that
delegation of power.
Substantive rules can affect in a variety of ways the "cost" calculations
which make up the other half of trade policy decisions. Though the
particular points of impact are quite disparate, the function of rules in
each case is basically the same. It involves another kind of normative
persuasion, something which might be called a legitimizing function.
Even if opponents or neutrals cannot be persuaded that the GATT
standards are "right," rules can still be of considerable value in
identifying those standards as an objective and principled basis for
action. This claim of legitimacy, in turn, can very often influence the
official's perception of outside pressures, and the way he responds to
them.
Perhaps the most important cost calculation affected in this manner
is the official's concern for the general climate of cooperation. Every
decision-maker tends to calculate the consequences of his actions upon
the future behavior of others. Normally, he will think not only of imme.
diate reactions, such as direct retaliation, but will also consider the
impact of his decision on the long-range attitudes which induce govern-
ments to tolerate some degree of domestic "hurt" in the expectation of
similar consideration in return. A code of substantive rules is one way
to institutionalize these concerns, one in which the desired calculations
will appear in the form of a general concern to preserve the integrity of
whatever legal system is involved. 45 To understand the function that
rules perform in making these calculations, however, one has to ask
what would happen when the same calculations are made under GABB.
The pragmatist viewpoint would argue that governments can identify
the desired level of mutual self-restraint through ad hoc consultation
procedures, provided they make a genuine effort to explore issues
fully and with candor. The proviso considerably oversimplifies the
process of trade policy decisions. In the first place, candor is not that
easy to come by. It is all but impossible to obtain agreement within
45. Although the same might be said of every function identified in this section, it Is
particularly necessary here to note that the working of a legal system in this regard de.
pends on its representing at least a rough consensus among governments. One need not
insist upon complete accord as to the equity of each and every rule, but there must be
a shared sense that the rules as a wvhole are at least a satisfactory framework over te
long run. As noted earlier, Part I assumes the existence of such a consensus; Parts III
and IV will take up the problem of maintaining it in practice.
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a national government on an initial position which does not press for as
much as possible from the other side.40 As a result, consultations will
usually begin with both sides playing from more-or-less closed hands
while diplomats begin the slow process of identifying each other's "es-
sential" positions-positions which the home governments may not
even begin to think about seriously until the first impasse. To expect
officials to identify the likely impact of a decision on the basis of such
exchanges is asking quite a lot, particularly when those officials are
being hounded by much more immediate domestic pressures on the
other side. Lacking any accepted standards calling for more, there is a
real danger that officials will recognize only the most evident expec-
tations of self-restraint, those which involve some immediate threat
to the maintenance of minimum order.
In the second place, the fact that a matter is settled by ad hoc con-
sultations will not necessarily mean that its consequences are mutually
accepted. Most things are settled somehow. The critical problem is to
have some way of keeping accounts for the future. Absent some
agreed measure of the result, it is quite possible that each side will
walk away believing that it has a "credit" owing from the other side
because of concessions made. Attempts to spend such credits in the
future will only confuse everyone's calculations still further. 4
46. See note 44 supra.
47. An example of this sort of miscalculation occurred recently in conuection with
the United States-Canadian Agreement Concerning Automotive Products, Jan. 16, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 1372, T.I.A.S. No. 6093. In order to solve certain business and political problems
concerning North American auto production, the United States agreed as part of a larger
agreement to grant duty-free entry to auto products from Canada but not from other
countries, a violation of GATT Article I. Although the GATT problem caused some
concern, the problem was put to one side fairly earl), in the negotiations on the assump-
tion that the commercial effects of the discrimination would not really trouble other
governments and that there would be no serious opposition in principle to granting the
United States a GATT waiver permitting such discrimination. This calculation was ba,-ed
in part on the ground that GATT had recently indulged several other cases of ad hoc
discrimination, particularly in the case of the EEC, which to United States officials had
involved considerably greater departure from basic GATT Policy. The agreement vas
negotiated, of course, before any real test of foreign reaction could be made.
When the test came, the expectations proved wrong. Although the waiver wms eventually
granted, GATT, 14th Supp. BISD 37 (1966), it came only after a great deal of criticism
from governments which saw no parallel to earlier situations at alL See, e.g., GATT,
13th Supp. BISD 112 (1965). The waiver is still regarded by many GATT participants as a
conspicuous breach of faith, to the continued consternation of many United States officials.
What happened, of course, was that the numerous departures from Article I during
this period had left each government the judge of which departures were reasonable and
which were not. EEC officials, for example, generally take the position that the) have
achieved a laudatory degree of trade liberalization in the face of the very difficult
political problems which economic integration entails. Other governments tsually take
the same view of their own actions. Although the GATT community as a whole will
usually "settle" the matter by going along with these various exceptions in one way or
another, the Auto Parts waiver shows that the underlying normative accounting is not
always shared.
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In short, there is good reason to fear that GABB's case-by-case ap-
proach will invite a combination of wishful thinking, self-justification
and eventual suspicion which will obscure any long-range calculations
as to mutual expectations of self-restraint. The participants are simply
too clumsy, their perspectives too diverse, and the benefits too remote.
Rules do not guarantee that such calculations will be made. But rules,
or some other source of external standards, would seem to be needed
to frame the calculation in manageable terms.
A second, more immediate cost calculation that can be influenced
by substantive rules is the possibility of direct economic retaliation.
Threats of retaliation are fairly common in GATT circles, and the
real thing, although rare, is certainly not unknown. 48 The effect of such
48. The provisions of the GATT which allow countermeasures, e.g., Articles XIX,
XXIII and XXVIII, are all framed in terms of "compensation" rather than punitive
sanction. Nevertheless, the fact that most demands for compensation are satisfied by the
offending party's grant of alternative concessions has led to a general tendency to view
"compensatory" increases of trade barriers as a symbolic form of punishment. The recog.
nition that retaliation usually hurts the retaliating country more than it helps it adds
to this view. Retaliation is thus usually reserved for action preceived to be conspicuously
"wrong" in some sense, and tends to be primarily didactic in purpose. For a discussion
of the rather artistic way in which the GATT/lTO draftsmen dealt with the issue of
sanction versus compensation, see Hudec, supra note 33, at 625-27.
I have found three major instances of retaliation in the GATT records. The first was
a discriminatory quota on United States exports of wheat flour imposed by the Netherlands
from 1953 to 1959 under Article XXIII, in response to admittedly illegal United States
quotas on dairy products. See Appendix, Item A-10, Interestingly, the Netherlands never
imposed the authorized quota restriction in full; United States sales exceeded the quota
limit by over twenty per cent in five of the seven years, and for the first four years the
United States retained its share of the total import market. See COMMONWEALTtl ECoNoMIc
COMMISSION, GRAIN TRADE (1953-61 eds.); INTERNATIONAL WHEAT COUNCIL, TRADE IN WIIEAT
FLOUR 27 (Sec't. Paper No. 5, 1965).
The second major case was a decision by the EEC in 1962 to retaliate under Article
XIX:3 rather than accept compensation for a U.S. escape clause action on carpets and
glass products. GATT Doc. L/1803 (1962). Though no claim of legal violation was made,
EEC officials regarded the action as unjustified and wished to make it clear that suh
action was not acceptable. See J. EVANS, supra note 3, at 167; E. PREG, TRADERS AND DiPLO-
MATS 53 n.20 (1970).
The third major case was the United States decision in 1963 to retaliate under Article
XXVIII: 1 for the EEC's withdrawal of member country tariff concessions on poultry.
Appendix, Item A-26. The EEC action was legal, but the protective measures which
replaced the binding (the EEC variable levy) were, although perhaps technically legal,
certainly against the spirit of GATT policy. The United States could have accepted
equivalent compensation on other products, but chose to reject the offer as a way of
protesting the poultry restrictions and the similar direction of the EEC's Common Agricul-
tural Policy in general.
There were two other relatively minor cases. In 1952 Turkey retaliated in a response to a
United States escape clause action on dried figs; though Article XIX:3 does not require
a finding of legal violation, the Turkish government had in fact claimed that the United
States action violated GATT Article XIX conditions. See Appendix, Item B-8. The other
case was an Article XIX withdrawal by Belgium, also in 1952, in response to a United
States escape clause action on fur felt hat bodies, still another case in which a charge of
legal violation lurked in the background. See Appendix, Item A-9.
The fact that three of the five actions involved the United States escape clause may be
attributable in part to the fact that this United States-sponsored exception had been a
serious cause of concern to other governments from the beginning, and was thus a natural
object of the didactic impulse. See W. A. BROWN, supra note 9, at 89-90. Perhaps the same
lesson can be drawn from the fact that all five actions have been aimed at superpowers.
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threats will vary according to the way that they are perceived. Unless
the recipient is persuaded that economic retaliation is justified, the
threats may be perceived as bare power tactics and thus generate greater
intransigence than before. Agreed substantive rules can perform an
important function here, "chipping off," to use Jackson's term, the
underlying question of whether the reaction is fair or appropriate. The
legal justification will affect not only the reaction of the decision-making
officials themselves, but also their ability to use such threats as a justi-
fication to others. At some point, indeed, the decision-making official
may well find himself arguing the rules more vigorously than foreign
governments. 9
A third cost-related function that substantive rules can sometimes
serve is their role in justifying difficult decisions. This function
arises when an official concludes that he would like to oppose a certain
demand. One of the costs he must bear in taking that position is the
necessity of explaining his opposition to the proponents and to their
Congressmen. Explanations such as "Your hurt is not serious enough"
or "Other interests are more important" tend to make the costs fairly
high-either violent anger, or, the next worse thing, hour upon hour
of rehashing the facts and rearguing the values. An answer in terms of
the need to comply with international rules helps to avoid these con-
sequences. While such answers do not necessarily dissuade further
effort, they at least offer the official a politically tenable basis for stale-
mate." Such excuses are particularly useful in the case of the casual
Threats of retaliation are not employed loosely, but they are quite common when
governments resist correcting legal violations. In the United States dairy products matter
mentioned above, for example, although only the Netherlands actually retaliated, the
threat was also made by New Zealand, Canada, Norway, Australia and France. GATT
Docs. CP.6/SR.10 (1951), SR.7/10 (1952). These threats were emphasized by the Executive
officials before the Congress, even to the point of mentioning specific products that might
be affected. Hearings on the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951 Before the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 2947-51 (1951).
49. Officials always seem to think it worthwhile to invoke such justifications when
they speak of these threats. Consider, for example, the form (if not the somewhat dated
substance) of the following statement in a presidential message to the Congress:
I reject this argument [for increased trade restrictions] not only because I believe in
the principle of freer trade, but also for a very simple pragmatic reason: Any re-
duction in our imports produced by U.S. restmctions not accepted by our trading
partners would invite foreign reactions against our own exports-all quite legally.
Address by President Nixon to Congress, Nov. 18, 1969, United States Trade Policy, 5
WEEKLY COMATION OF PRESmENTIL DocumEmts 1617, 1618 (1969).
50. The former Director General of GATT, Sir Eric Wyndham-White, would often
tell visitors the story of the government official who once called upon him with a private
industry representative in tow. The official asked Sir Eric if a certain trade restriction then
being advocated by the industry representative would violate GATT. There being some
room for argument on the issue, the Director General gave a "balanced" legal opinion.
The government official later confessed some annoyance about the performance, explain-
ing that all the way to Geneva he had been telling the industry representative that the
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or unwilling supporter-the Congressman or party official making a
routine representation on behalf of a constituent. Legal impossibility,
often much overstated, removes pressure from the token supporter,
and thus from the decision-making official himself.
The word "excuse" gives too little credit to this phenomenon. The
possibility of a tenable stance may well be an important influence on
the decision itself. It affects not only the decision-maker's cost calcula-
tions, but also the number of people around him who might otherwise
feel compelled to press for, or vote for, the opposite result. In addition,
the justification helps to sustain continued and vigorous presentation
of one's views. For Executive officials particularly, there is a limit
beyond which advocacy of purely personal views may be considered
an abuse of one's office. Concern for international rules, rightly, has
more leeway.
A final cost-related function has to do with the point made earlier
about momentum and "digging in." Contrary to popular belief, the
forces which gather behind any particular proposal for trade restric-
tions are not a fixed or inevitable quantity. A good deal depends on
the way the original proposal is handled. If the proponents can be
persuaded at the outset that success is quite doubtful, they will in many
cases accept the fact and turn their energies elsewhere. This result is
not as unlikely as it may seem, for in a substantial number of cases
foreign competition is only a part-very often just a small part-of the
business difficulties behind the claim for protection. But, on the other
hand, if government opposition is slow to mount or is not particularly
convincing at the outset, the forces behind the proposal are likely to
grow. The expectation of success will draw forth the investment of
additional time and effort, and perhaps new allies as well. And, need-
less to say, the more the investment grows, the greater will be the
subsequent efforts to save it.
The function of international rules in connection with this final
point should be fairly obvious. Some resistance from government offi.
cials is expected, and initially negative responses are discounted ac-
cordingly. Knowledge that the government will be required to breach
internittional rules is a good deal more discouraging. The self-screening
proposal was impossible because it violated GATT, and that Sir Eric's answer had now
made it much more difficult to oppose the measure.
Professor Dam mentions this phenomenon in the passage quoted earlier, p. 1300
supra, though for some reason he makes it seem that the phenomenon belongs to "pro.
cedures" rather than "rules."
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of protectionist demands which such discouragement performs may well
be one of the most important functions international rules perform.
2. The United States Congress
The role of GATT substantive rules in decisions by the United
States Congress can be dealt with rather briefly. It will be evident, of
course, that individual Congressmen can be influenced by GATT rules
in all of the ways already discussed. The Congress as a whole, however,
plays an institutional role in trade policy-making quite different from
that of the Executive. It is that larger role I wish to discuss here.
The Congress tends to act more favorably toward requests for pro-
tection than does the Executive. The conventional explanation of this
difference is that legislators are closer politically to the local interests
seeking protection and are less immediately involved with the day-to-
day demands of foreign relations. It is difficult to determine just how
widely basic attitudes differ, for Congress and the Executive have de-
veloped a form of role playing which certainly exaggerates the differ-
ence. According to the common stereotype, Executive officials appear
to the Congress as ultrasensitive diplomats ready to pay any price for
international good will, while legislators are seen by the Executive as
unthinking captives of medieval mercantilism. Role sometimes merges
into reality, for the more one side treats the other side as if the stereo-
type were true, the more its own behavior tends to conform to the
opposing caricature. It must be noted, however, that this adversary
process also serves as a convenient political device for both Congress
and the Executive, enabling each to avoid some of the responsibility
for compromises which both may know to be necessary. If the Executive
should ever stop fighting for liberal trade principles, it very much re-
mains to be seen whether the Congress would do everything it says it
wants to do.51
51. It can be argued that exactly this situation arose recently in connection with the
Nixon Administration's efforts to secure voluntary restraints on textile imports. A bill
designed to strengthen the Executive's hand in negotiations mas introduced by Chairman
Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee. It provided for more stringent quotas
by law if a voluntary accord could not be reached. The bill mudroomed into an omnibus
package containing a host of other restrictions which would have marked a sharp
turnabout in United States trade policy. For the most recent version. see H.R. 20, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), discussed at length in the Note which appears in this same issue,
infra p. 1418. Although the Japanese textile industry finally offered to accept voluntary
restraints, the Administration rejected the terms of the Japanese proposal as inadequate
and seemed to be content to let the matter ride, even though passage of the omnibus bill
in the Ninety-second Congress was rapidly becoming a certainty. The game of Russian
roulette proved too much for Chairman Mills. Mills opened his own negotiations with
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In accordance with its role, the Congress has generally maintained a
certain independence from the international commitments represented
by membership in GATT, viewing itself more as an umpire than a
participant in the contest between GATT and local interests. Congress
has never formally ratified the General Agreement. 2 Although Con-
gress has given the Executive the occasional negotiating authority and
funds needed to support U.S. participation in GATT programs, it has
almost always done so in a way which has carefully limited Congres-
sional involvement.53 In day-to-day affairs, Congress tends to treat
GATT rules as the ward of the Executive, seldom if ever raising
GATT questions on its own motion.
The first principle of Executive strategy is to keep Congress as far
away as possible from all trade issues. When pressures for legislative
action become serious, the Executive will very frequently make a
partial concession on its own, hoping to avert something worse from
Congress. 4 GATT rules sometimes serve to justify the Executive's not
going further.
the Japanese industry, secured agreement on voluntary restraints less restrictive than
those demanded by the Administration, and then announced that the "unilateral" Japanese
action had removed the need for the legislation as a whole. Later reports indicate that
Chairman Mills is now working on the major textile exporters. See N.Y. Times, March
9, 1971, at 47, col. 1 (city ed.); id. at col. 2; id., March 10, 1971, at 59, col. 3 (city cd.); id,,
June 16, 1971, at 61, col. 5 (city ed.).
Author's note: The final chapter in this story was a renewed campaign by the President
to upset this accommodation on the ground that it was too generous. Under a threat of
non-legislative quotas, Japan and the other major Asian exporters recently accepted the
more restrictive "voluntary" limits sought by the administration. N.Y. Times, Oct, 16
1971, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.).
52. The General Agreement was presented to the Congress as a trade agreement which,
under the authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, supra note 27, could be
entered into by the President alone. For a detailed study of this proposition and Its
domestic law effects, see Jackson, supra note 29.
53. The recently concluded Kennedy Round trade negotiations were the sixth "round"
of tariff negotiations under GATT. In each the United States was ecjuipped with legisla-
tive authority to negotiate. From 1951 until 1962, however, each legislative authorization
carried the statement that:
The enactment of this Act shall not be construed to determine or indicate the
approval or disapproval by the Congress of the Executive Agreement known as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
62 Stat. 72 (1951). See generally, Jackson, supra note 29, at 267-68 and Appendix D. The
1962 legislation said nothing.
The onmibus trade legislation currently pending before the Congress (and unlikely to
pass) contains the first line authorization for United States GATT expenses. H.R. 20, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 3, § 321 (1971). Previous funding has been accomplished by treating
GATT as a nonrecurring international conference under the State Department's "Inter-
national Conferences" appropriation. See Jackson, supra note 29, at 271.
54. Almost every proposal made to the Executive, of course, has the possibility of
legislation lurking behind it, particularly if the proponents know what they are doing,
A recent example illustrates the way things are usually handled. Beginning sometime In
1964, several American industries began to advocate revision of the United States anti.
dumping laws to make them more effective (some would have said "restrictive'). Legisla-
tion was introduced. For the fully developed text, see S. 2045, 89th Cong., Ist Sess, (1965).
To head off action on the bills, the Treasury Department issued new regulations which,
while also meeting some of the importer's complaints, were primarily designed to disarm
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When legislative debate on trade policy occurs, it tends to focus on
the bread-and-butter issues-the immediate impact on business and
workers. Executive intervention tends to address the same criteria. The
main argument against trade-restricting measures is invariably that
damage to local interests is either insubstantial or otherwise remediable,
coupled with an appeal to consider the economic harm that protec-
tionist measures will cause for export industries. 5 GATT obligations
are often invoked to sustain the credibility and legitimacy of foreign
retaliation, but that is usually the extent of their function.
On the surface, therefore, the tone of Congressional decision-making
would probably not be significantly different under GABB. Moreover,
against this larger institutional background, it would be difficult to
argue that the direct impact of GATT rules on individual Congress-
men is all that significant. The main difference in Congressional
decision-making, I think, would be in the quality of Executive par-
the legislative effort by meeting some of its most persuasive objections to existing practice.
29 Fed. Reg. 16320 (1964). The move succeeded. Shortly thereafter, the Executive negoti-
ated an international agreement, the so-called Antidumping Code, which required a
liberalization of certain United States administrative criteria and procedures. Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI, June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A-S. No. 6431, re-
printed separately as Sales No.: GATT11969-5. The text of the Code bears every indica-
tion of having been negotiated to limit American commitments to those not requiring
new legislation, and the Executive proceeded to issue new Treasury regulations on that
theory. 19 C.F.R. § 153.1-.64 (1970); see Anthony, The American Response to Dumping
from Capitalist and Socialist Economies, 54 CoRmNE.L L. Rxv. 159, 186-89 (1969). The
Executive's tightrope act received generally sour reviews from the Congress, and legisla-
tion was introduced to prevent application of the Code by the Tariff Commission. The
final text, 82 Stat. 1347 (1968), was the product of a vigorous contest; the result was
inconclusive, leaving the question ultimately to a case-by-case appraisal by the Tariff
Commission. See generally Pintos & Murphy, Congress Dumps the International Anti-
dumping Code, 18 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. 180 (1968).
For a discussion of a similar response to Congressional pressures concerning the escape
clause, see Metzger, The Escape Clause and Adjustment Assistance, 2 LAw AND PoLicY L4
INrr's Bus. 352 (1970).
55. For example, in the debate over the American dairy products restrictions, see
note 48 supra, even though the GATT had declared the restrictions to be in violation of
GATT in the most emphatic terms possible, see 2 GATT, BISD 16 (1951), Executive
witnesses seeking repeal of the measures barely even mentioned the legal violation itself,
concentrating instead on the threat of retaliation and the availability of less drastic relief.
See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2594 and S. 2645 Before the Senate Banhing and Currency Com-
mittee, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 302-04 (1952). Partial revision of the measure to meet
just a few of the complaints was proposed by the Senate Committee with the following
justification:
[rjhe provision in its present form is unnecessarily restrictive and inflexible, and
may result in injury to the American export trade and to American producers de-
pendent on exports, disproportionate to the benefits resulting from the provision.
S. REP. No. 1599, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1952).
Although GATT rules figured more prominently in the Walnut Logs hearings, supra
note 40, the Administration case to the Congress urged primarily that (a) export controls
achieved nothing from a conservation point of view as long as domestic consumption went
unchecked; (b) there were really a lot more black walnut trees than had been supposed
earlier, (c) restrictions on log exports hurt the balance of payments; and (d) the
popularity of walnut veneer was not likely to Last. See Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 1, at
80-84, 91, 173-79.
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ticipation in the process. Because of the way political responsibility
has been structured, Executive leadership has become the major out-
side influence over what Congress does in the day-to-day trade policy
decisions which constitute the real margin of choice. Ultimately, there-
fore, the case for GATT rules in Congressional decision-making must
be the same as that for the Executive itself.
C. The Role of Substantive Rules in GATT Procedures
Formal GATT procedures are rarely invoked before a government
has taken some initial action. Consequently, the work done in GATT
is usually directed to the more difficult task of persuading officials to
reconsider decisions already taken. The greater difficulty of influencing
policy at this point is a fact which should be underlined at the outset,
for, although international procedures are in many respects more vis.
ible, they are probably not the arena in which substantive rules exert
their most significant influence on government behavior. The point
should not be taken too far, however. GATT experience indicates
that a fair number of trade policy decisions rest on foundations that
can be shaken by subsequent review-sometimes a too-limited view of
possible alternatives, or perhaps a mistaken calculation as to trade
consequences, foreign reactions, or GATT law itself.r0 There are, in
addition, many decisions which have been closely contested at home
and which pro-GATT officials have not yet accepted as final.57
As presently constituted, GATT procedures can help to promote
reappraisal in several ways. Formal GATT action can provide a new
"event" that will serve as an excuse to reopen the issue. GATT pro-
cedures also offer a series of graduated steps-ritual expressions of
nastiness-which communicate seriousness of purpose in a way that
bilateral representation alone cannot do. 8 Finally, international action
56. In the Australian Subsidy case, for example, Appendix, Item A-8, the issue Involved
a consumer subsidy which, probably for reasons of its lesser visibility, was instituted In a
rather indirect fashion that seemed to have unanticipated trade effects. The difficulty
of proving the trade effects and the simple inertia against changin g a standing practice
had made the Australian government reluctant to consider alternative means.
Sometimes, it appears that decisions are taken by officials who are not close enough
to GATT affairs to appreciate the consequences. See, e.g., Hudec, supra note 33, at
660-61. At other times, legal rights are simply miscalculated, as when United States
lawyers (including the author) led themselves to believe that econometric analysis offered
by the United States would be accepted as a measure of Article XXVIII rights In the
Chicken War dispute, Appendix, Item A-26. See I A. CSAYEs, T. EuLiucui & A. LOWENLLD,
INT'L LEGAL PROCESS 249-306 (1968).
57. This was the situation in the early stages of the dispute over American dairy
products restrictions, Appendix, Item B-4, and in the long struggle to secure repeal of
a certain French stamp tax. Id. at Item B-19.
58. Bilateral notes and representations have a dreary sameness about them which
makes it difficult to distinguish real grievances from routine protests. GATT procedures
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can certify the normative standards in question, validating the often-
ignored claims of the government's own diplomats. Parallel to these
pressure devices, GATT procedures also offer the opportunity to ex-
plore possible solutions through consultation and negotiation in a
neutral setting.
The question to be addressed is whether a code of substantive rules
contributes to the success of these procedures. The alternative, of course,
is GABB. The GABB approach is sometimes described as a preference
for "conciliation" rather than "confrontation."r' 9 The major difference
is that GABB procedures would not be directed toward formal judg-
ment about previously defined normative standards, but would seek
to produce a satisfactory result through consultation in which all the
relevant social and economic factors would be considered in depth.
One hesitates to say that GABB procedures reject all forms of norma-
tive judgment, for even in negotiations both sides will strive to mar-
shall the community's normative sentiments as a tool of persuasion.
But GABB would reject prior standards, trusting instead to the analysis
of causes and consequences to reveal whatever normative judgments
are appropriate.
I would argue that "conciliation" procedures would not work as
effectively as the more rule-oriented GATT procedures. The principal
difficulty with the GABB approach is that it assumes a much greater
degree of cooperation from the object government than usually exists.
As a rule, the officials responsible for the decision will not have much
enthusiasm for the idea of reversing themselves. In addition, even
officials friendly to GATT objectives will often be wary of generating
too much pressure for results they cannot guarantee. Although absolute
refusal to participate is rare, these considerations frequently produce
lesser forms of resistance along the line. The object government may
try to find reasons for not discussing the matter at all. It may try to
draw out and divert what discussion there is by insisting on considera-
tion of as many other things as possible. And it may, as a final defense,
take whatever plausible position there is in defense of its action and
hold that position to impasse.
Resistance of this kind is difficult to deal with under any circum-
permit further demonstrations not available in bilateral diplomatic channels-first, the
docketing of the issue on a formal agenda, then some public speeches, then the request
for appointment of a Panel, then the request for a decision or ruling from the Panel, and
finally, the same sequence of announcements and procedures to demonstrate the threat of
retaliation.
59. The term "condliation" is used in many different senses in GATT parlance, in-
cluding occasional use as the title of the very "legalistic" Panel procedures.
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stances. The only effective answer is to assert with some firmness a
community judgment identifying what is expected at each point of
resistance. Although it is sometimes possible to make such judgments
in a completely ad hoc fashion, an uncooperative government can
usually find some plausible justification for doing things its way, plau-
sible enough to make it difficult for the community to insist upon
its position on the basis of ad hoc judgment alone. By rejecting not
only the means but also the objective of imposing any more systematic
normative framework on its procedures, GABB puts itself at the mercy
of any government practicing this all-too-well developed art.
The first difficulty likely to present itself is the matter of "juris-
diction." Consultations are seldom an enjoyable experience for the
object government, and most governments will not undergo these
discomforts for no reason at all. Under present GATT practice, breach
of a particular rule is the most common justification for imposing such
discomforts, one that will usually hold good until the matter is cor-
rected.60 GABB would have to work with something much more fragile.
True, governments will usually agree to consult at least once about
any measure that involves "trade damage," the distortion of existing
or anticipated trade patterns. It is difficult, however, to sustain that
justification for any extended length of time, for sooner or later the
measure itself will become part of the status quo. The much-heralded
"pragmatic" review of EEC trade consequences suffered just such a fate.
Once the main outlines of the EEC were accepted as a fact, review
became increasingly pro forma, until finally the EEC announced that
completion of its transitional stage had made the EEC itself a fact,
and that consequently there was no longer any justification for review
at all. 61
60. GATT waiver procedures under Article XXV usually establish periodic revlws
as part of the price for the waiver. See note 86 infra. The record for longevity probably
goes to the United States Section 22 waiver, GATT, 3d Supp. BISD 32 (1955), where re-
views of United States measures, often quite vigorous, are conducted to the present day.
Legal violations which are recognized but not under waiver can likewise be held under
review indefinitely. E.g., Brazilian Internal Taxes, Appendix, Item A-7 (annual reviewa
1949-57); French Stamp Tax, id. at Item B-19 (annual reviews 1955-61).
61. GATT Doc. L/3124 (1968). For the decision establishing consultation procedures,
see GATT, 7th Supp. BISD 69 (1959).
A similar result occurred in the case of the Greek-Turkish complaint over United
States export subsidies on sultanas, Appendix, Item B-7. The complaint alleged trade
damage, but in the absence of any obligation covering export subsidies, there could be
no claim of legal violation. The United States went along with treating the matter as a
special agenda item (i.e., as though it were a legal complaint) for two sessions, but
when Greece proposed to continue the item on the agenda for another session the United
States objected. American obligations would be discharged, it was said, by reporting
on sultanas together with all other American export subsidies in the general report on
such matters required by GATT Article XVI. GAT Do. SR.8/12 (1953).
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GABB's bias against normative judgments is likely to cause an even
more serious problem with regard to the scope and purpose of dis-
cussion once it is begun. The problem is the one Professor Jackson
describes in the passage, quoted earlier, arguing for some means of
"chipping off" particular issues.62 Unless the parties have some agreed
definition of what is relevant, each side is likely to want to discuss
that part of the "total picture" favorable to its position. The conse-
quence will be not only a paralysis of judgment at the end, but,
long before that, an inability to elucidate the facts needed to make
that judgment.
The difficulties GABB would probably encounter in this regard are
illustrated very nicely by a case Professor Dam describes. The case
involved a complaint by several governments protesting a discrimina-
tory agreement between the EEC and several French African coun-
tries.6 The parties reached a complete impasse on the question of
whether the "association" agreement met the requirements of Article
XXIV for free trade areas (a reminder, incidentally, that rules do not
always work either). The parties then agreed to put the legal issues
to one side and to search for a solution through GABB-type consulta-
tions examining in detail the actual economic effects of the association
agreement. Dam makes the reasons for failure quite dear.
[T]he Six could not reach agreement with the majority of the
working party on the relevant principles to be applied in deter-
mining the impact of the association upon world trade in those
commodities.
• The position of most members of the working party was
simple and straightforward: the association could necessarily open
to the associated territories a vast barrier-free, protected market
adequate to absorb not only present production but all foreseeable
production by the overseas territories as a whole with respect to
each of the twelve commodities. The effect would be, according
to this analysis, to permit the associated territories to capture
markets currently served by nonassociated areas; to encourage addi-
tional, and thus uneconomic, production in the associated terri-
tories, thereby necessarily causing even further diversion of exports
from nonassociated territories; and, given what would become the
inevitable need of nonassociated territories to find markets outside
the Six, to depress world market prices.
To the Six, reasoning in this manner was reasoning in a vacuum.
Harm to third countries could not be predicted without a forecast
62. See p. 108 supra.
63. See pp. 1360-61 infra.
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of future trade trends in world prices, at least through the transi-
tion period. The association would be only one factor among many
that would determine the level of those prices. One could not
overlook, the Six argued, the rising world standard of living, the
stability of traditional trade patterns, or the physical, climatic,
and financial problems affecting production in the overseas terri-
tories. More particularly, it would be improper to ignore the
rising level of consumption within the Community itself which
would result from the creation of the customs union.
The majority of the working party defended on several grounds
the procedure of attempting to isolate the influence of the associa-
tion from all other influences on prices. Third countries would be
entitled to participate in the fruits of rising consumption through-
out the world if there were no Treaty of Rome. Those countries
were, moreover, entitled to participate in the rising consumption of
the Six stemming from economic integration, since the expectation
of increased consumption was an essential part of the rationale
underlying the customs-union and free-trade-area exceptions to the
most-favored-nation principle of the General Agreement.04
The impasse cannot help but recall Jackson's hypothetical contro-
versy quoted earlier.6 5 And, interestingly, despite his general criticism
of Article XXIV's focus on substantive rules rather than procedures,""
Dam's answer, as Jackson's, is to write another set of substantive rules:
Although the difficulties faced in reviewing only twelve commodi-
ties in the EEC case suggest that there are some limitations on the
results to be expected from such reviews, it is easy to exaggerate
those limitations. The process would not always have to be so diffi-
cult as it was in the case of the Six. First, agreement that trade
creation and trade diversion were the standards to be used in the
review would facilitate matters greatly. The disagreements out-
lined above were primarily differences in standards. Second, the
burden of coming forward with the relevant statistical and eco-
nomic information could be placed squarely on the contracting
parties seeking to institute the regional arrangement; if an obliga-
tion to show that trade creation exceeded trade diversion were
placed unequivocally on the members of the regional grouping,
one of the difficulties of obtaining information would be mini-
mized. The GATT secretariat could also play an important role
in providing the kind of expert statistical and fact-evaluation
services which, for example, the staff of the Commission of the
European Economic Community provides in intra-Community
64. DAM, supra note 13, at 292-93.
65. P. 1308 supra.
66. P. 1308 supra. For one possible explanation of the apparent contradiction in
Dam's position, see note 185 infra and accompanying text.
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matters. Finally, it might be possible, once agreement upon the
trade-creation, trade-diversion standard were reached, to arrive at
certain rules of thumb that would facilitate the analysis of par-
ticular proposals. 67
We turn, finally, to several related questions about the particular
kind of results that GATT and GABB procedures are likely to pro-
duce. The central issue is GABB's insistence on examining the actual
economic effects in each case. GATT procedures are admittedly dif-
ferent, for on many occasions rules are pursued in a manner which
seems to ignore particular economic consequences. I would argue,
however, that this more wooden approach very often serves a more
useful purpose than would detailed economic analysis.
Many trade controversies do not require the detailed sort of analysis
GABB would offer. Some of the normative standards which operate
in this area accept certain adverse economic consequences as the price
of recognizing other competing values. As I shall argue in Part III,
I believe this is the case with many of the seemingly wooden GATT
rules concerning regional economic arrangements. 8 Similarly, on some
issues such as the measure of retaliation the dispute itself will be more
political than economic, and the political need for demonstrable objec-
tivity may well justify a somewhat arbitrary standard in place of one
more difficult to apply.69
67. DAm, supra note 13, at 294.
68. Pp. 1359-66 infra.
69. The point may be made about the GATT rules and practices for measuring the
equivalence of bargaining concessions generally. Given the obvious impossibility of fore-
casting actual trade gains, the practical goal here is simply to keep all countries movng
toward the same pace. In the short run, what the rules have to do is to prove to the
home constituency that one's country is not losing out in any conspicuous fashion. Far
from being a flaw in the system, the arithmetic which allows every single participant to
report home a net gain in trade is doing exactly what it is supposed to do. For detailed
commentaries on the GATT's approach toward reciprocity, see J. EvAns, supra note 3,
at 21; DAM, supra note 13, at 58.
With regard to retaliation itself, I disagree with the criticism implicit in Professor
Dam's charge that
In the "Chicken War" dispute... the discussions under Article XXVIII deteriorated
into a silly and essentially meaningless battle ....
D A, supra note 13, at 374. The "battle" -as over the quantity of retaliation the United
States was allowed as compensation for the EEC withdrawal of a tariff concession. GATT
practice called for comparison of the amount of trade under the tariff items involved, an
issue which produced widely different estimates based on differences in the base years
used, the influence of certain admittedly distorting factors, and the validity of statistical
methods used. Dam's point, I suppose, is that none of this debate had any relation to
the real damage the EEC was doing to the United States, or the real damage to EEC
trade of the proposed American measures. If it is correct, however, to say tlt the primary
purpose of retaliation is as a symbolic device to awaken the other side to the serious
consequences of its policy, see note 48 supra, it becomes evident that the primary concern
of both parties-and of the GATT itself-is to establish some standard of legitimacy so
that the retaliation will not trigger something larger. The main test of such a standard
is that it be acceptable, not only to the parties but, especially, to their constituencies back
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Even where economic impact is the issue, there will be some cases
in which it is more effective in the long run to stand by a rule based
on a rather crude general prediction as to those effects. There are two
reasons. The first is that the evaluation of economic consequences in
particular cases is often quite difficult and conjectural, particularly
since, if pressure is to be applied promptly, judgments must be made
before there is any data as to actual effects. Even with the data, it is
seldom very easy to separate the effects of any measure from develop-
ments in the economic situation generally.70 As a consequence, such
judgments run a great risk of being too inconclusive to have any per-
suasive effect in the heat of actual controversy. The second reason is
an extension of the first. Because actual economic effects are so difficult
to forecast, a standard of restraint based on such forecasts will have
a far less limiting effect at the critical time when government decisions
are first made. The temptation to wait-and-see is much too appealing.
And, of course, once the measure is in motion, it is much more difficult
to stop.
A related issue is whether, despite these advantages, the tendency to
approach trade problems in terms of wooden rules may not blind the
participants to the possibility of exceptional circumstances, as well as
the general need to consider compromise. The question is basically
one of fact. The GATT/ITO draftsmen certainly expected that their
substantive rules would be applied with sensitivity to these limits. 1
Contrary to some critics, I would argue that GATT practice has
generally vindicated this expectation. Even in its most legalistic days,
the GATT was quite generous with waivers and with other kinds of
tolerance for delay and partial compliance. 72 Then as now, special
circumstances were invariably argued as the excuse for such deviations,
home. The numbers game played by the United States and EEC had two virtues: (a) the
governments were willing to accept it, and (b) its arithmetic looked very objective to the
general public. In the end, the Chicken War standard passed the essential test: It
worked.
70. For a brief account of the GATT's reaction to requests for more detailed economic
analysis in particular cases, see notes 192-93 and accompanying text. The Sardines cage,
Appendix, Item A-11, illustrated the typical kind of difficulties that arise. The contro-
versy concerned differential treatment of two arguably substitutable products. Norway, the
exporter of the disfavored product, produced evidence of a decline in trade following the
imposition of differential treatment. The Panel concluded that, despite the evldent
likelihood of prejudice, there was no way of proving a casual link between the measures
and the trade decline, owing to irregularities both in the composition of the trade (some
of the sales were duty-free transactions with United States military installations) and In
the prior volume of trade generally. GATT, 1st Supp. BISD 53, 56 (1953). The arguments
over the EEC-African association quoted earlier, p. 1393 supra, give some Idea of the
range of items that would have to be considered.
71. See pp. 1813-14 supra.
72. See pp. 1337-58 infra.
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and the decisions permitting them were justified in these terms. A
similar flexibility has been evident in GATT legal proceedings them-
selves. While there have been individual cases in which governments
probably held on to legal claims past the point of good sense73 such
proceedings have generally been conducted with as much room as pos-
sible for negotiated solutions. Formal legal rulings have seldom been
sought before the parties are in evident deadlock.7 4 The rulings them-
selves have usually been expressed in terms that are soft and tentative,
and have almost invariably been accompanied by an invitation to
continue negotiations.-5 And, in fact, the parties have very often gone
back to the bargaining table after a ruling and worked out a bilateral
settlement.
76
The third and last issue about the comparative merits of rules versus
negotiations is the increasingly common argument that introduction of
legal claims will "poison the atmosphere" in a way which reduces the
possibility of favorable action by the object government. I think the
short answer is that the poison seems not to have been noticed very
much during the years when lawsuits were very common. To be sure,
legal rulings cause some discomfort 7 That is one of their purposes.
The word "poison" simply means that, for some reason, governments
no longer consider the discomfort owing. That such a change in atti-
tude has occurred is an important fact, one which must be examined
carefully when we consider GATT's own experience in the following
73. I would agree with Professor Dam that the debate over the EEC's Common Ex-
ternal Tariff under Article XXIV:5 was carried to unrealistic lengths by the EEC's critics,
although for a somewhat different reason. Professor Dam finds the effort of the critics to
work out other mathematical formulae more favorable to themselves a completely sterile
exercise, and feels that more attention should have been paid to the real trade effects.
DA2r, supra note 13, at 292-94. I would argue that, wooden though it is, the mathematical
averaging called for by Article XXIV:5 is about all that a GATT rule can ask for and
evaluate; it seems to me that the EEC had made its case.
74. That fact should be apparent from the number of cases, listed in Part B of the
Appendix, which were settled bilaterally. It must be remembered that almost all of those
cases involved some initial charge of a legal violation.
75. The tone of the legal ruling will vary according to the anticipated difficulties a
party is likely to have in complying. For some of the better examples of GATT's
consummate command of ambiguity, see the rulings and recommendations in Australian
Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Appendix, Item A-8; Belgian Family allowances, id. at
Item A-14; French Export Subsidy on Wheat Flour, Id. at Item A-19. See generally,
Hudec, supra note 33.
76. See the results listed in Part A of the Appendix.
77. When it suits their purpose, government officials can affect a worldly sophistica-
tion about GATE legal rulings which makes the very idea of "discomfort" seem ridiculous.
The denial does not ring true. In addition to the testimony implicit in the word "poison"
itself, there is also some interesting evidence in the GATT records themselves in the
form of statements by government officials when they feel wrongly accused. See GATT Doc.
SR.9/29 (1955) (Greek objection that "somewhat humiliating" Panel proceedings seem
reserved for smaller countries); GATT Doc. SR.8/14 (1953) (inequity of bringing teveral
legal complaints against Belgium when countries in weaker balance-of-paznents position
get away with same things).
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section. For the present, it is enough to say that the allergy seems to be
acquired rather than congenital.
III. GATT Rules in Operation
In Part III, I wish to examine the GATT's own experience with
substantive rules, focusing in particular on the conditions which seem
to have accounted for the relative successes and failures of GATT
law over time. The main conclusions can be summarized briefly. The
GATT substantive code did in fact work during the first decade, even
better than the surface indications might suggest. The decline in the
influence of GATT rules since then is equally striking. The decline
can be traced, I believe, to two basic changes in the larger GATT en-
vironment. First, the GATT rules no longer command the very tight
consensus they once did; in some cases the underlying consensus itself
has broken down, and in others changing economic conditions have
made rules inapposite to their original purpose. Second, both the
passing of the postwar era and the subsequent realignment of GATT's
membership into large blocs have removed some of the political in-
centives which led governments to work through a formal legal struc-
ture.
These developments have seriously undermined the basis of the old
GATT code. At this moment, one cannot predict with any certainty
whether there is a sufficient basis, either substantively or politically,
for a new GATT code on the original model. Some limitations in the
original design appear inevitable. I believe, however, that a careful
look at the sources of breakdown will show that a good many signs
of life remain-enough, I would argue, to justify setting in motion an
attempt to renegotiate.78
A. The First Decade
The most striking thing about the first decade of GATT legal experi-
ence was the extent to which GATT substantive rules were accepted
as the framework within which business of all kinds was to be con-
78. The statement is made with an awareness of the diplomat's justifiable reluctance to
launch any major negotiation without some pretty good expectation of success. As I
point out later, however, the first step in any event must be a less formal exploration of
possibilities among the major participants. I am saying that I believe there is a basis
for launching that considerably more tentative sort of effort, at a minimum. Judgment as
to what should follow that step must abide the event.
For a recent study which takes up many of these questions, see J. EvANs, supra note 3.
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ducted. The record in terms of overall compliance, though far from
disappointing, does not tell the entire story.
The GATT complaints machinery was used a good deal more than
its formal decisions would have indicated. For the fifteen or so deci-
sions actually rendered during this period, about twice that number of
lawsuits were filed and then settled bilaterally.7" Complaints usually
took the form of a written request to put an item on the agenda, often
no more than a paragraph sketching the nature of the legal dispute
and asking for "consideration" by the Contracting Parties. These papers
were often filed before bilateral contacts had been fully exhausted, just
by way of preparing the groundwork.80 The frequency and businesslike
calm with which these steps were taken indicated, I believe, a wide-
ranging acceptance of GATT substantive rules as a relevant ingredient
in the solution of trade problems.
The GATT's less formal "consultations" also involved a good deal
more attention to GATT law than appeared on the surface. A typical
example is a case that Dam mentions briefly, and, I would argue, mis-
construes. In the late 1950s when the European balance of payments
crisis was over, most European countries found that they were unable
promptly to remove quantitative controls protecting certain very weak
sectors of their economies. The initial response of the United States was
to press for compliance within fixed time limits,8 ' but when it became
apparent that the problems were more intractable than had been sup-
posed, the United States proposed a more gradual procedure of annual
consultations and progress reports for the remaining countries involved,
chiefly France and Italy.82 Dam cites this procedure as an example of
79. See Appendix, Part B.
80. Several weeks after filing the complaint concerning French export restrictions,
Appendix, Item B-1, the American delegation had to request a postponement of formal
discussion because it did not yet have all the facts. GATT Doc. CP.5JSR.5 (1950). Simi-
larly, Belgium had to ask for a postponement in the case involving French and United
Kingdom quantitative restrictions, Appendix, Item B-2, because bilateral discussions had
not yet been completed. GATT Doe. CP.5/SR.16 (1950). A United States complaint
concerning French stamp taxes was withdrawn after further bilaterals persuaded the
United States that it had gotten the facts wrong. GATT Does. L1245 (1954); SP-[28
(1955). The emergence of the same complaint later in the year, Appendix, Item B-19,
suggests that the United States may have been more unprepared than wrong.
81. The initial United States position wms reflected in the adoption of a standard
waiver form for post-balance of payments restrictions, the so-called Hard Core Waiver.
GATT, Sd Supp. BISD 38 (1955). The waiver was used in the case of Belgium and Luxem-
bourg. GATT, 4th Supp. BISD 22 (1955); id. at 27 (1956). A substantially modified form of
the waiver was worked out for West Germany. GATT, 8th Supp. BISD 31 (1959). Every-
one else fell under the later procedure.
82. GATT Doc. W.16/13 (1960). The procedure required governments to submit a list
of restrictions still in effect, the co-alled negative list, and to report and consult peri-
odically about plans for reducing the number of restrictions. The governments involved
generally compiled with the procedure, though there was occasionally some conspicuous
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the progress that can be made "without the necessity of poisoning the
atmosphere through charges of illegality."83 I would have stressed the
opposite point, for it was the universally acknowledged "illegality" of
these measures which led Italy and France to accept these tiresome and
somewhat humiliating procedures. The clearest indication of this un-
derstanding was the fact that, when French interest in the procedure
(never very keen to begin with) began to flag, the United States filed a
formal Article XXIII complaint to make clear its dissatisfaction.84
Shortly after the decision reaffirming United States rights, bilateral
consultations produced some further liberalizations, and the United
States announced that it was satisfied for the moment. Though perhaps
the dying gasp of the old system, the case does demonstrate rather
dearly the underlying legal structure on which the old system worked.85
The same recognition of the legal norms was present in the cases in-
volving flat noncompliance. The invariable response was to seek a
formal waiver. A request for a waiver constitutes an implicit recogni-
tion of the rule's continuing validity, not only in the plea itself but
also in the willingness to accept the sometimes cumbersome control
procedures which usually accompanied waivers. Some waivers during
this period were as demanding, in terms of procedures and detailed
criteria, as the General Agreement itself. Two waivers requested by
the United Kingdom even had their own disputes procedures to apply
the criteria in question, and the procedures were actually used on two
occasions. 86
foot-dragging. France did not produce a complete negative list until 1969. GATT Doe.
L/3212/Add.12 (1969).
83. DAm, supra note 13, at 854.
84. Appendix, Item A-22. The United States also filed an Article XXIII action against
Italy for the same reasons, but withdrew the complaint, before the Panel was convened,
upon reaching a satisfactory settlement. Id. at Item B-34.
85. Another example would be GATT's very "informal" approach to reviewing com-
pliance with the Article XII rules on balance of payments restrictions. Although the
Contracting Parties once turned down a proposal to subject such restrictions automatic-
ally to more rigorous legal analysis by Panels, see GATT Does. L/392/Rev.1 (1955):
SR.10/I (1955), the prevailing informality was broken at least three times when govern.
ments thought that the rules had been bent too far. See Appendix, Items A-12, B-2 and
B-13.
86. Both United Kingdom waivers involved permission to exceed Article I limits on
margins of preference in cases where, arguably, there would be no trade diversion. See
GATT, 2d Supp. BISD 20 (1953), amended, Sd Supp. BISD 25 (1955); id. at 21 (1955), For
the decisions, see Appendix, Items A-21, A-25.
Professor Jackson has compiled a complete table of waivers and their reporting re-
quirements up to January 1, 1969. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 549.52. With the exception
of (1) waivers allowing implementation of tariff revisions pending completion of ongoing
renegotiation procedures and (2) waivers releasing certain non-lMF members from the
need to enter special monetary agreements, almost all waivers have either provided for
annual reviews or have been of short enough duration to require extension procedures
which amount to the same thing.
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The relative success of the GATT legal structure during these years
rested on a particularly favorable set of community attitudes. Three as-
pects of this broader legal environment deserve to be mentioned. First,
during this period there was a reasonably firm consensus behind most
of the specific rules in question, and behind the tenor and balance of
the GATT code as a whole. The consensus went much further than
the written rules. On a number of occasions GATT Panels succeeded
in resolving textual ambiguities and omissions by drawing upon com-
munity policies and assumptions outside the Agreement itself.87 In
addition, Panels were also able to issue authoritative judgments as to
whether other practices had frustrated the "reasonable expectations"
underlying a particular tariff bargain, even though the practices them-
selves were not in violation of any express rule. 8 One could, without
stretching things, speak of a developing common law jurisprudence.
Second, if one can credit a number of statements both on and off
the record, there was a rather uniform belief during this period in the
importance of maintaining the integrity of the legal structure itself.
Many of the complaints stressed that the legal issue being raised was
primarily one of principle, and frequently other governments would
join in urging that special attention be given to a particular complaint
87. I have argued elsewhere that this is true of the Panel decision in the Belgian
Family Allowances case, Appendix, Item A-14. Hudec, supra note 33, at 636-65.
Another small but striking example is the ruling in the Indian Tax Rebates case,
Appendix, Item A-2. The issue was hether the reference in Article I:1 to "all matters re-
ferred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article I1I" meant that the NIFN obligation applied
to taxes affecting exports, given that the specific obligations of Article III mention only
taxes affecting imports. The Chairman of the Contracting Parties said yes. GATT Doc.
CP .2/R.l1 (1948). Then, during the 1954-55 Review Session, the Contracting Parties
adopted, for subsequent ratification, an amendment to Article I incorporating the ruling.
The amendment, however, applied Article I only to taxes on exports (the subject of
111:2) and not to other internal regulations affecting exports (the subject of 111:4). While
the distinction makes sense as a policy matter, given the reach of a rule affecting Lord-
knows-what internal regulations, that distinction could not have been made as a legal in-
terpretation of the original text which simply referred without distinction to "paragraphs
2 and 4." What the Contracting Parties had done, in fact, was to decide that it made sense
to apply the MfFN rule to export taxes (even if not to other internal regulations), and to
bend the text a little to get there. Interestingly, India reserved on the ruling at the time
and later rejected it categorically, GATT Doc. CP.-3/6 (1949), before going on to settle the
matter amicably in compliance with the ruling. Also interesting, though probably of no
practical consequence, is the fact that the Article I Amendment failed to secure the unani-
mous ratification required for formal adoption (lacking one vote for entirely technical
reasons), see GATT, 16th Supp. BISD 16 (1968), leaving the 1948 Chairman's Ruling once
again naked to the winds.
Other examples of creative legal rulings during this period would include the develop-
ment of the "reasonable expectations" standard as the test of non-violation nullification
and impairment. Appendix, Item A-8, the application of the Protocol's "existing legisla.
don" rule to overall increases in the rate structure of discriminatory taxes, id. at Item
A-7, and the development of a quite discretionary standard for reviewing proposed Article
XXIII retaliation, id. at Item A-10, adopted despite criticism GATT Does. $IL7/16, -17
(1952).
88. See notes 95-97 infra, and accompanying text.
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because of the importance of the precedent.89 Governments in violation
of the rules were repeatedly warned of the disrespect they were creating
for the legal structure as a whole.9 0 When the rules worked, govern-
ments generally announced their changes in policy as a sacrifice made
for the good of GATT law.0' Collapse of the GATT legal code was,
I think, genuinely perceived to be an undesirable event, a "cost" to
be avoided if possible.
Third, government responsiveness to GATT rules did not seem
to require very much attention to the niceties of "legal obligation,"
a fact which permitted GATT law to operate in a manner just as
flexible, if not more so, than that intended by the 1947 draftsmen.
The legal status of the Agreement itself was never made entirely dear.
It came into force (and still exists) by means of a Protocol of "Provi-
sional Application," a term which has had different meanings for dif-
ferent members.92 Day-to-day legal practice soon began to develop along
the same lines. Various modifications of the Agreement and its sclied-
ules were generally treated as operative without regard to when, if
ever, they formally came into effect. 3 Many of the early GATT's legal
interpretations were written in a form which purposefully failed to
make clear whether the suggested result was a legal requirement or
merely a piece of friendly advice. 4 The ambiguity seemed to make no
89. See, e.g., GATT Does. CP.4/SR.14, -15 (1950) (Appendix, Item A-8); CP.5/SR.14
(1950) (Appendix, Item A-9); SR.9/7 (1954) (Appendix, Item A-16).
90. See, e.g., GATT Docs. L/160 (1953) (Appendix, Item A-7); Press Releases GATT/42,
-43 (1951) (Appendix, Item R-4); and IC/5R.38 (1958) (Appendix, Item A-20).
91. See, e.g., GATT Docs. L/134 (1953) (Appendix, Item A-14). Press Release
GATT/79 (1952) (Appendix, Item B-3).
92. The text of the Protocol, which has been used for all subsequent accessions as well,
appears in 4 GATT, BISD 77 (1969). The term "provisional application" was originally
intended to signal the fact that the GATT was to be absorbed within, and in large part
replaced by, the parallel provisions of the ITO Charter-a formal treaty obligation, Al-
though the Protocol contains various express limitations on the signatories' legal obliga.
tions, such as the reservation for existing mandatory legislation and a very short 60.day
termination provision, the term "provisional application" itself has, so far as I can
tell, no operative meaning within GATT. (Many GATT officials have fallen into tile
habit of equating the term with the express reservations, causing no little confusion it
discussion.) The term may have some significance as a matter of domestic law, for
some countries. In 1965, GATT proposed that governments drop the word "provisional"
while retaining the express reservation for existing legislation. GATT Doc. L/2375
(1965). In conversations with the author, a senior GATT official reported that several
European governments balked at the proposal on the ground that the change of words
would raise problems of domestic law about the status of GATT. This would not be
the case in the United States; GATT's status as an Executive Agreement would not be
changed by a new form of words. On the concept of provisional application generally,
see JACKSON, supra note 14, at 60-66.
93. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 14, at 96-100 (accession of new members), id. at 236.38
(rectification of tariff schedules). For a discussion of more recent practice, see note 187
infra.
94. See the rulings cited in note 75 supra. For a more direct illustration of the same
point, see Appendix, Item B-28, discussed in note 187 infra.
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difference. The judgment that a member was not behaving in accord
with community norms seemed to be the main ingredient of what
compulsion there was, and compliance would usually follow, sooner
or later, without particular emphasis on "obligation" per se.
The dearest example of this tendency was a line of cases dealing
with something called "nullification and impairment," a GATT ana-
logue to the contract law doctrine of frustration. As interpreted, the
doctrine provides that actions by one party which deprive another party
of "reasonably anticipated" benefits of a tariff bargain create a right to
readjustment, even if the action causing impairment is one dearly
permitted by the General Agreement.95 Two early GATT decisions
under this doctrine found the defendant guilty of impairment.01 Al-
though both decisions made it quite clear that GATT could not
"legally require" removal of the measures causing impairment, both de-
fendants seemed to regard the finding of impairment as a source of
compulsion to do just that. In one of the cases, indeed, the losing
party filed a dissent which charged, in effect, that the Contracting
Parties were imposing a new obligation that had never been consented
to.97 The failure to appreciate the distinction between "impairment"
95. The concept of reasonable expectations, which has no foundation in the text of
the Agreement, was originally propounded in the 1949 decision concerning the Australian
Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Appendix, Item A-8. It was confirmed a few years later
in the decision of German Duty on Sardines, id. at Item A-11, and was elaborated further
in the rulings made in Uruguayan Recourse to Article XXIII, id. at Item A-24.
The exact reach of the doctrine, as it applies to nonviolation cases, is unclear. It is usu-
ally thought of in situations where the event causing impairment of benefits is the action
of the other party, the situation in which domestic courts find it easiest to discover frus-
trations. The first two cases cited above involved impairment of this kind. Article XXIII
also speaks of impairment caused by "any other situation," a term which, was intended to
cover gross economic dislocations such as a world depression. The Uruguayan complaint
made occasional reference to this concept but did not press the idea, See also note I1I
infra. Whether the concept would encompass more discreet nongovernmental events, such
as the action of a private cartel, is a nice question that has not been tested.
Although the immediate objective of the concept was to protect the balance of tariff
concessions, the provision speaks in terms of any "benefit accruing . . . directly or in-
directly under this Agreement," and goes on to include impairment of "any objective of
the Agreement." The Uruguayan complaint cited above also involved an attempt to invoke
these broader provisions in the context of a charge that Uruguay was giving more than
it was getting. Although the Uruguayan delegation prepared a list of mine 562 restrictions,
legal and illegal, affecting Uruguayan exports, Uruguay failed to develop either the
trade information or the legal theory necessary to press the issue, and the Panel fell back
to an item-by-item survey of impairment.
96. Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, Appendix, Item A-8; German Duty
on Sardines, id. at Item A-11.
97. Australia was held to have impaired a concession to Chile because an unforeseen
change in an existing subsidy policy had created a competitive disadvantage for the
Chilean products. Australia argued that the finding of impairment as in error because,
according to the well-understood practice of negotiating tariff agreements, a country
could not "assure" itself of protection going beyond the rules of the General Agreement
unless it expressly negotiated for such assurances. The possibility of rulings based simply
on reasonable expectations, the dissent continued, made tariff agreements "extremely
hazardous commitments." 2 GATT, BISD 188, 195-96. In arguing this %ay, the dissent
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and "obligation" was understandable. Whatever its legal characteriza-
tion, the decision as to "reasonable expectations" had unavoidably
become a formal adjudication of what the community regarded as
"reasonable,"0 8 thus giving it essentially the same force of compulsion
which lay behind GATT obligations themselves. 0
was treating the ruling as though it had announced a legal commitment not to impair,
for that is what expressly negotiated assurances would be. Technically, however, the finding
of impairment involved no legal commitment at all; it was just an excuse allowing the
other party to back out.
Though less striking, the Sardines case offers a similar example. Appendix, Item A-11,
The case involved a finding that Germany had impaired a tariff concession on Nor
wegian-type sardines by subsequently granting a much lower rate on competitive
Portugese-type sardines. Although Germany's response to the decision-pcgging the
concession rate a miniscule one per cent above the rate on the competing product-was
designed to affirm the absence of any legal obligation to make the rates equal, the fact
that Germany did restore the competitive situation by making a rather large reduction
nonetheless (from 20-25 per cent to 15 per cent) is quite significant. The reduction
required seeking new legislation. Until the decision itself, German officials had fought
vigorously to avoid that necessity, maintaining their position on the merits until thu
very end. Despite the very clear understanding of the decision's limits, there seemed to
be no doubt about the course of action to be taken after it had been made.
98. This is a proposition which the Panel or working party members themselves might
dispute. Nevertheless, I believe that analysis of the issues in both cases will show that
suc normative judgments could not have been avoided. Any third party putting himself
in the position of trying to decide what another might "reasonably expect Is quickly led
to the proposition that, absent advance warning to the contrary, any reasonable man
expects the other party to behave reasonably in the circumstances. In both these cases,
the issue involved differential treatment of competitive products; both complainants, In
fact, were also arguing that the discrimination violated Article I because the products
were "like products" within the meaning of that provision. Although the judges could
not agree with the "like product" charge, mainly because pre.GATT practice had Im-
posed very tight limits on that concept, there was little doubt in either case that the
unequal treatment of competitive products was contrary to the underlying policy of tha
agreement. Although in both cases there were specific events in the negotiating back-
ground on which the expectation could be found to have been based, and, indeed, there
are indications that the decision might not come out the same way without such a peg,
the larger concerns pervade each opinion. In the Australian Subsidy Case, for example,
the working party report sums up by saying,
In the case under consideration, the inequality created and the treatment that Chile
could reasonably have expected at the time of the negotiation . . . were important
elements in the working party's conclusion.
2 GATT, BISD 188, 193 (emphasis added).
99. Another factor which contributes to the similarity of impact is the "lawsuit"
framework in which these judgments are rendered. Although nullification and impair-
ment decisions do not obligate the offending party to act, they do involve legal consequen-
ces insofar as they withdraw the complaining party's obligation to the offending party.
Consequently, the decisions invariably assume the same judicial sort of care and con-
siderateness which surround legal decisions generally, and which furnish a not insubstantial
part of the latter's authority.
This is not to say that rules add nothing to the force of compulsion. Rules make it
easier for Panels to make judgments in the first place, for the unity of consensus necessary
to sustain pure common law decisions of the kind we are discussing is a very rare com-
modity in international organizations. More to the point, rules will give a decision
greater authority to the extent they call upon the fact that the offending member itself
has subscribed to the proposition being asserted. What I am arguing is simply that GATT
practice does not show any significant source of compulsion in the notion of legal obliga-
tion itself.
It is true, of course, that GATT diplomats invariably seek to invoke the notion of
legal obligation wherever possibly, even in cases where its existence is doubtful. See, e.g.,
Hudec, supra note 83, at 647-59. The question being asked here, however, is why and to
what effect. It is my view that the forces being advanced by such argument arc primarily
the factors discussed above.
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B. The Current Situation
1. Present Legal Practice
The one point on which both legalists and pragmatists invariably
agree is that GATT legal behavior has changed substantially in the
last decade. Attitudes toward the formal disputes procedure are indi-
cative of what has happened generally. Once rather proud of the
GATT's Panel procedure, 100 member governments now seem to regard
requests for formal legal rulings as unfriendly behavior inconsistent
with effective commercial diplomacy. Complaints involving out-and-out
legal disputes are now routinely channeled into procedures other than
Panels--either ad hoc working parties or the more structured consulta-
tion procedures of Article XXII, neither of which is aimed at producing
third-party judgments. 101 A small but significant sign of the times is
the fact that recent indexes of GATT documents now classify the very
mild reports from these proceedings under the heading "Conciliation,"
the title once reserved for formal Panel proceedings -02 The practice
seems to suggest that these no-decision procedures are now regarded
as the standard GATT lawsuit.
Just how sensitive governments have become can be seen from two
recent examples. In 1967, following extensive bilateral discussions,
the United States brought a complaint before the GATT charging
that certain practices of the nationalized British Steel Corporation
violated GATT obligations. The United Kingdom replied that the
practice was completely legal. In agreeing to pursue the matter further
under the consultative procedures of Article XXII, both parties felt
it necessary to make clear that this very mild procedure was in no way
to be regarded as a "confrontation."' 0 3 At about the same time, the
100. GATT's public stance toward its "law" has alwa) been torn between the de-
mands of pride in recording the accomplishments of a working international legal struc-
ture and the demands of survival in not exciting governmental sensitivities about loss of
sovereignty. Nevertheless, statements affirming the value and importance of GATT's
quite legal dispute-settlement procedures abound in the early GATT documents and
public literature. See, e.g., GATT Doe. Press Release GATT/169 (1954) (review of ac-
complishments by Chairman of Contracting Parties).
101. Working parties have been used on occasion to render third-party judgments,
usually in cases where the GATT had some reason to play down the presence of ad-
judication. See Appendix, Items A-5, A-8 and A-1. As a rule, however, the working party
is understood to be a negotiating rather than an adjudicating device. The principals in
the dispute are the stars, and nothing is done without their consent. Absent a voluntary
settlement, the usual working party report is simply a balanced recital of views pro and
con, concluding with a paragraph in which everyone promises sympathetic consideration
to everyone else's views. On rare occasions, a determined majonty may force a type of
quasi-adjudication by recording that a certain view represented a dear majority, eg.,
Appendix, Item A-20, but the general practice is to record each side equally.
102. See Appendix, note (d).
103. See Appendix, Item B-36. In a curious way, the concern may have been slightly
justified. The more that such nonadjudicatory procedures become identified as the last
resort, the more the decision to invoke them comes to represent the ddmarcle once asso-
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United States held out against the convocation of Article XXII con-
sultations on problems of the world dairy markets (a problem which
did not involve any charges of legal violations) on the ground that
the Article XXII procedures themselves might be regarded as a con-
frontation by outsiders.'0 4
A few efforts to revive Panel procedures for other purposes have met
with conspicuous failure. In 1967, the developing countries of GATT
persuaded the Contracting Parties to accept a procedure which pro-
vided that
[P]anels of governmental experts may be established to examine
problems relating to the quantitative restrictions maintained by
developed contracting parties on industrial products of particu.
lar interest to developing countries with a view to an early removal
of these restrictions. 05
The Secretariat duly prepared background material for Panel proceed.
ings in a few key industries. In the first case, the proposal to convene
a Panel was met by the response that the above decision had used the
word "may," and that bilateral discussions, then in progress, seemed a
more fruitful way to proceed. 00 The special procedure is now generally
regarded as a dead letter. More recently, the Trade and Development
Committee came up with the idea of appointing Panels to review
compliance with the new "commitments" assumed by developed coun-
tries under Part IV of GATT. Although the Panel procedure added
nothing to the procedures already available as of right under Article
elated with filing a lawsuit. I have heard, for example, GATT representatives speaking of
"threatening" an Article XXII consultation. One might argue, therefore, that the law-
suit's function as a demonstration of serious concern, see note 58 supra, has been
maintained despite the movement to the milder climes of Article XXII.
104. See GATT Doc. SR.24/19 (1967). The Director General's explanation of the dead-
lock, itself a departure from the usual practice of not talking about such disagreements fi
formal meetings, is worth quoting:
The language of Article XXII made it quite clear that the invocation of that Article
was not a hostile procedure nor a litigious one. Nevertheless, psychologically and
politically it could risk having that appearance and therefore might impair the ob-
jective of a friendly and collective approach to problems of common concern to the
international trading community.
Id. It was agreed, finally, to call for immediate action without specifying the exact fornt
such action would take.
105. GATT, 15th Supp. BISD 71 (1967). According to a Secretariat paper drculatetl
in advance of the decision, the Panels were to have analyzed all the relevant trade and
production information pertaining to the restricted products, and "the compelling reasons
of national interest that stand in the way of the removal of restrictions." A Panel would
then "report its views on how progress may be made in the removal of these restrictions,"
GATT Doe. COM.TD/W/68 (1967). Although the terms of reference would have per-
mitted rather benign factual surveys, the choice of the word "Panel" suggested, as was
intended, the possibility that "views" might also include an evaluative judgment of the"compelling reasons."
106. See GATT Doc. COM.TD/56 (1968).
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XXIII, the proposal had to be amended expressly to provide that
Panels would be appointed if and when the party complained against
would agree.107 The result served as an indication of what to expect
from direct invocation of Article XXIII itself. 08
Much the same attitude appears in areas outside the complaints
procedure. Since the late 1950's the GATT has been trying to secure
the removal of the so-called "residual restrictions," developed country
quantitative restrictions left over from the days of payments disequilib-
rium.10 9 In the 24th and 25th Sessions of the Contracting Parties, the
government of New Zealand, supported by many developing countries,
proposed a decision which would have committed governments either
to remove the restrictions or to seek a formal waiver to legitimize them.
Despite the furor it raised, the proposal was really a rather mild one.
Everyone admitted that waivers would have been granted, so that
the only practical effect would have been to require governments to
bend their knee by asking for a waiver and, later, to submit to the
annual review and exhortation required of all other GATT waivees.
The countries maintaining the residual restrictions refused to go even
this far. Some explained their position by lecturing the proponents on
the unwisdom of seeking legalistic solutions to sensitive social prob-
lems. Others said that they saw no reason for submitting to these legal
restraints and humiliations when so many other governments were free
to pursue similar practices under one or another GATT exception.110
A similar pattern has developed in the case of new measures involv-
107. Compare GATT Doc. COM.TD/W/116 (1970) (draft proposal) with GATT Doc.
COM.TD/74 (1970) (final text).
108. The presence of these attitudes force one to attach relatively little significance to
the 1966 Decision of the Contracting Parties establishing new procedures to expedite the
processing of Article XXIII complaints. GATT, 13th Supp. BISD 18, 139-40 (1966). The
new procedures were proposed by GATT's developing country bloc as part of the general
campaign to make developed countries honor GATT obligations. The new procedures make
it easier for developing countries to initiate such lawsuits, and to carry through on
rights of retaliation. They do not, however, address the real problem-the developed
country annoyance with lawsuits generally, and the fear on the part of developing
countries that lawsuits sparking such annoyance will ultimately bring reprisals. The two
Panel proposals described in the text were really a confession by the developing countries
that the direct Article XXIII lawsuit would not work. (In fact, the new Article XXfII
procedures were never even used.) The idea of the new Panel proposals was to drcumvent
the confrontation problem by making the Panels more-or-less self-starting, thus removing
the need for a complainant. (A third example of this strategy is the disputes provision
of Part IV itself, Article XXXVII:2(a); the cumbersome use of the passive voice (compare
Article XXIII:1) was the product of endless hours of drafting tr)ing to describe a lar,-
suit without a plaintiff.) The fact that none of these alternative strategies have succeeded
tends to confirm the existence of the problem which led to the abandonment of Article
XXII. Unfortunately, it also proves that the problem is not one that can be met by
strategies.
109. The procedures described in note 82 supra were part of this overall effort.
110. See GATT Does. W.24/22 (1967); SR.24/10, -12, -14 (1967); and L/3034 (1963).
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ing some real or alleged departure from GATT rules. The typical
scenario begins with a sometimes heated discussion of the legal issue
in the first meeting, followed by a decision to put the legal issues aside
in order to concentrate on pragmatic considerations."' These new pro-
cedures tend to have a precedential effect. Having once decided not
to be "legalistic" about Problem A, the Contracting Parties thereafter
need some special justification to do anything different with Problem B.
Given such expectations, the perception of legal rulings as a particu-
larly unfriendly procedure tends to become true after a time.
I believe there are two main reasons for the present decline of GATT
substantive rules. First, in many areas the substantive consensus which
held together the early GATT has broken down under the pressures
of a changing world. Second, interest in working through a legal
structure of any kind seems to have diminished-in part because of
weakened substantive consensus, but also, I think, because of other
fundamental changes in GATT's political environment. Each of these
developments will require a rather extended treatment,
2. The Present Substantive Consensus
The state of the substantive consensus underlying the various GATT
rules varies from one subject to another. Change is apparent every-
where. A few of the changes represent shifts in basic attitudes, but
perhaps the larger number represent changes in market conditions
which were not anticipated in 1947 and which have made the 1947
rules inadequate to their original purpose. In some areas the break-
down appears to be quite serious; in others it appears reparable.
I shall divide the inquiry according to type of country and subject
matter. The rules applicable to "developing"' 12 countries will be con-
sidered separately. Following that, the trade rules which affect primarily
111. A typical example was the case of the import restrictions imposed by France
in 1968 to adjust for the large increases in wages and other cost factors made necessary
by the "events" of May 1968. The French government stated that In its view the mea.
sures were not in violation of the General Agreement, mentioning Articles XII, XIX and
XXIII but not advancing any supporting arguments. The French delegation went on to
state that it was pointless to examine the legal aspects of the matter, assuring everyone
that France would do its best to remove the measures as conditions permitted. Many
other delegations criticised the legal justification and France's refusal to discuss It, but
the French held to their position and eventually there was grudging agreement to go
along. The net result was that France was allowed to maintain that it was not in
violation, without ever having to demonstrate it. See GATT, 16th Supp. BISD 57, 63 (1968).
112. That is, the poorer nations, known as "underdeveloped" in the 1940s and "less
developed" in the 1950s and early 1960s. One can read the history of the so-called
Revolution or Rising Expectations in the evolution of this terminology. The official GATT
term, if one goes by the text of the Agreement, Is still "less developed"; both Article
XVIII (which defines the term) and Part IV were written during the LDC phase.
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the developed countries will be discussed under three headings: re-
strictions on agricultural trade, restrictions on industrial trade, and
discrimination. A final section will deal with the GATT rules concern-
ing balance of payments disequilibrium.
a- Developing Country Obligations
The consensus behind the GATT obligations undertaken by devel-
oping countries has broken down virtually across the board. GATT
was originally designed to treat developing countries in essentially the
same manner as developed countries. Although a few carefully limited
status exceptions were granted, the overall design called for developing
countries to follow a liberal trade policy based on reciprocal exchange
of commercial opportunity. 13 The developed country officials who wrote
the GATT were not insensitive to economic development goals, but
they were convinced that "genuine" economic development required
the discipline of world market forces.114 Whatever else experience since
then may have proved, it has proved that the pace of economic develop-
ment under these premises has not been rapid enough to satisfy anyone.
Consequently, there is now a consensus which either advocates or is
at least willing to tolerate rather thoroughgoing interference with
market forces as an aid to development.
Most developing countries never got very close to the real bite of
GATT obligations, because chronic balance of payments problems have
permitted perpetual quantitative control of imports.'11 GATT super-
vision of the remaining obligations, though still occupying a sizeable
part of each year's agenda, has grown progressively formalistic and less
attentive.n6 The principle of nondiscrimination (the most-favored-
nation rule) has held on longer than most, but it, too, is giving way
under a growing acceptance of the need for larger-than-national
113. The principal exceptions for developing countries in the ITO Charter were
Articles 13 and 15. The GATT adopted and later expanded upon Article 13 (now GATT
Article XVIII). ITO Charter Article 15, permitting selected preferences between develop-
ing countries, %as omitted from GATT altogether, not until recently has there been a
serious possibility of restoring it. See DAhI, supra note 13, at 251-55.
114. Clair Wilcox, vice-chairman of the United States delegation to the GATT/ITO
negotiations, explained his delegations's position:
Enthusiasm for industrial development is accompanied by little interest in the
conditions that must be satisfied if such development is really to be achieved.
. . . The underdeveloped countries seek industrialization by some quick and
easy route.... They do not believe that they must creep before they can walk.
Wuicox, supra note 30, at 143. See KoCK, supra note 30, at 41.
115. See, e.g., KocK, supra note -0, at 290.
116. The situation is simply that no one talks very much about developing country
obligations anymore, except to criticize the existing rules; all attention is focused on
what developed countries are doing for developing country trade. Authors writing about
GATT's developing country "problem" do the same thing. See, e.g., id. at 219-69.
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markets for developing country infant industry. GATT customs union
theory was the first casualty. Far from attempting to meet the criteria
of Article XXIV, most developing country customs unions are avowedly
designed to distort trade as much as possible for infant industry pur.
poses, and that purpose now seems to have been tacitly accepted by
GATT's developed country members.""' More recently, the developed
countries have agreed, in principle, to grant tariff preferences in favor
of developing country products. 118 Whether or not the preference
scheme will actually accomplish very much, the decision to grant such
preferences is important as an indication of what will now be tolerated.
Neither the developed nor the developing countries have shown
much interest so far in devising a new set of rules to cover developing
country trade policy. The legal response to the development crisis
has been concentrated almost exclusively on devising means to open
developed country markets. The GATT was amended in 1964 to in-
clude a new Part IV which sets forth a series of principles recognizing
the special needs of developing countries and a few very guarded
"commitments" by the developed countries to do something about
them.119 Developing country obligations, in the meanwhile, are simply
in abeyance.
Though one can hardly quarrel with the judgment as to priorities,
it must be observed that the new order of things has substantially
diminished the chances of establishing any sort of viable legal rela-
tionship between rich and poor. Even in the best of circumstances,
117. For a detailed review of both developed and developing country regional ar.
rangements under GATT Article XXIV, see Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and
the GATT: The Legacy of a Misconception, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 615 (1963). I would argue
that it is a mistake to treat developed and developing country regional arrangements as a
single body of evidence relating to the workability of the GATT rules. The failure of the
rules in the case of developing countries rests on reasons which do not pertain to the
problem of regulating developed country arrangements. Indeed, one Is tempted to say that
Article XXIV was not even drafted with the developing countries in mind. The General
Agreement recognizes, albeit grudgingly, the right of developing countries to raise trade
barriers for the purpose of industrial development-the infant industry idea, GATT
Article XVIII. The rules of Article XXIV, by requiring elimination of internal barriers
and a status quo ante ceiling on external barriers, say, in effect, that a developing country
must give up the infant industry idea if it wishes to join a customs union. Conceivably,
this might have been an intended consequence, given the perspectives of 1916.47, but
the inherent contradiction has now become clear with the recognition that markets of
individual developing countries are as a rule not large enough to support modern infant
industries. Also relevant to this issue is the history of ITO Charter Article 15, note 113
supra.
118. U.N. Doc. TD/L.37 (1948) (Report of UNCTAD II). The EEC has announced
the implementation of preferences as of July 1971. See 2 CCH Cohni. MKT. REP. 4 9125
(1971).
119. In the eyes of developing countries, results have been slow to come. See U.N.
Doc. TD/16 (1967) (developing country analysis of Kennedy Round results), reprinted in
FULDA & SCHWARTZ, supra note 43, at 204-08. See also PREEG, supra note 48, at 258.59.
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it is difficult to create legal relationships which can be asserted inde-
pendently (i.e., "chipped off") from the general donor-donee relation-
ship which exists on other matters. It is just that much more difficult
when the claimants themselves are perceived to be operating outside
the legal system they invoke. The problem is not primarily one of
commercial reciprocity. It is, rather, a question of legal reciprocity-the
difficulty of insisting upon adherence to substantive rules when the
claimant itself does not submit to any.
There is good reason to wonder whether it is possible to define a
new set of developing country obligations in the present circumstances.
Developing country governments will not be able to undertake inter-
national commitments in any form until they know where they are
going, and what trade policies they will need to get there. To judge
by the current unwillingness to restrict any instruments of trade policy,
that measure of certainty has not yet arrived. As yet, however, the
possibilities of redrafting have not been tested. 20
b. Developed Country Obligations
(1) Restrictions on Agricultural Trade. GATT's rules on agricultural
restrictions are usually the first item mentioned when the subject of
GATT "failures" is discussed. 121 The failure has been real and com-
plete, though not nearly as colossal as usually portrayed. The GATT
draftsmen took it as given that governments were committed to main-
taining high prices for domestic agriculture, and that quantitative re-
strictions would be needed to protect such artificially lucrative markets
from being swamped with imports. The condition the draftsmen tried
to impose was simply that imports should be allowed to share roughly
the same proportion of the domestic market-high prices and all-
that they would have occupied under normal market conditions.'2
Simple, perhaps, but too much to ask nonetheless.
The basic miscalculation here seems to have been a failure to an-
ticipate the forces, economic and political, that are generated by price
support programs. As late as 1953, one finds GATT debate proceeding
120. For discussion of one possible approach, see p. 1369 infra.
121. The restrictions in question are those used by a large number of developed
countries to protect producers of temperate agricultural products. Though most of the
restrictions are the result of government price-support programs, .€ome, such as the
United States program on meat imports, are simple cases of protecting a normal domestic
market. See 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1970). For one account of the current situation, see Mam-
gren 9- Schlechty, Rationalizing World Agricultural Trade, 4 J. WoRLD Tn..E L. 515
(1970).
122. GATT Article XI:2(c).
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on the premise that it should be possible to reduce domestic produc-
tion enough to make room for imports.123 Instead, of course, the price
levels required to satisfy constituents have consistently created the
booming surpluses we have come to know all too well-first in the
United States, and now, just as a few signs of control are appearing
there, in the new common agricultural market of the EEC. 12 4 The
rapid development of new technology in production, transportation
and product substitutes has made it even harder to satisfy national,
much less international, goals. And, as if that weren't enough, the flow
of excess production into subsidized exports has destroyed even the
premise of a world market price by which to measure competition in
third country markets.
In most cases, governments still cannot make room for imports
within their price support programs, and, where they can, the market
criteria for determining fair shares are becoming increasingly less re-
liable. For want of anything better, normative argument about market
shares now tends to focus on last year's share. Governments keep trying
to hammer out ad hoc agreements on particular commodities, without
much long-term success.1
25
The prospects for reviving GATT-type rules will be nonexistent
until the EEC digests its new membership. Beyond that time, the shape
123. Thus, in explaining why the United States had been unable to remove or relax
certain illegal restrictions on dairy products, a United States delegate stated that the
restrictions would have been removed if 1953 production had remained at 1952 levels,
but that 1953 had been a "bad year." Other delegations were full of suggestions for
reducing production and increasing consumption the following year. GATT Doc. SR.8/ll
(1953).
It stands to reason that the draftsmen must have had some such forecast in mind,
for it is impossible to believe that they meant their governments to buy up large quantities
of imports. It must be recalled, in this connection, that, at least in the United States,
the pre-war experience with price-support programs gave no real evidence of what was
going to happen.
124. The EEC situation differs from the earlier United States surpluses, for the EEC
has as yet not adopted a genuine policy of production controls. See generally B,
BERNTSON, 0. GOOLSBY & C. NOHRE, THE EUROPEAN COMIMUNITY'S CoMMON AGRICULTURAL
POLICY (Econ. Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 1969).
125. For a discussion of the evolution of Kennedy Round negotiating demands along
these lines, see E. P=EEG, supra note 48, at 71-76, 144-58; Albregts & van de Gevel, Negotiat-
ing Techniques and Issues in the Kennedy Round, in ECONOMIC RELATIONS AraR TrE
KENNEDY ROUND 36-45 (F. von Geusau ed. 1969).
The Kennedy Round negotiations finally produced the International Grains Arrange-
ment, Nov. 30, 1967, [1967] 19 U.S.T. 5499, T.I.A.S. No. 6537, which contained an agreement
to maintain prices and a program for food aid designed to absorb surpluses. The price
maintenance scheme broke down, and in early 1971 most of the member countries nego-
tiated the International Wheat Agreement, 1971, to replace it. The new agreement
abandons the price maintenance features, substituting merely an obligation to consult;
the food aid provisions have also been narrowed. See INTERNATIONAL WHEAT AGRMrNT,
1971, S. Doc. Exac.-F, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1971) (Presidential Message of Transmittal).
A similar price-maintenance agreement has been negotiated for dairy products. GATT,
17th Supp. BISD 5, 59 (1970).
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of agricultural trade will depend upon the effects of structural adjust-
ments, planned or otherwise, on the volume and relative efficiency of
production in the major producing countries. If, as seems likely,
governments intend to continue such programs until structural ad-
justments make local agriculture "competitive," the situation may
never improve. There will simply be fewer farmers producing the
same or greater surpluses at lower prices, a situation which will still
require isolation of local markets and artificially managed surplus
disposal. On the whole, the most likely focus of international coopera-
tion for the foreseeable future will be market management rather than
trade.
(2) Restrictions on Industrial Trade. Despite continued insistence on
the proposition that trade liberalization cannot move forward on the
industrial front alone, trade in industrial products has been the main-
stay of GATT activity and its principal claim to success. The recent
Kennedy Round negotiations achieved substantial reductions in de-
veloped country tariffs on industrial products, but did relatively little
to liberalize agricultural and developing country trade.2 The effective-
ness of GATT rules generally is also highest in this area. Both the
EEC and EFTA, for example, managed to achieve substantial com-
pliance with GATT Article XXIV as far as industrial trade was con-
cerned; their performance on agricultural trade was near zero.1-7
The present consensus on the rules governing industrial trade is
weakened, though far from complete collapse. Stresses of at least three
different kinds can be identified. First, there has been a general in-
tensification in international competition, caused on the one hand by
the recovery of the European and Japanese economies, and on the
other by a general reduction in trade barriers as tariffs have gone down
and balance-of-payments quotas have been removed. The increased
pressure on domestic industry is creating politically more powerful
demands for protection, most visibly in the United States but in
Europe as well.128 A collateral development that has further skewed
126. See, e.g., E. PREEG, supra note 48, at 256-60, 264-71. Both the source dited and J.
EvANs, supra note 3, are excellent detailed studies of the Kennedy Round negotiations
from beginning to end.
127. In EFTA (European Free Trade Association), agriculture was simply excluded
from the free trade area. See GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 70, 83 (1960). The EEC Included
agriculture, but the Common Agricultural Policy has called for a significant increase of
trade barriers, in effect removing much of the EEC market from world trade. See
BENISON rr AL., supra note 124.
128. The tenor of the trade legislation presently before the United States Congress
is the subject of a Note in this issue, infra p. 1418. Although nothing quite so dramatic
is occurring in the EEC, opponents of the protectionist swing in the United States warn
that such forces are mounting in Europe and will be released given the excuse. A factor
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the balance in the United States is the growing tendency of efficient
U.S. industries to invest abroad rather than to export, thereby depriv-
ing GATT forces of potential allies.
129
The lesson, it would appear, is that the GATT victories before 1960
took place in a more favorable economic climate, and are not, therefore,
entirely convincing as a demonstration of what is possible now. Even
the success of the Kennedy Round in 1967 is a little misleading, for it
was in many ways a product of conditions five years before. Although
the most recent manifestations of the new protectionism may have
been in part the product of monetary disequilibrium, changes in
exchange rates will not turn back the clock to the early 1960s. There is,
accordingly, a need to reappraise the present GATT standards concern-
ing the degree of competition that is tolerable, and the measures to be
taken when it exceeds those limits. United States trade policy officiah
have already suggested revising the domestic law counterpart of GATT
Article XIX, which defines when a government may raise trade barriers
to prevent "serious injury."
1 30
Second, there has been a marked increase in recent years in a particu-
lar type of import competition which seems not to fit very well within
the general framework of GATT rules. It might be called "Made in
Japan" competition 31 -goods which can be imported at prices far
below the most competitive domestic prices, and in quantities large
enough to seize a meaningful share of the domestic market. Trade in
textiles is the most prominent case in point, but the increasing flow of
which lends credibility to these concerns is that membership inside a large continental
market cannot help but alter to some extent the traditional interest in free external
trade on the part of small mercantile nations such as the Netherlands. The Community's
policy toward discrimination, see pp. 1360-64 infra, is one sign that changes of this kind
are quite possible.
129. Consider, for example, the testimony of a chemical industry spokesman that re-
duction in present trade barriers will force the United States industry to move its produc-
tion for the United States market "off-shore" in order to compete with foreign producers.
Hearings, supra note 43, at 4559. If cost differentials would really justify such a move to
serve the United States market, a fortiori they will justify investing rather than exporting to
compete in foreign markets, assuming that the industry has sufficient capital and that
the foreign market is large enough. Under such circumstances, reduction in foreign
tariffs simply has no appeal as an inducement to support reductions in the United States
tariff.
130. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTnATIONS, FuTruRE UNITED STATES FOMREGN
TRADE POLicY 41-54 (1969) (the "Roth Report"). The recommendations on the escape clause
were submitted to Congress. See Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals, supra note 44, at
21-22. The Congressional response was to propose an escape clause substantially more
trade-restricting. H.R. 20, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 111 (1971).
The Roth Report presents a complete overview of U.S. trade policy from the GATT
point of view, the most recent government statement of its kind. It is, however, the
product of the previous administration.
131. The idiom is becoming obsolete, for in some areas Japan itself is now being
challenged by newer Japans such as Korea and Taiwan. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1971,
at 59, col. 3 (city ed.) (Competition in textiles).
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capital and technology to low wage areas makes it likely that the
phenomenon will become far more general.
The GATT draftsmen seem not to have anticipated this type of
competition when writing the rules. Although low wage countries were
certainly known and talked about, the conventional answer until very
recently has been that the technology of high wage countries made unit
labor costs comparable.132 It was assumed, therefore, that at least in the
industrial sector tariffs alone could provide the sort of cushion needed
to permit local producers to "adjust" either by becoming more efficient
or by shifting gradually to other more efficient lines of production.233
Tariffs alone, however, cannot deal with the seemingly bottomless price
flexibility this new competition seems to involve, unless they are either
changed with great frequency or set at absolutely prohibitory levels to
begin with. Moreover, the very large price differences seem to invali-
date the assumption that domestic industry can be expected to "adjust"
gradually. The more common assumption has been that such imports
will swallow up the domestic market just as fast as the exporters'
capacity allows.
The GATT has already moved some distance toward recognizing this
new phenomenon. As a prelude to the Long Term Arrangement on
Cotton Textiles (LTA),' 34 the Contracting Parties adopted a Decision
defining a new kind of trade problem called "market disruption. 'la
The Decision proposed no solutions, but the LTA, a separate ad hoc
agreement outside the GATT, presented the basic idea-quantitative
controls on "disruptive" trade in exchange for a guaranteed annual
increase in the amount of imports accepted, the whole scheme negoti-
ated multilaterally to assure roughly equal rates of absorption by the
various importing countries. 36
132. See, e.g., WInCOx, supra note 30, at 191. The same view was advanced in support
of the Kennedy Round negotiations H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d SCes. 7 (1962).
133. GATT Atricle XIX allows the use of quantitative restrictions as an mcape clause
measure, but the exception, hotly debated in the GATT/rrO negotiations, came coupled
with an assurance that resort to such restrictions would be the exception. See BnoN,
supra note 9, at 89-90.
134. GATT, l1th Supp. BISD 25 (1962).
155. GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 26 (1960).
136. Technically, the feature of the LTA which distinguishes it most from past prac-
tice is the fact that controls were discriminatory, being applied only to the low-price
imports causing the most trouble. Indeed, were it not for this feature, it would probably
have been possible to square the LTA with GATT Article XIX (assuming that there
was the requisite injury). It is my view that the discrimination is merely incidental to
the larger break in GATT policy represented by this agreement, namely, the decision
to impose a long-term order on the world market in this product. Indeed, although
discriminatory in form, the agreement, and the other voluntary arrangements like it,
merely does what any quantitative control program has to do-carve up the market into
fair shares. The absence of control on smaller or higher-price suppliers represents mainly
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As suggested above, the stated objectives of the LTA approach are
not so very far from the real assumptions-the rather cautious
gradualism-which hide beneath the GATT's general policy of per-
mitting only tariff controls. Unfortunately, the necessity of making
these assumptions explicit makes it difficult to achieve as much trade
liberalization as when using tariffs alone. The nice thing about the
tariff system is that the government becomes involved only to the
extent of setting tariffs. Market forces determine how much of the
market is taken by imports, subject only to further indirect interven-
tion after the fact. The LTA approach requires the government to
take responsibility for deciding just how much of the market will be
"given away," for with prices as they are it is simply conceded that im-
ports will seize whatever share is opened to them.1 7 Responses to date
from importing countries indicate that governments do not feel they
can permit any real growth under these circumstances. 188 The resort
to "voluntary" quotas by the exporter has proved increasingly attractive
for this reason, but even here the need to mention numbers exposes
government officials to some direct responsibility for accepting any
substantial trade increase over time.129
A larger problem is the fact that "market disruption" is not an easily
containable exception. There seems to be no real economic distinction
a judgment that their present share of the market, without controls, is fair. If they move
too fast, they too will be put under controls. Like any such pie-cutting, of course, whether
or not discriminatory in form, the slicing usually bears little relation to comparative
advantage.
137. It is sometimes pointed out, in opposition to this assumption, that exporters
seldom fill their quotas under the LTA. The shortfall, however, is almost always the
product of the commercial inflexibility imposed by the quota, particularly the segmenta-
tion of the quota into narrow product categories, each with its own quantity limit, which
prevents exporters from being able to respond to typically sudden bursts of demand for
particular products. The real significance of the shortfalls is that nominal quota limits
are not even as generous as they appear. One should not be surprised, therefore, to see
quota proponents spending as much energy on product segmentation as on the overall
level of the quota; indeed, there are considerable cosmetic advantages to the former.
138. The most palatable formula seems to be to freeze domestic and foreign shareg
of the market at something near present shares, and thereafter to allow each to grow as
the market expands. The legislative quota for textiles and shoes in the trade bill prevently
pending is actually much lower, calling for an initial cutback to 1967-69 import levels,
with growth thereafter at a maximum of five per cent per year, a rate somewhat less than
the 1961-1970 growth rate of the United States market as a whole. H.R. 20, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. § 201 (1971); see Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals, supra note 44, at 1338.
Given the expectation that this legislative formula would be superseded by voluntary
quotas, see note 51 supra, it is fair to conclude that the tolerable level was in fact some-
what more generous. The voluntary quotas negotiated by Chairman Mills, id., were re-
ported to have used 1971 trade as the base, with a growth factor of six per cent, and,
significantly, very broad product categories. Author's note: The full details of the recently
concluded agreements, note 51 supra, are not yet available. The agreements appear to be
a compromise, the significant change being narrower product categories.
Five per cent was also the basic growth rate provided for new quotas under the LTA,
GATT, l1th Supp. BISD 25, 29 (1962).
139. See notes 58, 188 supra.
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between "disruptive" trade and other kinds of competition, the main
identifying characteristic of the former being simply that conventional
tariff controls cannot produce politically acceptable results. This means,
of course, that every industry suffering "too much" competition will
daim "market disruption" as a justification for quantitative controls.
In addition, the concept appears to encourage some to argue that very
low prices are in themselves a justification for action, regardless of the
impact on domestic industry. 40
Can these problems be met by defining new substantive standards
within GATT? It must be remembered, of course, that the present
rules themselves have some impact, for by characterizing something like
the LTA as an illegal measure the rules force such proposals to be
treated as exceptions requiring special justification.' 4 ' One further
thing that could be done would be to require consultations on the
facts, i la GABB, before action is taken. As for substantive standards
themselves, it is less certain that governments will be able to say any-
thing very useful on the critical issues of "when" and "how much."' 2
On the other hand, the fact that most governments seem concerned
about the need to confine this new beast is perhaps encouragement
enough to make that effort.
The third of the factors affecting the consensus on industrial trade
is a matter of under-control rather than over-control. The General
Agreement was designed something like a container with pressure
valves, dosing off the use of certain trade barriers entirely and per-
mitting pressures for protection to be relieved only through controlled
140. The argument that low cost competition, particularly low iagcs, is unfair is
worthy of a detailed study of its own. Regardless of the ultimate merits of the case,
it presents in acute form the need to discuss the actual normative basis of trade policy
and to understand counterarguments in the same terms, for to the extent certain kinds of
competition can be labeled "unfair," there will be less need to justify countermeasures
in terms of injurious impact per se.
141. But see the argument of Secretary of Commerce Stans that United States quotas
on textiles would not be in violation of GATT (presumably becamuse they would qualify
under Article XIX), and that voluntary restraints accepted by exporters under the threat
of such legislation would not even require the compensation provided in Article XIX.
Hearings on Tariff and Trade Proposals, supra note 44, at 4480. Here again, it would be
a mistake simply to dismiss the arguments out of hand. To the extent notions of gradual-
ism become more and more explicit as part of the total package of expectations behind
trade obligations, the more directly one has to deal with the argument that skyrocketing
exports are really not a basic part of the deal. This is not to say, of course, that
Secretary Stans argument was not in error on other grounds, such as the facts justifying
restriction in the first place.
142. GATT Article XIX lays down several causal conditions, but the only thing it
says about the degree of injury is "serious." For one application of these standards. ee
Appendix, Item A-9. In applying the similar provisions of United States law, it may be
noted that negative decisions by the Tariff Commission have generally rested on the cause
factor rather than the conclusion that injury was not serious. See Memrger, supra note 54,
at 565-66.
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tariff barriers. The container has proved a good deal leakier than
expected. To some extent, new holes (I refuse to say "loopholes") are
being searched for and manipulated by industries seeking escape from
the consequences of reduced tariffs. But many have been there for
years, attracting notice now simply because the conventional trade
barriers standing in front of them have been removed.
The list of things involved is long and varied, many being only
tangentially related to conventional trade policy. The issue on which
United States industry is making the largest outcry at the moment is
tax policy, and the GATT rules pertaining thereto. Most readers will
instinctively grasp the eminent neutrality of a rule which allows the
Federal government to apply the same confiscatory alcoholic beverage
tax to scotch as well as bourbon. Informed opinion has it, however,
that applying this rule to the various forms of general value-added
taxes prevalent in Europe, as the GATT expressly allows, may have a
protective effect favoring European producers.143 Discussions so far have
succeeded only in clarifying the reasons why the problem seems in-
soluble.144
The United States has come in for its share of criticism. It may be
good safety engineering to require on-site inspection during the manu-
facture of compressed gas cylinders, but the requirement does impede
trade in the absence of foreign-based inspectors. Safety and environ-
mental standards for automobiles present another fertile field for
controversy, and the environmental concern currently sweeping the
United States could well expand the problem significantly. 40
Another type of problem should be added to this list. All govern-
ments adhering to GATT have done so through a standard protocol
143. See OECD, REPORT ON TAX ADJUSTMENTS APPLIED TO EXPORTS AND IMPORTS IN
OECD MEmBER CouNRIES 71-92 (1968); DAM, supra note 13, at 210-21; JAcKSON, supra
note 14, at 294-304.
144. See, e.g., GATT Doc. L/3009 (1968). The difficulty is that while most participants
will admit, some of them grudgedly, that value-added taxes are not fully passed forward
in all circumstances and that direct income taxes are not always fully absorbed by the
taxpayer, there seems to be no prospect at all of being able to measure the deviation
from the 100 per cent assumed by the GATT rules. There would appear to be no justifica-
tion at all for the proposal, commonly advanced by United States business interests, that
border adjustments for the value-added tax be abolished entirely. The problem, to the
extent it exists, is one of much smaller degree. Though the present United States govern-
ment position is unclear, the qualified nature of the problem was certainly recognized In
the earlier United States position-that governments using border tax adjustments should
agree to raise and lower the border taxes as a balance-of-payments adjustment device.
145. See generally Kelly, Nontariff Barriers, in STUDIEs IN TRADE LIBERALIZATION 265-314
(B. Balassa ed. 1967); Wilson, Nontariff Barriers to International Trade. A Survey of
Current Problems, 18 J. PUB. L. 403 (1969). It may be added that the United States has no
monopoly on technical and safety standards. See, e.g., Hearings on Tariff and Trade Pro.
posals, supra note 44, at 564 (Greek auto safety standards).
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which exempts existing mandatory legislation from GATT rules. Thus,
for example, the United States may legally apply countervailing duties
under a pre-1947 law which requires no finding of injury, contrary to
the requirements of GATT Article VI.140 As tariffs and other barriers
have gone down, the impact of such practices has become more visible,
adding to the irritation caused by the problems mentioned above.14 7
The effect of these newly prominent forms of trade restriction has
been to create a sense of imbalance, or non-reciprocity, about the GATT
controls which do exist. Why observe a ban on quantitative restrictions
if other countries will be allowed to achieve the very same effects
"legally" by means of safety requirements, or through the protocol
reservation? The problem is one which will grow worse if nothing is
done, for each violation justified by the present imbalance simply adds
another excuse in succeeding cases.
The GATT has recently compiled a monumental survey of nontariff
barriers as a prelude to further negotiation. 4 The present design is to
explore the various bases on which governments might be able to
negotiate the removal of these barriers, individually or in related
groups. Many of the issues being confronted are more difficult than the
usual trade policy issue; governments will not, for example, accept
international determination of whether Thalidomide is a safe product.
The work so far, however, has given no reason to suppose that satisfac-
tory solutions cannot be achieved given the political will to do so.'"'
(3) Discrimination-The Most-Favored-Nation Rule. In weighing
the possibilities of negotiating a new GATT code, one final aspect of
the GATT consensus assumes a dominant importance. There has been
a serious breakdown of consensus over the pivotal question of dis-
crimination.
The nature of the breakdown is rather complicated, for the original
consensus was much more qualified than is commonly supposed. From
146. 19 U.S.C. § 1803 (1964). On the reach of the mandatory legislation reservation
generally, see JAcnsON, supra note 14, at 108-10.
147. There has been a good deal of pressure lately. for example, to negotiate a code
on Countervailing Duties to parallel the 1967 Antidumping Code. See GATT' Does.
SR.24/13, -14, -19 (1967). The prevalence of Protocol-justified restrictions generally was one
of the reasons often cited in refusing to accede to the New Zealand proposal to regularize
residual restrictions, discussed p. 145 supra.
148. See GATT, 15th Supp. BISD 69 (1967); id. at 16th Supp. 12, 14 (1968).
149. Political will is currently lacking due to the apparent unwillingness of the EEC
to tackle such problems before the United Kingdom merger is completed. Although the
United States has sometimes made more positive noises, there is an indisposition to believe
that the United States Congress is in a mood to grant any substantial authority either,
a situation which is not likely to change until the United States Executive regains its grip
on trade policy generally. Notwithstanding, work labeled "preparator," has been going on
in some intensity, to the apparent satisfaction of the officials involved.
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an economic point of view, discrimination between one foreign country
and another is objectionable because it adds yet another distortion to
international trade,150 a distortion more objectionable than national
tariffs because it increases the complexity of trade barriers and also
makes it more difficult to negotiate their reduction.1 51 The economic
objection itself, however, has never been treated as an absolute. Exist-
ing preferential systems such as the Commonwealth Preference and the
Franc Zone Preference were excepted from the MFN rule at the outset,
subject to the requirement that 1947 margins of preference not be in-
creased.152 The reason advanced for the exception was the need to
avoid sudden dislocation of established economic relationships, al-
though the refusal to promise even a very gradual phasing out of these
arrangements makes it clear that maintenance of existing political ties
was also a major factor, recognized and accepted.153 In addition, dis-
crimination has not been foreclosed as an answer to particularly "diffi-
cult" problems of import competition. The process of dismantling
European balance of payments restrictions began with liberalization
extended first only to Europe, and then more gradually to the rest of
the world. 1 4
The GATT has endeavored to contain these exceptions, however,
to specific transactions limited to a particular setting. The aversion
to open-ended discrimination has been quite strong, for, if govern-
ments had the power to discriminate at will, the entire GATT struc-
ture would be unworkable. It would be altogether impossible to bar-
gain about tariffs, for tariff reductions would have no value if tomorrow
a still lower tariff would be granted to the products of some third
150. Discrimination will not necessarily have this effect, to be sure, if it favors the
most efficient producer, the only producer, or a total nonproducer. Occasionally GATT has
encountered discrimination which is arguably of this kind, imposed for reasons other than
economic favoritism. E.g., the United States-Canada Auto Parts Agreement, supra note 47,
and the United Kingdom Article I waivers, supra note 86.
151. The generally greater hostility toward the economic distortions caused by dis-
crimination may also be due, in part, to a feeling that, while protection of local Industries
is a political necessity incumbent upon all governments, protection of another country's
industries is not.
152. GATT Article 1:2-4.
153. See GARDNER, supra note 8, at 151-53.
154. See KocK, supra note 30, at 115-16, 142-45. Other examples, resting on one or more
of the above reasons, would include GATT Article XXIV:3 on frontier traffic, Article
XXIV:Il allowing India and Pakistan to discriminate in favor of each other after they
had been made separate customs territories in the 1947 partition, and Article XXXV
allowing countries not to enter relations with new GATT members, an exception some-
times used for political reasons (e.g., India v. South Africa) and sometimes for economic
reasons (e.g., much of the world v. Japan). For the best work on GATT theory and prac-
tice, see G. PArr.ERsON, DIscRz~uNAT7oN N INTERNATiONAL TxAE, Tim PoLscy Issugs
1945-1965 (1966).
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country.155 Moreover, the ability to dispense discriminatory trade ad-
vantages would almost certainly open trade policy to manipulation for
political purposes, a process which, once begun by one country, would
draw similar responses from other countries and would eventually pro-
duce a network of self-cancelling distortions immune from conventional
commercial diplomacy.
The GATT rules governing customs unions fit into this-'general
pattern. As Professor Dam and others have shown, customs unions
sometimes result in a net distortion of trade.05 The GATT never-
theless permits customs unions. Although there may have been some
misunderstanding about trade effects, I would argue that the GATT
rule rested mainly on a judgment that whatever trade distortion there
might be was justified by other factors. The countervailing concern
was one of parity. One could object to the trade distortion caused by a
customs union only if one was prepared to accept the status quo prior
to the customs union as a legitimate base from which to measure.
Given the accidents of political boundaries in 1947, however, that
was not possible. It could not be argued, for example, that the dis-
tortion caused by enclosing Europe in a single customs territory was
any worse than the distortions already caused by the existence of a
single customs territory for the United States. One might lament the
new trade distortion, but the fair answer was to demand equal im-
provement in both the old and new together.
The rules of GATT Article XXIV are really concerned with what
happens after the basic demand for larger regional units has been
conceded. Here again the rules represent other than economic con-
siderations. As Professor Dam has shown, the rule requiring total
elimination of internal barriers causes greater trade distortion than
would result if GATT allowed economic union in selected markets
where union would be trade creating.157 The rule represents a judg-
ment, I believe, that such selective union could never be controlled-
that all the political forces surrounding a customs union would unite
to compel selection of exactly the opposite markets, those in which
155. It should be noted that Article I requires MFN treatment only for other contract-
ing parties. Indeed, at one point in the GATT/ITO negotiations the United States,
othenvise the most vocal proponent of IEFN, proposed that nonmembers be excluded from
the benefits of the Agreement. SuGGEsra CHARTr, supra note 27, art. 31.
156. See Dam, supra note 117. For the reasons which follow, I believe that the economic
analysis, though certainly correct, is misleading to the extent it suggests that failure to
achieve net "trade creation" is a defeat for the original design.
157. Id.
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the gain occurred at the expense of outsiders. Further distortion was
accepted as the price of ensuring that the concession to "economic
union" did not become a charter for free-floating discrimination.
Until 1960 or so, there seems to have been agreement that the much-
qualified GATT rules on discrimination still made sense, and that, as
understood, they were being observed reasonably well. There have
been tvo significant changes since then. The first, mentioned earlier,
concerns the agreement by the developed countries to give some form
of tariff preference to developing countries. By itself, this change in
attitude would probably not have precipitated a major change in de-
veloped country policy generally, for, after some hesitation, it has been
agreed that developed countries will grant preferences in a nondis-
criminatory fashion to all developing countries and that they will not
bargain for any reciprocal advantages in return.0 8 Preferences should
take their place, therefore, as another fixed and containable exception
to the general rule.
The tremors created by the development crisis have been over-
shadowed by a second change in policy which, although it has some
overtones of development aid, goes much further. The formation of
the EEC has been accompanied by a proliferation of side agreements
which establish reciprocal preferences between the EEC and most of its
neighbors. Following an initial agreement with former French African
colonies, under the guise of a nascent Article XXIV free trade area, a
number of even less tangible economic unions have been negotiated
with other African countries and with Mediterranean neighbors from
Spain to Israel.159 In addition, it is likely that various forms of "special
158. See note 118 supra. For an excellent account of the struggles leading up to this
position, see Note, Trade Preferences for Developing Countries, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1150
(1968). In the one application of the UNCTAD preferences plan, the EEC generally
followed this principle toward most of the world, but there were significant exceptions.
Several Mediterranean countries were excluded temporarily, most likely for a variety of
reasons stretching from fear of import competition to questions of politics. Cuba and
Taiwan were the other countries excluded for the moment. See 2 CCH Comtmst. MKT. Rei*.
9425 (1971).
159. Tabulations of the EEC's various associations rapidly become obsolete due to the
increasing frequency with which they are negotiated. At this writing, an agreement or
some kind has been negotiated (though not necessarily ratified) with all of the following:
(a) Dependencies of member states




(f) Morocco and Tunisia
(g) Spain
(h) Israel
() the East African Common Market (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania)
() Malta.
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association" will be used to deal with whatever remaining European
countries choose not to enter fall EEC membership, and with various
Commonwealth problems incident to pending British membership10u
The initial impetus behind this wave of discrimination seems to have
been concern for dislocation of existing trade patterns-the need to
accommodate both the franc zone preferences and also certain Medi-
terranean trade patterns affected by the formation of the EEC. Unfor-
tunately, the discriminatory measures taken to deal with some of
these early problems created other dislocations in turn, and soon al-
most every country in the area was claiming some sort of dislocation.""'
From the beginning, however, these arrangements involved a good
deal more than trade dislocation. Almost all the existing arrangements
have been with poorer countries, and thus have lent themselves to
more extended discrimination on grounds of economic development.
Moreover, the EEC has used these arrangements to further its own
"economic development." Reverse preferences for EEC products in-
variably accompany these arrangements, despite the fact that, except in
the case of former colonial preferences, there has been no reverse dislo-
cation for EEC producers. Finally, agreements such as the one recently
concluded with Malta suggest that political and military considerations
may have played more than a small part in shaping the network of
Mediterranean arrangements.0 2 Political considerations of another
kind have been generated by the momentum of earlier arrangements,
as, for example, the Egyptian request after the EEC had made an
agreement with Israel.
Requests being considered include Cyprus. the United Arab Republic, Lebanon, Libya.
Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden. I CCH Commar. MEr. REP. 5342, 5344, 5346; 2 id. at
9349, 9376, 9403 and 9407 (1971). For GATT reviews of some of the earlier arrange-
ments, see GATT, 6th Supp. BISD 89 (1957) (Association of Overseas Countries and
Territories); id. at l1th Supp. 149 (1962) (Greece); id. at 13th Supp. 59 (1965) (Turke));
and id. at 14th Supp. 100 (1966) (Association of African and Malagasy States).
160. See Dale, Principle of Favored Nation Laid to Rest, N.Y. Times, May S0, 1971,
§ F, at 7, col. 5 (city ed.).
161. An example of the initial dislocation 'would have been those producers competing,
say, with Italian agricultural products in the other EEC markets, for whom movement of
Italian producers inside the EEC customs wall created a new competitive disadvantage.
Subsequent dislocations were those such as Nigeria's disadvantage when French African
States producing competitive products were given preferential entry to the non-French
EEC markets. Though the rest of the world also suffered-and was expected to suffer-
from the formation of the EEC, the African and Mediterranean dislocations were argu-
ably more serious because the countries involved were relatively poor and depended on
just a few products for vitally needed export earnings. Article XXIV theory, not having
contemplated any thing quite so large as the EEC, may have rested on inadequate assump-
tions about the problem of adjustment for such countries.
162. According to one commentary, Malta's trade was not in the least affected by the
formation of the EEC, nor wras there any other similar economic justification for the
association. L'association de Malta avec la C.E.E.. 1971 REvUE DU IARCII CoMnnt.N
181 (May, 1971).
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The GATT reaction to all this has been one of increasingly silent
frustration. After a vigorous legal battle over the initial franc zone
agreement, the GATT has had less and less to say about each succeed-
ing agreement, and the agreements themselves have made less and less
pretense of complying. The political factor has probably had a good
deal to do with the silence. Having swallowed the EEC preferences to
former colonies, the United States could hardly do less for its real
friends, such as Turkey, Greece and Nigeria. Although the United
States has recently taken a rather vigorous stand against the discrimina-
tory arrangements on citrus products in some of the newer agreements,
it is by now much too late to attack the general practice itself in indi-
vidual cases, for the situation on both sides has already become a
classic example of the political snarl which develops once discrimination
breaks loose.163
The seeming collapse of the MFN rule is probably the single most
important cause of the present day pessimism about GATT substan-
tive rules. It is also the largest obstacle to renegotiation, for no other
rules could have much impact if the EEC practice were generalized.
Indeed, it would be pointless even to consider renegotiating the GATT
rules until some long-term resolution of this situation can be agreed
upon.
Long-term prospects are a mystery, even, I suspect, to the EEC itself.
Despite talk of a greater European economy, it would appear that the
163. The reports cited in note 159 supra do not accurately reflect the Increasing
formalism and sense of hopelessness with which the legal arguments mentioned therein
are advanced. A much better indication is the fact that GATT criticism has done nothing
to slow the rush to "associate." The association agreements, moreover, have made less
and less effort to comply with GATT Article XXIV; the agreements with Spain and Israel
do not even purport to be part of an Article XXIV arrangement.
The course of the recent argument over citrus preferences illustrates both the existing
momentum and the way it feeds itself. Preferences to Spain and Israel were originally put
forward without the usual free trade area cover, in the form of an EEC request for a
waiver from Article I. The waiver request was withdrawn when a working party examining
the request came out badly divided over its justification. See GATT Doc. L/3281 (1969)
(working party report). The preference then surfaced again as part of association agree-
ments with Spain, Israel, Tunisia and Morocco-each advanced as a nascent free trade area.
Under some pressure from the Congress, the United States attacked these arrangements
as well, claiming that they do not comply with GATT Article XXIV. The claim itself
is hardly surprising; what is significant is that someone is actually pressing it. The United
States has convened Article XXII consultations, see notes 101-03 supra, and has even
mentioned advancing to Article XXIII. Hearings on Citrus Exports Before the Sanate
Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Agricultural Exports, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
117-24 (Mar. 18, 1971). In response, the EEC recently proposed a reduction in the MFN
rate during the peak season for United States exports, the effect being to reduce the
absolute margin of discrimination during that period. The manipulation of the lower
MFN rate to confine its applicabilty to the United States export season is, of course,
another form of discrimination, a nice example of the proposition that the easiest answer
to the trade problems of discrimination is to discriminate some more. As of July, 1971,
the United States was considering whether it would accept the EEC action as a satis-
factory answer.
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EEC's "policy" has really been a series of ad hoc responses to various
pressures. More of the same patchwork discrimination seems to be
in store before the final rounding out of the Community is completed.
It will not be very easy to turn things around after that, although there
is already some indication that the EEC itself may want to try.104 The
first objective must be to stabilize the situation by defining a coherent
long-term policy to replace the present process of uncontrolled action-
reaction. Whether a stabilized policy will meet the problem depends, of
course, on what it is. It is possible that a fixed relationship linking all of
Western Europe, and possibly Southern Europe as well, might be ac-
ceptable to outsiders as a natural consequence of economic gravity,
particularly if the downward trend of external tariffs in the industrial
sector can be made to continue. On the other hand, an EEG policy
which sought to maintain more extensive commercial and political
privileges could well break apart the present GATT system.
C. Balance-of-Payments Exceptions
The substantive policy issues discussed so far have related to the rules
of conventional trade policy which constitute the core of the GATT's
substantive code. All of these rules, however, speak to a situation in
which member governments are in tolerable balance-of-payments equi-
librium. When monetary disequilibrium occurs, the GATT code itself
provides for an overriding exception allowing governments to impose
comprehensive trade controls to reduce imports by the needed amount.
Although the problems of monetary disequilibrium are beyond the
scope of this study, a survey of the prospects for renegotiation requires
a brief description of where these balance-of-payments rules now stand.
The requirements of the GATT rule are rapidly becoming inopera-
tive, but the underlying consensus still seems to be relatively sound. Ar-
164: In May 1970, the Committee on External Relations of the European Parliament
issued a report criticizing the Community's halting development of a common external
commercial policy in general ("timidement et incornpletmenL'), pointing to the flood of
preferential arrangements as one such problem. [1970-71] Eum Pm. Docs., No. 64, at S, 12
(1970). In April 1970, the Commission of the EEC issued a tentative statement of policy
reviewing the many preferential arrangements and concluding with a recommendation
that consideration be given to the possibility of phasing out certain of the tariff prefer-
ences in favor of other devices such as regional commodity agreements and technical-
financial assistance. AcEcE EuaoPz Does., No. 572, April 27, 1970.
Except for the contemplated association agreements with developed countries of Western
Europe such as Switzerland and Austria, it would seem that all of the existing and con-
templated "associates" are countries that would qualify as recipients of the UNCTAD's
generalized preferences, thus offering a possible substitute for the am"ation agreement
preferences of manufacturers and semi-manufacturers. Agricultural commodities, not
covered by the preference scheme, would present a separate problem. Before anything
else, however, the EEC has to agree to give up its own reciprocal preferences. At the
moment, that is the heart of the problem.
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tide XII contains two central provisions: (1) It allows governments to
impose quantitative restrictions (but not tariff surcharges) to control
the volume of trade in times of serious disequilibrium, and (2) it re.
quires that the fact and degree of disequilibrium be certified by means
of a formal determination of the International Monetary Fund. Neither
part of the rule is being applied these days in the case of monetary dis-
equilibrium of the major GATT members. The requirement of formal
IMF certification has fallen because, when a major currency is in
trouble, the last thing the government trying to save that currency
wants is an authoritative declaration that the trouble is really as bad as
speculators and opposition politicians think it is. The requirement that
governments use only quantitative restrictions has fallen primarily be-
cause earlier fears about the difficulty of removing "temporary" sur-
charges have been proved wrong. Consequently, since about 1960,
GATT governments have been using different instruments to achieve
roughly the same objectives. The standard practice is now the sudden
imposition of a surcharge followed by consultations in which the
government's situation, its policy and its progress are reviewed quietly
but intensively. So far, there seems to have been no great difficulty in
reaching agreement on the monetary issues informally, in large part
because the GATT proceedings are paralleled by extensive IMF/
Group-of-ten discussions. Nor, significantly, has there been difficulty in
getting rid of the developed country surcharges once the short-term
problems are corrected. 165
The GATT rules plainly need renegotiation. What they should say
will depend, of course, on what if any changes are made in the world
monetary structure in the interim. Assuming that the world will con.
tinue to live with something like the present system of fixed exchange
rates, present practice should provide a ready starting point on which
to fashion new rules and procedures.
3. The Present Political Environment
The preceding survey of substantive developments should serve to
165. Surcharges have been used by Canada, the United Kingdom and France. See
GATT, lth Supp. BISD 57 (1962); id. at 15th Supp. 113 (1966); id. at 16th Supp. 57, 65
(1968). All have been removed.
A large number of developing countries have turned to surcharges as an alternative to
quotas. In 1965-66 an effort was made to draft an amendment to GATT Article XVIII
that would have authorized this practice, for developing countries alone. Despite agreement
on the general merits of the proposal, the legal drafting group uncovered a number of
unanticipated issues trying to translate the present restrictions and criteria of Articles XII
and XV1II into terms applicable to a money charge. The project was shelved. See GATT,
14th Supp. BISD 129, 141 (1966). For a discussion of the pros and cons of such an amend.
ment generally, see JACKSON, supra note 14, at 711-14.
1364
Vol. 80: 1299, 1971
HeinOnline  -- 80 Yale L.J. 1364 1970-1971
GATT or GABB?
explain the stresses which upset the positive momentum of the first
decade. It is not, however, a satisfactory explanation of the direction
taken since then. The deterioration of an existing set of rules is one
thing; the decision not to rebuild them is another. The latter rests,
I believe, on other factors which have changed the way many govern-
ment officials think about the role of GATT and GATT law in inter-
national trade relations.
The early GATT benefited from several transitory factors which
contributed to the willingness of governments to work within the
framework of GATT's substantive rules. One was a general desire that
the GATT not "fail" in a conspicuous manner. Whatever reservations
the founding governments may have had about GATT's ultimate role
in the world, the GATT and its substantive code were at the time the
sole embodiment of the world's commitment to turn away from the
chaotic trade policies of the 1930's. Failure of the GATT's legal system
at the very outset would have been interpreted by all as a rejection of
that larger commitment. The concern was more than symbolic. With
the 1930s fresh in everyone's mind, there was a good reason to fear that
the alternative to GATT rules would in fact be a return to the destruc-
tive autarky which characterized the earlier period.
Experience has brought greater wisdom, if one may call it that, about
the importance of the GATT legal system to international trade rela-
tions. The blind autarky of the 1930's has not reappeared, for most
developed country governments seem to display a fundamental appreci-
ation of the need for some self-restraint, with or without formal obli-
gations. Although governments are not yet ready to dispense with
codes and coda altogether-indeed, they continue to negotiate new
substantive agreements all the time-they now seem confident that
the world will not fall apart if these agreements fail.
This change in attitudes has undoubtedly been facilitated by changes
in the government personnel dealing with GATT affairs. For the bet-
ter part of the first decade, GATT meetings resembled a reunion of
the GATT/ITO draftsmen themselves. Failure of the code would
have meant a personal failure to many of these officials, and violation
of rules they had helped to write could not help being personally em-
barrassing. The present generation of government officials have come
to GATT with a more open mind.
Another factor which greatly aided the early GATT was the quite
fragmented composition of its membership during this period. Except
for the United States, the other major participants were all relatively
small countries, none wielding very much political or economic influ-
1365
HeinOnline  -- 80 Yale L.J. 1365 1970-1971
The Yale Law Journal
ence when measured against the rest of the membership.100 Countries in
this situation could see a reciprocal advantage in conducting trade
policy through a framework of substantive legal obligations. Among
themselves, a system of legal restraints would produce about the same
results as would the mutually offsetting exertions of ad hoc diplomacy,
Against the United States, legal restraints could only operate to the
smaller partner's advantage. There was, moreover, nothing unseemly
about submitting one's policy to judgment at the hands of other rela-
tively similar countries. The members were more-or-less equals, and
there were no manifest obstacles to objectivity.
The United States obviously did not fit this description, but the very
conspicuous nature of that difference provided an equally good reason
to cooperate. The United States had so much political and economic
power in the early years that some objective restraint on its conduct
(or at least the pretense thereof) was seen as a necessary base for
amicable relations. GATT veterans recall more than one occasion in
which United States actions were accompanied by claims that "We,
too, will honor our obligations."
The growth of the EEC and the bloc of developing countries has
converted GATT into an essentially tri-cornered body, with Japan
rapidly carving out a fourth corner of its own. External relations have
become relations between the larger entities.10 7 Although the develop-
ing country bloc is not conspicuously less law-minded, the pivotal U.S.-
EEC relationship is. The United States no longer needs the pretense of
legal restraints vis-a-vis the EEC, and the EEC, a superpower in its own
right, has less to fear from a more power-oriented diplomacy. Moreover,
both superpowers now seem to find the prospect of outside restraints
from "GATT" a bit incongruous. Part of the reaction is simply the
natural consequence of being a superpower-a point which has been ap.
preciated for many years by a large part of the U.S. Congress. But in ad-
dition, GATT itself no longer appears to be the same objective entity it
166. This statement might be challenged with regard to the United Kingdom's posi.
tion, for the United Kingdom during this period had the appearance, if not the reality,
of a major power. For whatever reason, however, the United Kingdom was one of the
early pillars of GATT law-the only government, to the author's knowledge, ever to Sentl
a Cabinet Minister to Geneva just to demonstrate that it regarded its own delay In cor.
recting a GATT violation as a very serious matter. See GATT Doo. CP.6/SR.7 (1951)
(United Kingdom Purchase Tax, Appendix, Item B-3).
167. The developing countries maintain a formal caucus of their own, served by the
GATT Secretariat and graced with its own document series. Although separate trate
interests are still pursued individually, on larger issues developing country delegates
generally represent the caucus. (The caucus is not the same thing as GATT's Trade and
Development Committee; the latter is the formal working organ on development matters,
attended by both sides.)
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once was. Almost everyone is either an associate, present or prospective,
of one of the superpowers themselves, or else a member of the develop-
ing country bloc which has declared an adversary position toward both
superpowers, and independence from the very code of behavior the
superpowers would want adjudicated.
It is difficult to say how deep-rooted these attitudes are. Drafting
rules is an old GATT tradition, and the superpowers have continued
to practice the tradition despite all the rhetoric to the contrary. The
quite elaborate Antidumping Code of 1967 has been followed by de-
mands for a similar instrument dealing with Countervailing Duties,
and the possibility of other such agreements is currently being held
out as part of the hoped-for nontariff barrier negotiations. The recent
report of the President's Commission on International Trade and In-
vestment Policy is another example, calling for new and more detailed
GATT rules to cover export subsidies and government procurement.10
As for the pragmatist rhetoric itself, it must be remembered that much
of it rests on discontent with the substance of the existing rules, and
that most government officials have not yet been forced to think about
whether they would really do away with rules altogether. While I
would not minimize the appeal of the pragmatist arguments, I be-
lieve that most officials, if confronted squarely with the issue in the
course of a new Review Session, would be open to persuasion.
The political lethargy toward the revitalization of GATT rules has
been aided, I think, by a certain inertia on the part of the GATT
legalists. In contrast to their general appreciation of the need to make
ad hoc compromises, those who defend the GATT legal system have
generally resisted relaxing the GATT rules themselves. The reluc-
tance is understandable. The present GATT, though far from per-
fect, represents a statement of rather high aspirations toward trade
liberalization. A less ambitious GATT would no longer serve that
authenticating function. In addition, there is some fear that a new
GATT at this time would go too far in the other direction, legitimiz-
ing a degree of trade restriction even greater than that presently
tolerated. More will be gained, it is argued, by continuing to invoke the
higher standards, even when they obviously demand more than govern-
ments are prepared to give.
In its way, the legalist attachment to the old rules under these con-
ditions is just as much a decision against the use of a substantive legal
168. See note 4 supra. On the proposals concerning countervailing duties and other
nontariff barriers, see notes 54, 147-49 supra.
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framework as is the pragmatist viewpoint. There is, of course, no way
to prove that these tactics are wrong. Results are the ultimate test of
either approach, and even afterward the result one obtains proves
nothing about what might have been. It is my view, however, that the
results attributable to the existence of the present substantive rules
are becoming so thin that the risk of trying something else is becoming
negligible.
IV. Proposals
The GATT will not be renegotiated unless the present superpower
members are persuaded that a substantive code makes sense as a
vehicle for their commercial diplomacy. In the first instance, persuasion
will depend on whether officials agree with the general view argued in
Part II. Ultimately, however, persuasion will also require the prospect
of meaningful substantive rules and of an institutional structure that
corresponds to the present political environment. This final part con-
siders some of the specific issues that must be confronted in trying to
meet this second condition.
On the question of developed country substantive rules, I have little
to add to the discussion in Part III. I would merely offer two final ob.
servations on the conditions for negotiation. First, there is not much
point in going forward unless the United States, the EEC, and Japan
can agree on the basic outlines of a new code. The logical first step,
therefore, would be discussions such as the United States-United King-
dom consultations which laid the groundwork for the GATT/ITO
negotiations.
Second, governments must be prepared to accept two major limita-
tions of the original substantive design. It should be recognized from
the outset that agricultural trade will not be amenable to the same type
of rules as those developed for industrial trade. While the United
States and others will undoubtedly insist on some benefits to agricul-
tural trade as a "price" for any larger agreement, ad hoc side agree.
ments seem the only possible answer at the moment. Similarly, new
rules on industrial trade will require a retreat from some of the
specifics of the present code, for the present GATT consensus is (and
in many cases always was) a good deal less ambitious than the rules
themselves suggest. A good deal of work remains to be done in rede-
fining that consensus. In particular, more attention needs to be given
to the claims against liberal trade principles. It is too easy, and ulti-
mately not very fruitful, to dismiss all such claims as unthinking mer-
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cantilism. The government officials who respond favorably to these
claims are more often than not relying on a variety of other values,
seldom fully articulated, which persuade them that such claims are
"fair." Even if one may disagree with the values being asserted, or
with the relative weight they are given, one cannot draft rules accommo-
dating them without first having a dear understanding of what they
are.'
The question of rules for the developing countries raises both
substantive and structural issues. Jackson argues throughout his treatise
for a concept of "federalism" with regard to GATT legal obligations' 70
I believe the concept itself would meet little resistance, for such diver-
sity already exists with regard to the de facto status of developing coun-
tries in GATT, not to mention the de jure basis of Poland's member-
ship. 71 The question, however, is whether some other set of rules can
in fact be formulated, rules meaningful enough to warrant participa-
tion in the same legal community.
For some years developing countries have been arguing that com-
mercial reciprocity between rich and poor is guaranteed as things now
stand because the desperate import needs of the poor countries compel
them to spend every cent of export earnings on imports. 72 Poland's
membership in the GATT is based on a concept which is not very
different from this argument, involving as it does a Polish commitment
to a certain percentage increase in GATT country imports in return
for MFN access to GATT markets. The obvious differences in internal
economic structure notwithstanding, comparison of the two situations
might be a fruitful place to start. The start will have to be made by the
developing countries themselves, for the superpowers, far from being
annoyed at developing country independence from the old code, might
well prefer to leave things that way.
The reach and diversity of substantive obligations, in whatever form
they emerge, will have to be reflected in the organizational structure
of the institution that administers them. Ideas have been floated in the
GATT corridors for some years suggesting that the part of GATT
169. For an example of the kind of arguments that have to be understood in these
terms, see notes 140, 141 and 144 supra.
170. JAC sON, supra note 14, at 663-71, 183-85.
171. Poland's GATT membership is based on a Protocol which, although promising
adherence to GATT rules generally, really rests on a multilateral purchase commitment.
Protocol for the Accession of Poland to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
June 30, 1967, 19 US.T. 4331, T.I.A.S. No. 6430.
172. This was one of the main arguments advanced is support of GATT Artide
XXXVI:8, in the new Part IV, providing that developed countries do not expect reciprocity
from developing countries in trade negotiations.
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which still works, the rules governing trade between developed coun-
tries, would be better handled in the OEGD, an organization consist-
ing solely of Europe, Japan, and North America.73 Professor Jackson
recognizes the validity of the OEGD urge, but tries to make room for it
in a different fashion. Jackson would like to see an organization open
to the world at large, but would separate membership from adherence
to the code of legal obligations. The only conditions of membership
would be a pledge to consult on trade controversies and to cooperate
in trade information collection and analysis. The network of legal ob-
ligations would be a separate instrument, open to those who wish to
join.'7 4
Jackson's approach seems preferable for the obvious reasons. The
idea of separating functions, moreover, would seem to be adaptable to
a variety of solutions encompassing more than one code.17 The critical
issue, however, will be the correspondence between obligation and
participation under such a "federal" structure. A similar issue pre-
sented itself during the ITO negotiations, when it became clear that
not all ITO members would participate in the early rounds of tariff
reductions under GATT. The power to determine which countries
would be entitled to the benefit of certain GATT obligations became a
burning issue for much of the negotiations, and was only solved, late in
the day, by a compromise which rested on the assumption that everyone
was going to negotiate sooner or later. 7 Eventual uniformity of obliga-
tion will not be available as an answer this time.
Assuming a new code or codes and an institution which corresponds
to them, the new rules will still not mean a great deal unless the in-
stitution is also capable of rendering judgments about the perfor-
mance of its members under the code. Even though the real force
behind such judgments will be the attitudes of the community as a
whole, there must be an effective institution capable of mobilizing and
legitimizing those attitudes. The present GATT Panel format appears
increasingly unworkable. The supply of neutral countries suitable for
superpower dispute settlement has decreased substantially, and the
idea that individual representatives achieve such neutrality when acting
173. These attitudes antedate by many years the recent United States initiative In
the OECD mentioned earlier, supra note 3.
174. JAcxSoN, supra note 14, at 780-85, 789-93.
175. Jackson himself does not suggest more than one code. The two.column code he
proposes later, see p. 1372, infra, seems to have no "federalist" design to it, unless it i5
that federalism for developing countries means simply adopting fewer of the developed
country rules.
176. ITO Charter, supra note 7, art. 17, par. 4 (b-e). See BROWN, supra note 9, at 74,
157-58.
1370
Vol. 80: 1299, 1971
HeinOnline  -- 80 Yale L.J. 1370 1970-1971
GATT or GABB?
in their "personal capacity" is not sufficiently convincing to outsiders t1
Moreover, superpower sensitivity may well have increasing difficulty
with the very idea of submitting disputes to smaller countries.
Jackson suggests two standing bodies, a Legal Panel and a Commer-
cial Panel, staffed by what look like professional adjudicators and
mediators.17 8 I am dubious. GATT members have never had much
taste for dispute settlement by professional outsiders, fearing, I think,
a lack of understanding about the delicate mechanism that GATT law
is. Assuming that GATT law will remain essentially what it has been,
acceptance of a change along these lines is not too likely.
What is needed, I think, is an attempt to replicate, in a more per-
manent form, the rather remarkable GATT institution that was
called Eric Wyndham-White. A close look at the workings of the
Panel procedure will show that the prestige of the Secretariat has been
the basic ingredient in the acceptance of GATT Panel decisions all
along, mainly the prestige of Wyndham-White himself and of the two
very able Deputies who served during his term.170 The Secretariat's
role was carefully concealed from the outside world for a while, but
legal rulings of a general nature eventually fell to Wyndham-White
himself, 8 0 and toward the end of his tenure ENVW began to serve as
chairman of some Panels. The one U.S.-EEC dispute actually sent to
a Panel-the 1964 Chicken War decision-was essentially submission
to Wyndham-White himself.' 8 '
177. In recent Senate hearings on EEC citrus preferences, the problem of neutrality
received some attention with respect to the Article XXI working party's deadlock.
Hearings, supra note 163, at 118, 123-24.
178. JAcKsoN, supra note 14, at 791-92.
179. In the early years, the Deputy Executive Secretary, Jean Royer, served as the
secretary and staff director of all important dispute-settlement Panels or working parties,
and usually drafted the decision. His successor, Finn Gundelach, did the same. Professor
Dam is in error when he suggests that GATT Panel members have had to rely on their
own national delegations for staff work. DAM, supra note 13, at 375. GATT Secretariat
officials do almost all of the work.
The contribution of the two Deputies to the acceptance of the Panel process rested
primarily on their technical command of the Agreement and on their sll at finding
acceptable solutions for the difficulties which troubled most cases. See generally Hudec,
supra note 33, at 644-59. Wyndham-White, in addition to his direct participation in some
of the later cases and rulings, lent a measure of confidence to the entire process by uirtue
of the assurance his leadership gave that the Secretariat's action would be "sensible."
180. E.g., Questions Relating to Bilateral Agreements, Discrimination and Variable
Taxes, GATT Doc. L/1636 (1961).
181. Appendix, Item A-26. The statement is made with no disrespect for the repre-
sentatives of Switzerland, Sweden, Canada and Australia who sat on the Panel, all four
of whom happended to be among the most distinguished of the GATT permanent repre-
sentatives. Nevertheless, the author recalls that the agreement of the two parties to submit
to a Panel was made solely on the assurance that EWW would chair it, the other members
to be selected afterwards by indication of mutual preference from a list submitted by the
Executive Secretary.
It must be said that the Chicken War case is not as convincing a demonstration of
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The Wyndham-White Secretariat is gone, and the job it did has be-
come a good deal more difficult in this era of increasing superpower
sensitivity. To equip the new leadership to play the same role today,
the GATT will have to pay considerably more attention to the Secre-
tariat than it does now. Details such as regularizing the formal status
of the Secretariat go without saying.18 2 The main requirement is that
the major powers agree to the exercise of these adjudicatory functions
by the Secretariat, and that they do what is necessary to maintain and to
attract Secretariat officials of appropriate stature and experience. The
officials themselves, of course, will have to win the respect needed to do
the job. This time, however, the GATT cannot afford to wait for a dec-
ade while they earn the right to try.
A related issue which also deserves serious thought is the form in
which the substantive rules of a new GATT might be cast. The
traditional concept of legal obligation does not express very well the
sort of diplomat's jurisprudence which GATT law was, and almost cer-
tainly will continue to be. The claims implied by the concept of legal
obligation have made GATT law the target of much misinformed
criticism, and the obvious impossibility of satisfying those claims has
often served as a facile justification for ignoring rules altogether when
they become inconvenient. As will have been evident by now, I am
rather cautiously of the view that GATT rules might do as well or better
in a form which rested more explicitly on their character as "norms"
rather than as legal obligations.
Although I take the concept of "norms" directly from Jackson, I
would propose to use that concept in a manner quite different from the
proposal Jackson makes. 183 Jackson seems to be troubled mainly by the
complexity of the present GATT code and by the difficulty of amend-
ing it due to the stringent voting requirements which reflect govern-
GATT power as it may appear. The dispute over the correct amount of retaliation was
the sort in which neither party is plaintiff or defendant. See note 76 supra. Moreover,
being that is was the eve of the Kennedy Round, both parties were extremely anxious
to find a face-saving way out of the dispute, the substance of which (the actual amount
of retaliation) had little or no real significance.
182. Since the GATT is technically a trade agreement and not an organization, It has
no official place in the United Nations hierarchy. All these years, the housekeeping fun,
tions of the GATT and the status of its Secretariat as international civil servants have
been taken care of by maintaining the fiction that the Interim Commission of the Inter.
national Trade Organization (ICITO) still exists, and that it lends its Secretariat to the
GATT Contracting Parties. It was not too long ago that even the garbage cans at the
Villa Bocage were stenciled "GATT/ICITO." When M. Olivier Long was appointed to
replace EWW, the ICITO governments called the first meeting of the ICITO since
November, 1950, to regularize Long's appointment by making him Executive Secretary
of ICITO. U.N. Doc. ICITO I/6 (1968).
183. JAcasoN, supra note 14, at 784-85.
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mental caution about legal obligation. Jackson proposes, therefore, a
double-column substantive code, a "Mandatory" column containing
those obligations governments deem essential, and a "Norms" column
containing the rules governments would like to see applied to the re-
maining subjects. The Mandatory column, hopefully as short as
possible, would be made legally binding immediately. The Norms
column would be authenticated, but would become legally binding
only when adopted by individual governments as and when they became
ready to do so. Underlying the scheme is the thought that amendment
of mere "norms" would be easier, that the substance of the rules
would be less crippled by compromise, and that "legal obligation"
would be taken much more seriously if it were reserved for rules
meant to be complied with. Jackson warns that the proposal is but a
model for a distant era.
Much as I agree with Jackson's perception of the need to amend
GATT and of the difficulties posed by the notion of "legal obligation"
in this regard, I believe that his proposals move in the wrong direction.
Jackson's focus on legal obligation as the end product passes over the
considerable potential of "norms" as a regulatory device in themselves.
Jackson's "Norms" column is really a lot closer to what GATT law
has in fact been, and was intended to be. Although I share Jackson's
prefeience for moving to a more effective legal structure, I believe
the more limited ambitions of the 1947 design are still the only ones
that can hope to be achieved in the foreseeable future. Consequently,
I think the architects of the new GATT would be better advised to
try to get the old machine running again.
184
I would suggest that GATT rules continue to be the single
column code they have always been, their substance reflecting, as be-
fore, the behavior governments realistically hope to achieve under the
somewhat optimistic forecasts rule-making always seems to induce.
Rather than trying to construct a more potent form of legal obligation,
I would recommend removing their "binding" character altogetherIas
The rules could, instead, be framed as written standards of "nullifica-
tion-and-impairment," a concept which would include (1) the right to
184. Even if one were to accept the basic direction of Jackson's proposal, there would
still be a substantial practical question. Rules on trade policy do not divide very easily
into more important and less important, for one kind of restriction can stop trade just
about as well as another. If, therefore, the difference between "Obligation" and "Norm"
really made a difference to governments, it is very likely that they would insist on treating
all the rules as a single unit.
185. One is led to wonder whether a similar thought might not underlie some of the
apparent inconsistencies in Professor Dam's treatment of Article XXIV, pp. 1332-33 supra.
Substantive "rules" take quite a beating, but "standards" seem to be a different matter.
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ask for a third-party ruling on whether a particular measure conforms
to applicable norms, and (2) the right to treat transgression of a norm
as "nullification and impairment"-that is, the right to secure a polite
Recommendation addressed to the offending party, and the right to
redress the balance of concessions if the transgression itself is not
cured.8 6
I believe this change in form would remove none of the actual force
behind GATT law as it has operated in the past. I can see no difference
at all as far as GATT procedures themselves are concerned, for the
early GATT's disregard for legal form has continued to be a conspicu-
ous feature of present day GATT practice as well.187 Moreover, I
186. For a discussion of the concept of nullification and impairment with regard to
practices not involving a breach of legal obligation, see pp. 1340.42 supra.
I know of only one case in which the GATT has actually promulgated a written
nullification and impairment standard. In 1954, the Contracting Parties decided that
the grant of a domestic production subsidy on a product that had previously been the
subject of a tariff concession could not reasonably be anticipated by the party receiving
the concession. GATT, 3d Supp. BISD 224 (1955).
In theory, there should be no difference under present GATT law between the measure
of compensation retaliation with or without a legal violation. See TANI 33 supra. Since
retaliation is primarily symbolic anyhow, see note 48 supra, there would be no practical
difference either. The possibility of allowing discriminatory retaliation in the case of a
legal violation, e.g., Appendix, Item A-10, would probably not be admitted under the
present theory of nonviolation nullification and impairment. If that Issue were really
considered to be important, I see no reason why a GATT code along the lines I suggest
could not make an exception for discriminatory "compensation" in cases where MFN
action were deemed by the Contracting Parties to be ineffective. But the more likely
answer would be that, given the almost universal tendency to adjust such matters by
either remedial action or positive compensation, the issue is not important enough to
worry about.
Probably the most important technical matter would be the necessary adjustments of
domestic law to assure that the consequences of the GATT's present legal status upon
domestic law would not be lost upon the transition. As a general matter, I believe that
the political conditions necessary to such a renegotiation in the first place would almost
necessarily be sufficient to provide what consequential changes might be necessary, The
exceptional case would be the situation of divided authority, such as in the United
States, where either constitutional authority or prior legislation authorie the executive
to give GATT legal obligations domestic effect without recourse to the legislature. Thus,
for example, United States tariff rates after the Kennedy Round (as well as all earlier
trade agreement negotiations) are in force by virtue of Presidential Proclamations which
rest on legislative authority of semi-permanent character authorizing the President to
proclaim rates necessary and appropriate to carry out trade agreements. 19 U.S.C, P 1801
(1964). Should it be determined that such law requires binding legal obligations, hardly
a foregone conclusion, the proposal I have made would require a minor Congressional
amendment putting such concession rates on a different footing. The risk here is less that
Congress would try to turn back the clock on tariffs than that such legislation would Invite
a disastrous review and rejection of any new agreement as a whole. This is a risk.
187. GATT rights are routinely accorded on a "de facto" basis to new nations which
have not yet determined their policy vis-&-vis GATT. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 97.
Part IV of GATT has been acted upon for several years on the basis of a declaration
of de facto application, expressly nonbinding. GATT, 13th Supp. BISD 10 (1965): see
id. at 16th Supp., 8-9 (1968). Among the developed countries alone, GATT Article XVI:4
was treated as operative for several years before it actually came into force according to
its terms. Indeed, just shortly after the negotiators had agreed on a text and long before
formal ratification was even possible, the Danish government brought a formal complaint
against the United Kingdom based on the new text, explaining that since the new text
represented the position of both governments there was no reason not to use It, Not only
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would argue that the GATT's impact on national decision-making
would be substantially the same. As I have tried to demonstrate in
Part II, the principal function GATT rules serve at present is norma-
tive-whether in persuading certain officials that the GATT viewpoint
is right or in persuading other officials and outsiders that various ac-
tions and decisions on behalf of such standards are at least a legitimate
response. While it may be argued that the words "legal obligation"
make it easier for outsiders to understand the reasons for complying
with GATT norms, I believe the response to something like "agreed
standards of good behavior" would not be significantly different. The
gains, on the other hand, would be significant. In addition to a more
realistic attitude toward amendment, I believe such a change would
also make it more difficult to dismiss GATT "law" as utopian, and
thus, over the long run, would actually focus greater attention--of the
kind that matters-on the rules themselves.
A final word is necessary concerning the kind of rules that ought to
be written. One of Professor Dam's most appealing arguments is his
contention that GATT rules should be framed in terms of the real
trade effects rather than in terms of mechanical criteria. This is the
burden of his argument about GATT Article XXIV, for example-
the preference for a rule requiring net trade "creation" rather than
rules concerned with the level of external tariffs or the degree of in-
ternal liberalization.1 8 The same point is made elesewhere: GATT
Panel decisions, Dam argues, have generally been "superficial" because
they do not develop enough economic information. 180 The GATT rules
relating to retaliation do not focus on the real trade effects of the
measure in question. 90 The Border Taxes issue should be settled by
a rule which requires no trade diversion.1'0
One cannot quarrel with Professor Dam's general disposition to re-
examine the economic foundations of GATT rules, nor his insistence
that officials understand the economic impact of the standards they
employ. As to writing the GATT rules themselves in terms of these
criteria, however, I would merely repeat the warning made in Part II
did the United Kingdom accept the proposition, but a Panel was actually appointed to
adjudicate the dispute. See Appendix, Item B-28. On the history of Article XVI:4 generally,
see JACKSON, supra note 14, at 571-76.
For a discussion of the early GATT's attitude touard legal obligations per se, see
pp. 1340-42 supra.
188. See p. 1533 supra.
189. DAm, supra note 13, at 574-75.
190. Id. at 874. See also id. at 58-60. For a specific criticism of this view, see note 69
supra.
191. DAm, supra note 13, at 217-21.
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about the difficulties of undertaking detailed economic analysis in
particular controversies. I would also urge that a careful examination
be made of the prior GATT experience in this regard. In one of its first
legal controversies, the GATT confronted a proposal that trade dam-
age must be found before declaring any measure in violation of the
Agreement. The argument was rejected then, '12 and that decision has
been reaffirmed on at least two subsequent occasions. 103 Although the
192. 2 GATT, BISD 181, 184 (1949) (Brazilian Internal Taxes, Appendix, Item A.7).
193. The two early cases involving this issue are perhaps doubly significant, because
both involved nonviolation nullification and impairment. In both cases, the defendants
argued strenuously that there was no trade damage, and that consequently, especially In
the absence of a legal violation, nullification would not lie. Even here, however, the Con-
tracting Parties rejected the arguments, finding nullification on the basis of the practice
and its likely effects.
The first was the Australian Subsidy case, Appendix, Item A-8. Australia raised the
trade damage defense in the initial plenary discussion of the case, several other contract-
ing parties concurred as to the importance of the issue, and Australia eventually agreed
to submit the case to a working party on the understanding that trade damage would be
considered. GATT Doc. CP.4ISR.15 (1950). The first draft of the working party report
shows that the working party wrestled with the issue and could come to no conclusion,
GATT Doc. CP.4/G/2 (1950). The final text of the report was redrafted, quite artfully,
to avoid the issue by finding that there was nullification in any event and that the trade
damage issue was not relevant in the absence of a request for authority to retaliate,
2 GATT, BISD 188, 193-94 (1950). This fact was noted by one delegation when the
Contracting Parties reviewed the report, but despite that party's objection (Australia Itself
remained silent), the decision was approved. GATT Doc. CP.4/SR.21 (1950).
The issue was reproduced almost exactly in the Sardines case, Appendix, Item A-11,
but this time the Panel expressly concluded that an actual finding of trade damage was
not necessary to a finding of nullification. GATT, 1st Supp. BISD 53, 56 (1952).
The third case, somewhat more confusing, was the 1962 proceeding brought by Uruguay
against fifteen developed countries, Appendix, Item A-24. Many of the defendants offered
proof of no trade damage as to many restrictions. Uruguay submitted no evidence of trade
damage at all. The Panel treated all legal violations as having been established, without
even mentioning the trade damage issue. On the other hand, it limited itself to comments
on the literally hundreds of other restrictions involved, stating it could not consider
nullification without some more specific indication from Uruguay as to the nature of
the nullification-a request which Uruguay, preferring to argue only the grand sweep
of all the restrictions together, chose not to meet.
Generally speaking, GATT tribunals have not had much success with the trade damage
issue. The very first GATT Panel found itself stymied over such a question. Appendix,
Item A-4. The first two nullification and impairment cases cited above had no greater
success. Most GATT Panels in the past have established what facts were necessary by
negotiation, sometimes screening factual concessions by one party by pretending to have
made the decision themselves.
Neither of the cases in which GATT has reviewed retaliatory measures prove very much.
The decision reviewing the Netherland's retaliation against United States dairy product
restrictions, Appendix, Item A-10, appeared to make its own judgment on a figure some-
where between the initial demands of both parties, but in fact the figure was one
worked out privately between the parties. The Panel decision in the United States-.EEC
Chicken War dispute, id. at Item A-26, produced a genuine ruling, by the Panel. But two
factors have to be noted: (I) both the United States and the EEC were seeking a way out
of an impasse neither wanted, see note 181 supra; and (2) the dispute involved the
almost academic question of the amount of trade that would have occurred during a
specific one year period over two years in the past, making it possible to assemble at
least superficially plausible data from comparable markets in support of the decision.
To be fair, however, mention should be made of the two special panel decisions rendered
under the United Kingdom Article I waivers, note 86 supra. The terms of the waiver
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"trade damage" standard has been revived in a number of present-day
controversies, particularly in defense of the EEC's many "association"
agreements, I have yet to hear any of the participants claiming that
the rebirth of this standard has contributed to the GATT's regulatory
effectiveness. Indeed, the overwhelming sentiment seems to be exactly
to the contrary.
V. Conclusion
Strictly speaking, the current choice is not GATT or GABB. The
present world of international trade policy is quite different than the
world which existed in 1947. In some areas, the conditions which per-
mitted successful implementation of the original GATT design may
have disappeared entirely. In many other areas, conditions are at best
uncertain. It is quite possible, therefore, that GABB may turn out to be
the only realistic answer in many parts of GATT's original domain. Be-
fore any such choice is made, however, it is critically important that the
real choice be understood.
I have argued that despite its many current failings the GATT's basic
legal design is sound and is worth trying to save wherever conditions
permit. I have also tried to make clear, however, that preservation of
that design will require a fairly bold initiative, for both the substance
of the existing rules and the legal framework for applying them urgently
need to be brought up to date. On balance, I believe the existing con-
sensus on international trade policy is sufficient to make that effort
worthwhile.
The current crisis over United States trade and monetary policy
presents an obvious threat to GATT reform-but it also presents a
significant opportunity. The threat, of course, is that the crisis will get
out of hand and will rupture the very fabric of international coopera-
tion on which both GATT and GABB depend. But this same crisis
could also furnish the sort of shock that is needed to open the door to
consideration of the major structural changes GATT requires. Govern-
ments are certainly aware of the threat. One hopes they will also recog-
nize the opportunity.
required a decision as to whether an increase in the margin of discrimination under the
Commonwealth Preference would divert trade. Both decisions made the necessary rulings,
Appendix, Items A-21, A-26. Despite an express reservation by the losing part), in the
first case, GAT Doc. L./1059 (1959), it must be said that both decisions did succeed in
applying the test.
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APPENDIX
THE GATT COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE 1948-1970
This Appendix presents a compilation of cases handled by the GATT
complaints procedure up to January 1, 1970. I have selected for inclu-
sion only those controversies which have been framed in the manner
of an Article XXIII:2 lawsuit-that is, a proceeding (1) initiated by
one or more GATT members, (2) based on a claim that practices of
another member or members affect GATT legal rights, and (3) looking
toward an eventual "decision" of some sort by GATT in vindication
of those rights. These criteria exclude several typical kinds of GATT
legal controversy: first, the more or less automatic legal review pro-
cedures under GATT Articles XII, XVIII, and XXIV; second, proceed-
ings in which a government volunteers to undertake the normal review
and consultation procedure;a and finally, requests for legal rulings of a
general nature which, although usually aimed at some specific practice,
confess by their indirection a reluctance to press the issue to a con-
clusion.b
I have divided the cases into two categories. Part A lists those cases
in which the GATT or a GATT tribunal either (1) ruled on the
merits of a dispute,c or (2) fashioned a settlement acceptable to the
(a) See, e.g., the consultations cited in appendix note (d), infra.
(b) See, e.g., the United States request for clarification regarding the application of
GATT Art. IV to trade in television programs, L/1615 (1961).
(c) In theory, the only entity capable of rendering legal rulings is the CONTRACTING
PARTIES, the plenary assembly of all GATT members. See DAM, supra note 13, at
364-66. In practice, decisions by GATT Panels and working parties have come to be
treated as authoritative in themselves, and formal adoption by the CONTRACTING
PARTIES has become a formality. In Part A I have chosen to indicate the actual
decision-making body. With the exception of Items 17 and 20, where there was a real
dispute, Items 21, 25, and 26, which were special proceedings not requiring ratification,
and Item 2, where the de facto ratification was never formalized, all the decisions listed
were ratified by the CONTRACTING PARTIES.
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parties in the context of a formal report analyzing (and often resolving)
some or all of the legal issues in dispute. Part B lists those "complaints"
which appeared to be the first step toward an A-type decision, but which
were settled or otherwise disposed of. Variations in GATT practice
have required the exercise of some discretion in order to present an
accurate list of the Part B cases. Thus, I have included several early
cases (export subsidies before 1955) which were treated like other com-
plaints even though they did not involve legal rights. I have also in-
cluded several post-1962 controversies which fit the "complaints" model
in every respect except that since 1962 GATT practice has virtually
excluded the possibility of pressing any of these complaints to a formal
ruling on the merits. Conversely, I have excluded a few post-1960
consultations which, although sometimes classified as "conciliation" in
the BISD indexes, were really more in the nature of a broad Article
XII review.d
Unless otherwise indicated, all citations below are to GATT docu-
ments or publications. Notations marked with an asterisk are based on
the author's personal knowledge, the relevant documents not being
available at this time.
(d) GATT terminology has bounced back and forth between "complaints" and "con-
ciliation" as a description for the settlement-of-disputes process, coming to rest on the
latter term in recent years. Both the relative softness of the latter term and the absence
of any more rigorous complaints procedure has led GATT indexers to include some
rather broad and fuzzy consultations within that term. Thus the consultations over the
United Kingdom Surcharge, see 15th Supp. BISD 113 (196, were so classified, id., at iv,
but then were later omitted from a more comprehensive index, see 16th Supp. BISD 131.
Virtually identical consultations over Canadian Surcharges and emergency French Trade
Measures were not, however, classified as "conciliation." See l1th Supp. BISD, at 6, 57
(1962); 16th Supp. BISD, at v, 57, 65 (1968).
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